pragmatic—degenerated into a mask for individual, factional,nand sectional acquisition. It was not and could not be an authenticnnationalism that controlled and disciplined the partsnwithin the whole but only a pseudo-nationalism that allowednthe parts to seize control of the whole and define the whole innterms of the parts and their interests. As another of Hamilton’snbiographers, John C. Miller, writes, the failure of Hamilton’snnationalism probably “stemmed from the fact that he associatednthe national government with no great moral issue capablenof capturing the popular imagination; he seemed to stand onlynfor ‘the natural right of the great fishes to eat up the little onesnwhenever they can catch them.'”nAmerican nationalism after Hamilton, especially throughnAbraham Lincoln, sought to rectify this flaw by defining thenideal of national unity in terms of (more accurately, maskingnit with) a “great moral issue.” Manifest Destiny was onensuch issue, and it quickly became a mask for territorial expansion,nsurviving in Wilsonian internationalism, the messianicnanticommunism of Cold War liberalism, and the globalndemocratism and “New World Order” of the post-ColdnWar neoconservatives. Equality was another such issue, and itntoo served as a mask for acquisitive individualism. HarrynJaffa is in a sense correct that the “principle of Equality” asnhe perceives it in the Declaration of Independence and in Lincoln’snthought “is the ground for the recognition of thosenhuman differences which arise naturally, but in civil societynwhen human industry and acquisitiveness are emancipated,”nthough he is wrong in claiming that equality is “far from enfranchisingnany leveling action of government.” The very processnby which human acquisitiveness is “emancipated” involvesnthe obliteration by the state of social barriers tonacquisitiveness, and so it did in the attack on property andnfederalism that Lincoln unleashed in the Civil War. Hence,nM.E. Bradford is also (and more importantly) correct whennhe writes that the depredations and corruptions of the GildednAge, the “era of the Great Barbecue,” the original “vulture capitalism,”n”began either under [Lincoln’s] direction or with hisnsponsorship” and that Lincoln’s administration laid “the cornerstonenof this great alteration in the posture of the Federalngovernment toward the sponsorship of business.” It was indeednthe cornerstone of the modem corporate state on which the twinntowers of managerial capitalism and managerial governmentnare grounded. The “great moral issues” that the old nationalismneventually selected, therefore, were little more than fantasticnand easily penetrated costumes in which even older human passionsnof greed and lust for power sallied forth to their orgy.nPrecisely because the old nationalism assumed an adversarialnrelationship toward the norms and institutions to which mostnAmericans adhered, it could locate few forces in American societynwith which it could join, and it therefore came to rely almostnentirely on a centralized state as the only “nationalizing”ninstrument available for its mission. Hence, the old nationalismnwas intimately bound up with abstraction, alienation,nthe serving of special rather than authentically national interests,nand the consolidation of state power against its own society.nWhat a new, Middle-American nationalism must seek isna redefinition of nationalism away from the terms of thenold. Since a Middle-American nationalism bases itself on thenactual interests and norms of a concrete social group, it will notndisplay the same adversarial alienation that affected the pseudo-nationalismnit seeks to replace, nor will it need to rely on thenpower of the national state to the same degree or in the samenway. Nevertheless, the mission of the new nationalism must bennot merely the winning of formal political power throughnelections and roll-call votes but also the acquisition of substantivensocial power and the displacement of the incumbent managerialnelite of the regime by its own elite drawn from and representingnthe Middle-American social stratum. No social group becomesnan elite unless it makes use of the instmments of force that arenat the heart of the state, and hence, a Middle-American nationalismncannot expect to achieve its goals unless it employsnthe state to reward its own sociopolitical base and exclude itsnrivals from access to rewards. A Middle-American nationalismnmust expect to redefine legal rules, political procedures, fiscalnand budgetary mechanisms, and national policy generally in theninterests of Middle Americans, and it must do so with no illusionsnabout rejecting, decentralizing, or dismantling the national statenor the power it affords. Middle-American interests are dependentnon the national state through various educational, fiscal,ntrade, and economic instruments, and a Middle-Americannnationalism ought to announce an explicit agenda of consolidatingnand enhancing these instruments. At the same time, annew nationalism must recognize that many of the organs of thennational state exist only to serve the interests of the incumbentnelite and its underclass allies—the arts and humanities endowments,nand most or all of the Departments of Education,nLabor, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, andnHealth and Human Services, and the civil rights enforcementnagencies in various departments—and it should seek theirnoutright abolition, as well as that of those agencies and departmentsnin the national security bureaucracy that serve globalistnand anti-nationalist agendas.nThe mission of the new nationalism mustnbe not merely the winning of formalnpolitical power through elections and roll-callnvotes but also the acquisition of substantivensocial power and the displacement of thenincumbent managerial elite of the regime bynits own elite drawn from and representing thenMiddle-American social stratum.nBut power based merely on the state is insufficient for thenreconstitution of American society under Middle-American dominance.nState power indeed, though a prerequisite for the emergencenof a new elite, is by itself a weak support, and it must bensupplemented by cultural dominance. Under the incumbentnelite and its regime, characteristic Middle-American norms ofnsacrifice for and solidarity with family, community, ethnicity,nnation, religion, and morals, and their rules of taste and propriety,nare under continuous attack, subversion, and delegitimizationnby the cultural and intellectual vanguards of the elite.nIn place of such norms, the elite offers an ethic of hedonism,nimmediate gratification, and cosmopolitan or universalist dispersionnof concrete identities and loyalties, an ethic that servesnthe interests of the incumbent elite by encouraging a passivennnJUNE 1992/21n