tablishment is intact. Not one alliance has been dismantled;rnnot one commitment has been eliminated. On the contrary,rnthe U.S. government has increased gnarantees and deploymentsrnalmost exponentially: American planes bomb Iraqrnaronnd the clock; troops are deployed in Bosnia, East Timor,rnMacedonia, and Kosovo; Azerbaijan is angling for a U.S. base;rnUzbekistan wants militar)’ relations with N A T O ; and even longtimernenemy North Korea is suggesting that the United Statesrntransform its troop presence into a nentral peacekeeping mission.rnThis globalist campaign to contain nothing is expensive, costingrnnearly $300 billion annnally. Militar)’ spending is the pricernof an aggressive foreign policy: The more there is to do, thernmore forces and weapons arc needed, hi inflation-adjustedrnterms, Washington is spending as much on the military today asrnit did in 1980—during the Cold War. Outlays remain as highrnas in 1975, when we were coming out of the Vietnam War, andrneven 1965, when we were going into Vietnam. Today, Americarnaccounts for about one-third of the world’s military outlays —rna far higher share than during the Cold War. America spendsrnmore than three times as much as Russia, eight times as muchrnas China, and twice as much as Britain, France, Germany, andrnJapan combined. U.S. “defense” spending equals that of thernnext ten countries, and is 17 times as much as the niilitarv’ expendituresrnof the “rogue nations” (Iraq, North Korea, et ai).rnThe United States suffers an economic disadvantage as well:rnAmerica devotes roughly four percent of its CDP to the military,rntwice as much as Germany and four times as much asrnJapan. The result is a de facto subsidy to leading trade competitors,rnwhich means that U.S. taxpayers and businesses support research,rndevelopment, and inveshncnt in other nations.rnIntervention is also risky. Although the potential consequencesrnof war have dramatically diminished since the demisernof the Soviet Union, very real dangers remain. The Kosovo warrnresidted in confrontation with both China and Russia andrnstrengthened India’s commitment to an independent nuclearrndeterrent. The Korean peninsula coidd still erupt in war.rnWashington’s implicit security guarantee to I’aiwan could leadrnto conflict with China. Attacks on small countries like Yugoslaviarnwill grow more dangerous as biological, chemical, andrnnuclear weapons spread. Unfortunately, wars rarely turn out asrnexpected.rnIt is one thing to accept these risks as the price of protectingrnAmerican security; it is quite another when the risks are runrnto advance the interests of other countries. Yet the three mostrnobvious situations in which America could be drawn into a majorrnwar today—Iraq versus Kuwait/Saudi Arabia, China versusrnTaiwan, and North Korea versus South Korea —all involverntiireats to U.S. allies radicr than to the United States.rnThe price of intervention is also paid in human lives. America’srnBalkan war was unique in its lack of U.S. battle casualties.rnHowever, America’s overwhelming military preponderance isrnlikely to prove transitory as other nations close the gap. Indeed,rnshoidd the Kosovo occupation degenerate into a desultory civilrnwar, Americans will see body bags coming back fronr overseas.rnIt is all too easy to be humanitarian with otiicr people’s lives.rnThe lives may not l)e only tirose of members of the ArmedrnP’orccs. Terrorism today is largely a response to U.S. interventionrnabroad. The World Trade Center was bombed because ofrnWashington’s policies in tire Middle East. Terrorism is a meansrnby which relatively powerless groups or nations can strike thernglobe’s only superpower.rnAs we move further into the post-Cold War world, the UnitedrnStates could develop a new, expansive, interventionist foreignrnpolicy that justifies maintaining a Cold War military; orrnAmerica could adopt a restrained foreign policy and cut militar)’rncommitments, deployments, and spending accordingly.rnSome advocates of the first course see new enemies everywhere.rnNATO expansion is obviously directed against Russia.rnWliile the rise of nationalism (spurred, alas, by the West’s ownrnactions, particularly NATO expansion and the war on Serbia) isrnworrisome, tiie Moscow Humpt)’ Dumpty has fallen off of tirernwall and cannot be put back together again. Russia is onlyrnabout two-thirds tiie size of the old Soviet Union, its economyrnhas imploded, and its armed forces have deteriorated dramatically.rnThe British, French, and Germans today spend more onrnthe military than does Russia. Moreover, if tiiose most at risk,rntiie Fuiropeans, feared a revived Russia, tiicy would not havernbeen cutting military spending. Washington’s proper responsernis watchful wariness. There is no need to preserve a militar)’ createdrnto defeat the Soviet Union in order to deter an anemic Russia.rnChina is also an unlikely enemy. The nation with thernworld’s largest population may eventually enjoy the world’srnlargest economy; it will eventually become more influential inrnother dimensions, including the militar)’. China may ver)’ wellrnbecome the most dominant nation in East Asia. But Chinesernpreeminence in Asia does not necessarily threaten the securityrnof America. Conflict is likely only if the United States attemptsrnto maintain its hegemony ever)’where, including along China’srnborders.rnIt is difficult to imagine any otiier likely U.S. enemies. Germanyrnand Japan have neitiier the ability nor the incentive tornthreaten America. Brazil, Indonesia, and India are importantrncountries with significant long-term potential, but whateverrnflireats they could conceivably pose in the future do not requirernmilitary confrontation today. Nor do flieir interests seem likelyrnto clash catastrophically with tiiose of the United States.rnMost of the arguments, then, for a leading military role todayrninvolve having the United States play something akin to globocop,rnacting as the world’s 911 dispatcher. That has certainlyrnbeen tiie case during the Bush-Clinton era: Among military actionsrnin Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Kuwait, Panama, and Somalia,rnonly flic war against Iraq offered even the pretext of the nationalrninterest being at stake. The rest were attempts to impose arnnew domestic political regime or international settlement onrndisorderly or failed states.rnThe result has not been pretty. Somalia remains dividedrnamong warring clans. The United States managed to movernHaiti from a militar)’ to a presidential dictatorship. In Bosnia,rnWestern occupation, not popular consent, holds together threernhostile parties in an artificial state. Panama’s government mayrnhe less hostile, but appears to be no less corrupt. In Kosovo, thernkilling continues, only now by ethnic Albanians.rnAnother argument for intervention is that flic United Statesrnhas to demonstrate “leadership.” Former Speaker of the HousernNewt Gingrich once acknowledged that America could cut itsrndefense budget in half if it did not have to “lead” the world. ButrnAmerican leadership, given this nation’s economic and culturalrninfluence, is inevitable. There is no reason why “leadership”rnmust be predominantiy military. Indeed, real leadership requiresrnthe use of discretion in deciding when and how to act,rnrather flian intcr’ening everywhere on behalf of everyone.rn14/CHRONICLESrnrnrn