cal experience we have refers primarily tonconsciousness of the other as a genuinenother, not as a mere “mental construct.”nWhat may seem a purely theoreticalnconcern actually has political implicationsnfor the contemporary world. Modernnpolitics—Voegelin calls it “Gnostic”npolitics—depends on precisely the sort ofnepistemology that splits “subject” andn”object” so that one can conquer thenother. In the modern West, all “values”nare believed to be “subjective,” in spitenof traditional claims for ethical principlesnrooted in human nature. In the modernnEast, Lenin teaches (in Materialism andnEmpirio-Criticism) that the “objective”nmaterial world colonizes the “subjective”nconsciousness. Stalin, Mao, and PolnPot carried this “objectivist” conquest ofnthe other to its insane extreme.nBy insisting on consciousness of thenother as a given, as irreducible to “subjectivity”nor “objectivity,” Voegelinnwould cure modernity’s radical mentalnimbalance, restoring the balance betweennmatter and form, process andnstructure. This balance restores the sensenof divine hierarchy, one that is dynamicnrather than static. A difficulty arises herenbecause form, process, and structure, innVoegelin’s arrangement, are not material,nwhereas matter obviously is. He suggestsnthat matter “issues” from thendivine, and admits the mystery of that.nMystery allows him to meld reason andnfaith, Athens andjemsalem. Accordingnto Sandoz: “Faith in the reason of thenWhole is… the foundation of all philosophizing.n”nIn Anamnesis (which means “not-forgetting”),nVoegelin remembers that hisnfavorite childhood schoolbook was callednThe Book of Realities: “The realities ofnnamre that were to be found in this booknI do not remember; but history is stillnfirmly retained.” Voegelin’s not-forgettingnof history (which, as he conceives it,nis not a succession of external events butn”the unfolding of the typical in meaningfulnconcreteness,” an aspect of thenmetaxy) and his forgetting of materialnnature (relegated to the status of then’^9’nChronicles of Cttlturenmysterious basis, but not the form, process,nor structure, of life) allow him to donto the “Gnostics” what the “Gnostics”ntry to do to him: silent questioning. Silencencan be discreet or cmde. “Gnostic”nsilence, which usually results in totalitarianismnor libertinism, deserves classificationnas a crude silence. Voegelin’s silence,nconceived in resistance to “Gnosticism,n” deserves the esteem we feel for refinement.nWhereas crudeness teaches usnonly about itself, refinement can teach usnOn Korea, Right & WrongnJoseph Goulden: Korea: The UntoldnStory of the War; Times Books; NewnYork.nRobert Smith: Mac Arthur in Korea: ThenNaked Emperor: Simon & Schuster;nNew York.nby Alan J. Levinen^osephGoulden’snewbookisnotthenwhole untold story of the Korean War,nbut his informative work exposes a goodndeal that was previously hidden, even if itndoes not fundamentally change our perspectivesnon the war. Despite some faultsnand questionable interpretations, this isnan excellent book, clearly written andnsometimes moving—if sometimes irritating.nGoulden’s narrative alternatesnbetween discussions of strategy andnpolicy-making at the highest levels andnon-the-spot descriptions of criticalnground engagements. The portions dealingnwith actual fighting are well written,nbut they seem to be derived largely fromnthe works of S. L. A. Marshall, T. R.nFehrenbach and Andrew Geer. The realnvalue of Korea lies in its revelations ofnupper-echelon machinations and itsntreatment of the peace talks. Thesenrevelations are not always flattering tonthe Tmman administration and even lessnDr. Levine is a historian in New YorknCity.nnnabout itself and about matters beyond it.nThe education Voegelin offers excelsnmodern education even when it ends innthe silence of unresolved paradox.nJcriedmann and Sandoz gladly learnnfrom their teachers, and gladly theynteach us their learning. If modern educationninvites the students’ resentment ofnthose who provoke fear, envy, or temptation,nthe teaching of Buber and Voegelinninvites gratitude. Dnso to General MacArthur.nGoulden is not, to put it mildly, annadmirer of MacArthur—although he isnsurprisingly sympathetic to SyngmannRhee. The book sometimes seems to benmore about MacArthur’s foibles thannabout the Korean War. Some of thenspace devoted to MacArthur’s quirksnmight have been better spent on descriptionsnof the air and naval war, bothnof which Goulden neglects. (The airncampaign in Korea was far more importantnthan is generally realized.) In short,nGoulden is successfiil in cutting MacArthurndown to size. Basing his argumentsnon the statements of Thomas JeffersonnDavis, MacArthur’s aide in the 1930’s,nGoulden suggests that “The implicationsnof the Davis material . . . [were]nthat MacArthur was much too unstable anman to be entrusted with a delicatenmilitary-political command.” Some ofnMacArthur’s behavior was indeednbizarre (though it should be noted thatnDavis saw him at a low point in his life),nbut MacArthur’s supposed threats ofnsuicide—he reportedly forced Davis tontalk him out of it—may explain why hisnfellow officers referred to MacArthur asn”Sarah Bernhardt.” Douglas MacArthurnwas not a shining example of mentalnhealth, but he did command successfullynfrom 1941 to 1950. The Korean Warnwas not one of the more glorious episodesnin his career, although evennGoulden praises his execution of the In-n