to conservative political theory to formulatena conflict-based (or, in JuliennFreund’s term, a “polemological”)nmodel of political society, in distinctionnto the consensus-based model that hasnbeen a staple of conservative thoughtnsince Aristotle. Probably the only othernmajor conservative thinker of this centurynwho has advanced a conflict modelnwas the late James Burnham, whondrew it mainly from Machiavelli andnhis descendants such as Vilfredo Pareto,nand both Burnham and Pareto arenalso icons of the European New Right.nSchmitt, however, drew his conflictntheory principally from ThomasnHobbes. He defined the “political” innterms of the “friend-enemy” distinction,nstating that any relationship thatninvolves an antagonism between “us”nand “them” is by its nature political.nThe chief problem for Schmitt, as itnwas with Hobbes, is the settlement ofnthe antagonisms within and amongnpolitical societies, which are artificialnconstructs subject to human will rathernthan the natural organisms that classicalnand medieval thought conceived.nSchmitt argued that that problem isnintensely aggravated by liberal regimesnsuch as Weimar that refuse to abjure ancommitment to “pluralism” and enforcenorder and in which sub-stateninterest groups contend for power.nUsing the discourse of “rights,” suchngroups disguise their quest for powernwhile in fact extending it throughoutncivil society and thereby paralyzing thenstate at the same time they “totalize”nthe scope of politics. Democracy, innSchmitt’s view, “aims at the total politicizationnof all of human existence,”nand he was one of the first to distinguishnbetween authoritarian and totalitariannstates and to defend the formernon the grounds that they limited rathernthan expanded the domain of the political.nSimilariy, Schmitt saw the sovereignnnational state as in decline, in partnbecause of the rise of the “total state,”nwhich abandons traditional limits onnnational conflict; in part because of thentechnological integration of states; andnin part because of the emergence of annintellectual class, itself a sub-state interestngroup, that seeks to capture powernand impose its own universalist valuesnon domestic as well as foreign states.nThe extreme case of such intellectualsncontesting for power is the terrorist andn32/CHRONICLESnthe partisan, but, as Mr. Gottfriednargues, there is only a diflFerence ofndegree between these and such universalizingnintellectuals as civil rights activistsnand global democratists who demandnthat all states conform to theirnprivate goals, but do so by appealing tonthe universalist premises shared by thenliberal state.nMr. Gottfried’s exposition, defense,nand criticism of Schmitt’s ideas is probablynthe best account of this malignednbut significant thinker, though at timesnhe tends to dwell more on what otherncommentators have had to say aboutnSchmitt than on Schmitt himself.nNevertheless, in a brilliant concludingnchapter, Mr. Gottfried argues for thencontinuing relevance of Schmitt’s ideasnto contemporary derailments of thenpublic order by the left and its neoconservativenand Straussian sparring partners.nMr. Sunic is also an admirer ofnSchmitt, and he devotes a shortnchapter to him as well as to Pareto andnSpengler as intellectual ancestors of thenEuropean New Right. Mr. Sunic’snbook is the first English-language studynof this movement, and its main failing,naside from the author’s evident discomfortnwith English, is its brevity. Then”European New Right” refers to anmultinational constellation of critics ofndemocracy, capitalism, communism,nand Ghristianity, and is perhaps bestnknown in the United States for itsn”paganism” and alleged racism. So variousnand complex are the writers andnthinkers of this movement that theynmerit a far larger treatment than Mr.nSunic has attempted.nYet he has managed to pack in a goodndeal of information and to discovernseveral important common themesnamong the writers he surveys. He acknowledgesnthat the term “right” asncommonly used does not always applynto them, but since they are offeringndefenses of what they take to be thenparticularism of Europe and its specificncultures and launch effective critiques ofnequality, universalism, and other abstractionsnaffiliated with the left, there isnno problem in placing them on thenright, despite their debt to Marxists likenAntonio Gramsci and their radicalnalienation from contemporary political,neconomic, and cultural institutions.nBy far the most intriguing part of Mr.nnnSunic’s book is his account of the NewnRight’s critique of equality, “economism,”nand Judeo-Ghristianity, which,nrather than the secularism of the Enlightenment,nit sees as the root of egalitarianismnand universalism. “For thenNew Right,” writes Mr. Sunic, “thenchief axiom of liberalism and socialismnis the dogma consisting of human rightsnand the unity of mankind — a dogmaninherited from the Judeo-Christian eschatologynand subsequentiy transposednin a secular form into the modernnworid.” Biblical passages such as Galatiansn3:28 — “There is neither Jew nornGreek; there is neither bond nor free;nthere is neither male nor female; for yenare all one in Christ Jesus” — as well asna number of studies he cites of thenHebraic origins of egalitarianism wouldnseem to support the New Right’s interpretation.nBut orthodox Ghristians andnJews would argue that such passagesnwere intended to refer to transcendentnrealms and not as political blueprints. Innthe case of Paul’s letter to the Galatians,nthe purpose was to justify Christiannevangelism to the Gentiles — not tondeny significant cultural distinctions betweennJews and Gentiles. Ghristiansnwould argue that it is the hereticalnsecularization and abridgment of theirntheological tenets that lead to egalitarianismnand universalism, not their truenmeaning. The New Right, in Mr. Sunic’snaccount, does not seem to havendealt with that response, though it isnpossible to argue that the temptation tonsecularize theological doctrines is irresistiblenand inevitable. Once unchecked,neven otherworldly promises of equalitynwill be conscripted for very secularnpolitical purposes.nThe New Right in fact does see innJudaism and Christianity the sources ofnsecularization, rationalization, and whatnMax Weber called “the disenchantmentnof the world,” simply by virtue ofntheir monotheistic rejection of a spiritualizednnature. “For the New Right,”nsays Mr. Sunic,nthe chaos of the modern politynhas primarily been caused bynthe biblical monotheism. In thenvery beginning of itsndevelopment in Europe,nJudeo-Christian monotheism setnout to demystify and desacralizenthe pagan world by slowlynsupplanting ancient pagann