on constitutional grounds, but out ofnreligious bigotry against Catholics.”nThe charge of monomaniacal anti-nPopery against the epitome of Englishncommon sense, John Locke, is hard tonmake. Although Locke was concernednabout the foreign influences of Poperynand was obviously dependent upon hisnanti-Catholic sponsor. Lord Shaftesbury,nthis by no means proves anti-nPopery was his primary justification fornhis views on the most important eventnof his lifetime.nAs proof, Mr. Stanlis argues that thenmyth of Locke’s constitutionalism “endurednfor 266 years, until Peter Laslettnshattered it in 1956 in his superbnedition of Locke’s two treatises.” Well,nLaslett makes an excellent case thatnLocke wrote most (not all) of his worknthen, but Laslett does not attributenLocke’s motivation to anti-Catholicism.nOn this matter, Laslett is ambiguous:n”We do not know whether hen[Locke] ‘believed in’ the Popish Plotnanymore than we know if Shaftesburyndid, but he never criticizednShaftesbury’s actions at any time.” Fewnservants criticize their masters and, asnLaslett notes, Locke is especially circumspectnabout anyone, be he high ornlow. On the central question, Laslett isnclear: “Even in this, to us his earliestn[writings], Locke is revealed as a constitutionalist,nand a man convinced ofnthe distinction between secular andnspiritual power.”nMr. Stanlis’s .claim that Locke andnBurke are not in the same tradition isnhai-der to answer. But I will stand withnF.A. Hayek and say that Locke andnBurke stand in the same British empiricalnand moral tradition — of coursendiffering in that they faced differentnproblems during their lifetimes.nMr. Stanlis places Burke in thennatural law tradition and Locke outsidenbecause he misreads SterlingnLamprecht, who was recognized as thenauthoritative Locke scholar until modernntimes. Lamprecht is quoted tonshow that Locke “stood so close to thendeists that he has sometimes beennclassified as one of their number.” ButnLamprecht’s actual point was thatnthose who so classified Locke werenmistaken. According to Lamprecht,n”The tradition which seems to havenhad the most outstanding effect uponnLocke’s ethical philosophy was thatnwhich based morality upon the ‘law ofnnature.’ This tradition was very old andnwidespread. It sprang from the teachingsnof the Roman stoics, dominatednthe thought of the medieval scholasticsnand then found striking expression innseveral great moralists of the seventeenthncentury.”nThis is the tradition that unitednLocke and Burke, and it is the samenone that has energized the British andnAmerican cultures and that modernnconservatism at its best still conservesntoday.n—Donald DevinenWashington, DCnIt is unfortunate in the extreme thatnPeter Stanlis must resort to a caricaturenof Locke in order to rescue Burke fromnthe seemingly Rousseauian O’Brien.nThe religious marriage of Locke andnVoltaire may be provocative, but itnbetrays a mind unfamiliar with thenreligious currents of the 17th centurynand their impact on political thoughtnand action. While some may find interestnin reducing political thought tonits lowest common denominator, as innfinding the roots of Locke in thenLevellers (not to mention the Diggers,nwith whom O’Brien seems to identifynand from whom Stanlis does not distinguish),nthis does not make Locke anynless a Christian, much less a Voltairianndeist, unless, of course, one is either anHigh Churchman or a tridentine RomannCatholic, in which case the positionsnof the Presbyterians, Harrington,nMilton, Sydney et al. are no differentnfor purposes of judgment. Nor can onenforget that Locke lived and wrote in annage when religious intolerance stillnfound expression in political action.nLocke, with his Arminian flavor, hardlynappealed to the likes of Calvinist JohnnEdwards and perhaps with reason, butnhistorians will be hard pressed to findnany essay of Voltaire’s favoring Christianity,nmuch less a sympathetic one thatncites the historicity of Christ withoutndenying His divinity. John Locke’s finalndays were spent defending his Christianity.nVoltaire’s were spent attacking it.nMore to the point, how does Stanlisnsquare his view of Locke with that of,nsay, G.H. Sabine, who ties Locke tonHooker in a “long tradition of medievalnpolitical thought, back to St. Thomas,nin which the reality of moral restraintsnon power, the responsibility ofnrulers to the community which theynnnruled, and the subordination of governmentnto law were axiomatic”? Surelynthis makes a better foundation for explainingnLocke’s incongruities, whilensaving his relationship with Burke andnserving to parry a view that identifiesnhim with Jacobinism.nLocke, a precursor of Toland andnTindal? Maybe. An influence on Voltairenand Burke? Definitely. But to divorcenhim from Burke in the arena ofngovernment, much less marry him tonVoltaire in the arena of religion, servesnno purpose but to disclose a prejudicensharpened by animosity, a prejudicennot unlike that which both he and Voltairensought to frustrate and discouragen— the one by sustaining the separationnof Church and State, the other by separatingnthe two; the one by accommodatingnChristianity, the other by destroyingnit.n— Gordon D. PaynenVerona, WJnMr. Stanlis Replies:nMy two critics not only disagree withnme regarding Locke’s politics and religion,nbut also with each other. Mr.nPayne appeals to Ceorge Sabine tonjustify his liberal interpretation ofnLocke, and thereby criticizes me fornwriting “a caricature of Locke.” Mr.nDevine objects that I was “overiy influencednby the modern liberal interpretationnof Locke” by the likes of Sabinenand Conor Cruise O’Brien, whichnPayne accepts. I agree with Devine thatnthe common wisdom that perceivesnLocke as a shiny-bright liberal politicalnphilosopher is indeed a caricature of thenhistorical Locke; it is an idealized abstractionnwholly shorn of all the sordidnconspiracies and underground revolutionarynactivities he engaged in duringnmore than a decade before 1688. Paynenignores this and accepts at face valuenLocke’s propaganda, pitched to create anpublic illusion of social and politicalnrespectability. In short, Payne is stillnengulfed in what Maurice Cranstonncalls “the myth of Locke’s politicalninnocence.” This myth, consciouslyncultivated by our secular liberals, is thenresult either of ignorance or a conspiracynof silence to suppress the historicalnLocke.nNeither of my critics mentions RichardnAshcraft’s Revolutionary PoliticsnSEPTEMBER 1991/5n