and Locke’s Two Treatises of Governmentn(1986), nor the excellent scholarshipnof Mark Goldie on “The Roots ofnTrue Whiggism” and “John Lockenand Anglican Royalism.” From originalnmanuscripts by Locke in the BodleiannLibrary, Ashcraft describes Locke’s exclusionistnrevolutionary activities andnclose associations with old Commonwealthnradicals in their prosecution ofnthe Popish Plot, the Monmouth Rebellion,nand the Rye House plot to murdernKing Charles II and the Duke ofnYork. Ashcraft presents “the historicalnevidence for the view that Locke’snpolitical theory is much more clearlynlinked with the ideas of the Civil Warnradicals than we have been taught tonbelieve.” He notes that in courting thenpopulace, “Locke invariably presses hisnargument as a hard-line radical.” Ashcraftnproves to the hilt Laslett’s observationnthat Locke “went much furtherntoward revolution and treason than hisnearlier biographers knew, anxious asnthey were to present him as a man ofnunspotted personal and political virtue.”nThe same applies to Locke’sntheory of property ownership. Henpraises the “honest industry” of thendispossessed and condemns “the idle,nunproductive, and Court-dominatednproperty owners” as undeserving ofntheir property, thus throwing out legalnprescription in favor of utility basednupon labor. Ashcraft observes: “Itnseems strange that this rather radicalnendorsement of the claims of labornover those of land ownership has beennso little commented upon by thosenwho are eager to award Locke thenhonor of having formulated the modernndefense of the private ownership ofnproperty. . . . Locke was not advocatingnthe return of the Diggers, thoughnhis attitude toward property is not sonfar removed from theirs as is generallynassumed.”nBefore Payne accepts Sabine, “whonties Locke to Hooker,” he should readnPeter Munz’s The Place of Hooker innthe History of Thought (1952). Afternfour pages of comparisons of similaritiesnand differences between Hookernand Locke, Munz concludes: “Hookernwould have been unable to understandnthe reasoning of Locke.” The reversenis also true. Unlike Payne, I take seriouslynstatements about Locke’s religionnmade by his closest associates.nRobert Ferguson, one of Locke’s col­n6/CHRONICLESnleagues in subversive revolution, recordednthat Locke’s patron, Shaftesbury,nattributed to Locke his ownnSocinian jeligious beliefs. Like thengood Anglican Socinian that he was,nLocke never denied, nor did he affirm,nthe divinity of Christ, so that as annextreme minimalist in doctrine he remainednone point removed from Unitarianismnand a world apart from orthodoxntraditional Christianity.nFollowing Lamprecht, Devine assertsnthat Locke’s appeals to moralnnatural law places him in the samentradition as the Roman Stoics andnmedieval Schoolmen. This colossal errornis well contradicted by Munz:n”The fundamental and far-reachingndifference between Hooker and Lockenis reflected in their theories of naturalnlaw.” Devine agrees with me thatnBurke is in the tradition in which henplaces Locke, and this forms the basisnof his linking Locke with Burke, evennincluding Locke’s empiricism. Whilenthe empirical element in Burke’s politicsn(probably derived in part fromnMontesquieu) is rooted in the facts ofnhistory, simultaneously it is connectednwith the moral norms of natural lawnthrough his providential view of history.nIn sharp contrast, Locke’s empiricismnrejects or neglects history in favornof immediate sensory impressionsnbacked by ideological theory basednupon private discursive reasoning andnlogic of the kind that MichaelnOakeshott condemned as “rationalismnin politics.” To Locke, medieval Christianitynwas a tissue of vile superstitions,nwhereas Burke revered its achievements.nLocke’s philosophical orientationnis not in the tradition of the Stoicsnand medieval Christianity, regardingnnatural law, but in Newtonian 17thcenturynscience and speculative philosophy.nAs William Hazlitt demonstratednin “Mr. Locke a Creat Plagiarist,”n(Works, Vol. 20), Locke at once condemnednHobbes as “an exploded writer,”nand rejected Descartes’s innatenideas. Yet he expropriated all of hisnbasic philosophical principles fromnthese and similar writers, such as Malbranchenand Spinoza. As John W.nYolton has shown in Thinking Matter:nMaterialism in Eighteenth-CenturynBritain (1983), Locke wholly acceptednand only slightly modified Hobbes’snmaterialism and mechanistic conceptionnof human nature. In Britain andnnnFrance, throughout the 18th century,nLocke was the acknowledged fountainheadnof the materialist philosophy. Thenmaterialism of Anthony Collins in Discoursenon Free Thinking (1713), thatnof Joseph Priestley, La Mettrie’snL’Homme Machine (1748), D’Holbach’snatheism, and many others, allndrew from Locke’s “thinking matter.”nLocke’s materialism is wholly at variancenwith the orthodox Christian conceptionnof human nature, which includesnsoul or spirit, and which isnnecessary for a valid normative comprehensionnof natural law. LikenHobbes, Locke used the traditionalnlanguage of natural law, but largelynemptied it of its normative content innfavor of a sensory perceived “nature”nas a descriptive process in a Newtoniannuniverse, applied to man in society. Hisnconception of “reason” was the privatendiscursive logic of each individual, notnthe “right reason” {ratio recta) of Cicero,nthe Stoics, Medieval scholastics.nHooker, and Burke. The latter threenfound the moral norms of natural lawnembodied in the Justinian Code andncommon law, in the corporate naturenof man in Church and State, and innconstitutional law. In contrast, likenHobbes, Locke had an atomistic andnhedonistic conception of man, derivednfrom a fictional “state of nature,” innwhich each isolated individual possessedn”natural rights” centered in hisnwill and desire to survive. To overcomenthe anarchy of a state of nature Locke,nlike Descartes and Hobbes, attemptednto place ethics on a mathematical basis.nIf Mr. Devine wishes to rid himself ofnthe illusion that Locke is in the politicalntradition of Burke, let him read CarolinenRobbins’s The Eighteenth-CenturynCommonwealth (1959), and thennread copiously in the replies to Burke’snReflections by Locke’s revolutionaryn”natural rights” disciples.nDevine states that Locke “believednin toleration.” Payne is closer to thentruth: “Locke lived and wrote in an agenwhen religious intolerance still foundnexpression in political action.” This is andescriptive historical fact, but it hardlynjustifies persecution. Some contemporariesnof Locke, including John Dryden,ncondemned all persecution.nLocke’s total toleration for Protestantsnand intolerance for Catholics makesnhim a perfect exemplar of what Actonndescribes in “The Protestant Theory ofn