Voegelin but is contemptuously ignorednby the most formative component ofncontemporaneity—the media. Then”facts” are up front and in the “news”nsections and the “values” are neatly relegatednto the editorial pages. Butn”news,” by its very nature, cannot benneutral. Carl Becker observed, “Historynis not fact, but the interpretation ofnfact.” This is true of “news” as well. Thenvery process of selecting what is “news” isnan interpretative act itself. Even modernnphysics acknowledges that the act ofnobserving changes the thing itself, so thenobjective neutrality of the reporting observernis even physically impossible. Besidesnbeing specious, the fact/value distinctionnis also disabling, as Gray’s playndramatizes. The truth of a political communitynwill be found in the understandingnof a citizen, not of a serial scientistnwho abstracts from it a behavioral model.nPOLEMICS & EXCHANGESnThe Paradigms of Warnby Alan J. LevinenIn April 1915 Allied forces landed onnTurkey’s Gallipoli peninsula in an attemptnto force Turkey to surrender. Thenresulting campaign was one of the disastersnof that disastrous war: WinstonnChurchill became a scapegoat, and thenGallipoli defeat became a major factor innhis political career.nRecently an Australian film, Gallipoli,nopened in New York. It has beennhighly—and for once deservedly—npraised as one of the finest war films evernmade. Although some reviewers haventried to read various political convictionsninto it, the ritualistic poses of the usualnantiwar movie are conspicuously absent.nYet, on closer examination, it does fitncertain stereotypes and provokes muchnDr. Levine is an historian in New York.n%tnChronicles of CulturenOne will learn nothing of love from observingnsex; in fact, applying a behavioralnmodel to a political community will ultimatelyndestroy it, as the observation ofnsex may undermine the capacity for loving.nWhether Gray wished to go so far asnto say that value neutrality destroys civilizationnis not entirely clear. But we believenin interpretation.nTo see that How I Got That Story is notnthe play about Vietnam, one need onlynremember that the Vietnam War is notnyet over. It is still going on. More peoplenhave been killed or displaced in SoutheastnAsia since the American withdrawalnthan during the whole American involvementnthere. Only the journalists arengone. They are no longer getting thenstory. They are not observing. They neverndid get the story. How I Got That Story isnthe play about “how the story got away.”nAnarm,aleg,acountryatatime … Dnthought, not only about World War Inand war in general, but about the waynpeople think about war.nWhether consciously or not, peoplenseem to think about war in terms whichnare neither abstract nor specific; theynusually think in terms oi paradigms, ornmodels, often of some particular war, ornwars, that have particularly affected thenconsciousness of our society. It would benfair to say that most people’s thinkingnabout war has been formed by the paradigmsnof World Wars I and II, Vietnamnand, to a lesser extent, Korea. When wenconsider carefully the paradigms, ornstereotypes, of these wars, several puzzlingnfeatures of the popular perceptionnmay come into focus.nGallipoli, intentionally or not, fits intonand expresses the paradigm most peoplenhave absorbed of World War I—anparadigm which is oversimplified, to bennnsure, but which possesses a nugget ofntmth. World War I is seen as an unnecessarynconflict between basically similarncountries. No vital issue was at stake,nand, in the eyes of many, it was a pointlessnbutchery of millions by incompetentnmilitary leaders. At least until the 1960’snWorld War I was the symbol of meaninglessnhorror for Western society. AsnPaul Fussell and others have shown,nthere was a strong tendency to conceivenof war itself, all war, in the image of then”Great War”—although, in fact, nonother modern conflict has much resemblednit, either morally, politically ornmilitarily.nRightly or not, the acceptance of suchna paradigm had far-reaching consequences,nas one tends to expect that fiiturensituations will resemble the paradigm.nThe paradigm of one war becomesnthe paradigm of all wars. If one believesnthe last war was unjustified and insane,nhe assumes that the next one will be too.nThe possible means to prevent one warnare thought to be appropriate for thenavoidance of ftiture conflicts. Unfortunatelynthe paradigm of World War I,nwhatever its worth as a picture of thatnwar, was the worst possible preparationnfor dealing with nazi Germany. The paradigmnseemed to counsel the use of appeasementnpolicies, the results of whichnare well-known. The dominant paradigmnof World War II, by contrast, remainsnfor most people the clearest examplenof a “just war.” Anglo-Americans,nat least, could see tangible gainsnand advances; those who liberated thenconcentration camps could see the justificationnof the war firsthand. If the aftermathnof the war did not quite match thendelirious forecasts of 1941-1945, this didnnot really undermine people’ s belief thatnthe war had been justified.nThe paradigm of World War 11—ansorry but necessary stmggle against totalitariannaggression—was not a bad preparationnfor the postwar era. In moralnterms, neither the Cold War nor the Koreannconflict was very different fromnWorld War II. For all the energetic effortsnof Marxist apologists to obscure then