tions necessary for the practice of andemocratic politics within the context ofna diverse social structure.nLipset is no Marxist. His preference isnfor a pluralistic democratic order groundednin interest-group liberalism, with antolerance for a policy orientation rangingnbetween the nonextreme poles of individualismnand moderate collectivism. Henwants to find what might be called anTocquevillean way of channeling thendisparate interests of a pluralist societyn(made up of a plethora of private andnpublic associations) into a tacit consensusnon working political arrangements thatncan satisfy enough of the demands ofnthese various groups to constrain conflictnwithin the limits of peaceful competition.nAt the same time, he wants anWeberian resolution of the threat ofncentralized bureaucratic domination ofnboth socioeconomic and governmentalninstimtions. He seems to think that thenfunctional advantages of a rationalnbureaucratic mode of administration cannbe obtained without relinquishing controlnover the expert by the “public” thatnthe bureaucracy is supposed to serve.nDemocracy is the means of solvingnthese problems. But democracy is dependentnon certain social and psychologicalnconditions—the most importantnof which are economic development andnwidespread acceptance of governmentalnlegitimacy. Without going into detail ornproviding illustrations, one can say thatnthe fulsome correlational analysesndisplayed by Lipset (or more often, incorporatednby reference) in Political Man allnpoint to the necessity of adhering closelynto the characteristics usually ascribed ton”modernity”—if the teleocratic end ofneconomic development, leading to stabilizednliberal democracy, is to benrealized. Modernization cotmotes secularization,nurbanization, industrialization,nexpanded educational opportunity,nand increased physical and social mobility.nThese conditions offer possibilities forndecreasing the great economic gap betweennthe privileged and the almostntotally deprived in traditional societies,nthus reducing the polarization of socialnclasses that produces political extremes,ninstability, coercive regimes, and revolution.nIn addition, economic developmentnfacilitates a broad extension ofnpolitical participation, not just by way ofnmoving toward universal suffrage, butnalso through the organization of newnmediating groups (e.g., political partiesnand trade unions) that afford additionalnopportunities for popular participationnthrough their own processes of internalndemocratization. Since Lipset seems tonassociate ideology (in a rather elusivendefinitional way) with absolute moralnand religious values that imperil functionalnconsensus on basic issues of socialncohesion and goverrunental legitimacy,n”the end of ideology” is simply a correlativenof the extension of the conditionsnthat combine to produce modern liberalndemocracy. And, as Upset’s comparativencorrelational analysis presumes tondemonstrate, universally valid socialscientificnpropositions emerge about thenpossibilities that the “functional rationalism”nof modernity will, over time, displacenthe “substantive” rationality of traditionalism,nwith its ideological offshootsnthat stand in the way of economicndevelopment and a concomitant growthnin individual and group political participationnto the point of full-scalendemocratization and political stabilitynon a global scale.nIf I were a sociologist, I, too, wouldnprefer to identify with Tocqueville’s conceptnof pluralistic social accommodationnand Weber’s notion of democratic controlsnover bureaucracy rather than withnMarx’s revolutionary means of resolvingnclass conflict and Michels’s iron law ofnoligarchy as means of attaining the socialnconditions required for functional politicalnconsensus and legitimation of regime.nFor better or worse, however, Inescaped that vocational fate as a result ofnexposure to instruction in philosophynthat prevented a permanent lapse intonthe positivist reductionism that furnishesnwhatever rational underpinningn”modern” sociology (as contrasted withnthe older tradition of social philosophy)nnncan lay claim to.nIn this respect sociology is a thoroughlyn”modern” subject whose intellectualnforefathers are Comte and Marx. Thenless-than-coherent legacy left by this pairnmaintains its currency in the hands ofntheir successors. And so it is with PoliticalnMan. Despite Lipset’s relatively modestndirect claims about the definitiveness ofnsociological knowledge and the extent ofnthe social transformation made possiblenthrough application of that knowledgento political action, the old Comtian andnMarxian confidence in the methods ofnnatural science and technology as keys tonunderstanding and shaping the course ofnhistory still shows through, as does thenvague faith in progress toward a secularneschaton that is essentially materialist.nLittle note is taken of the needs of mannbeyond the satisfaction of physical ones,nother than some indirect references tonthem as abstract absolutes productive ofnthose social, moral, or religious ideologiesnthat obstruct the functionally rationalncourse of economic and politicalndevelopment leading to the end ofnideology in the postindustrial society.nEven when, toward the concliision ofnthe last (new) chapter, “A Concept andnits History: The End of Ideology,” a differentnkind of sociologist, Edward Shils,nis quoted as indicated below, the readerncannot be at all sure that Lipset grasps thenextent to which Shils’s summary philosophicalnstatement vitiates so much ofnboth the purported sociological truthnand the program of social action broadlynset forth in Political Man:nIt is obvious that no society can existnwithout a cognitive, moral, and expressivenculture. Standards of tmth,nbeauty, goodness are inherent in thenstructure of human action. The culturenwhich is generated from cognitive,nmoral, and expressive needs andnwhich is tiansmitted and sustained byntradition is part of the very constitutionnof society. Thus every society,nhaving a culture, will have a complexnset of orientations toward man, society,nand the universe in which ethicalnand metaphysical propositions, aes-n131nDecember 1982n