Principalities & Powersrnby Samuel FrancisrnForty Years AfterrnAmericans have grown fond of celebratingrnanniversaries of one kind or another.rnI first noticed this new habit during thernnational thrombosis over the Statue ofrnLiberty back in 1986, but more recentlyrnthe habit has swollen into something likernan epidemic, hi the late 1980’s and earlyrn1990’s, we have endured the anniversariesrnof the U.S. Constitution, the Bill ofrnRights, the birth of Thomas Jefferson,rnthe Bolshevik Rcolution, the MunichrnAccord of 1958, the attack on Peari Harbor,rnthe emancipation of Negro slaves,rnthe assassination of John Kenncdv, thernliberation of Dachau, and every stage,rnfactual or fictitious, in the life and careerrnof Martin Luther King, Jr., not to mentionrna number of other events of equallyrngalactic significance that just happenrnto elude my memory. The reason for thernrigorous observance of these commemorativernoccasions ought to be clear tornthose Americans who hac even therndimmest glimmer of what is going on inrntheir country today. Anniversaries, likernnational holidays, provide excellent opportunitiesrnto subvert the meanings ofrnhistoric events as understood by a particularrnculture and to substitute otherrnmeanings of those same events as understoodrnand preferred by the exponentsrnof a rial culture.rnThis month we will observe yet anotherrnanniversary, that of the Brown v.rnIhe Board of Education decision thatrnEarl Warren and a unanimous SupremernCourt handed down to an unsuspectingrnnation exactly 40 years ago. The Brownrndecision, of course, marked the beginningrnof that extended political, cultural,rnand racial revolution that has come to bernknown to its adherents as the “civil rightsrnmovement,” and for all the genuflectionsrnto Rosa Parks and “Dr.” King thatrnarc popular and even obligatory today,rnthe forces that really allowed the movementrnand the revolution to succeedrnwere: the Warren Court, which issuedrnthe decision; the Eisenhower administration,rnwhich enforced it with federalrntroops in Little Rock; and a Southernrnwhite population that, when confrontedrnwith real soldiers in the streets, ratherrnquickly muted its braggadocio aboutrn”white supremacy” and the heritage ofrnLee and Jackson and did what it was instructedrnto do. Since the movement andrnits adherents have today everywhere triumphed,rnthe meaning that will be imposedrnon the anniversary of the Brownrndecision will be the meaning of thosernvictors, and it most definitely will notrnbe the meaning of those Americans whorndissented from the decision and the revolutionrnthat ensued from it but who preferredrna comfortable and convenient silencernto any serious resistance.rnObviously, in the course of observingrnits anniversary. Brown will be hailed asrnthe ruling that struck down school segregationrnlaws as unconstitutional andrnthat paved the way for the racial integrationrnthat the nation so amicably enjoysrntoday. The irony of this interpretation isrnthat racial integration as the architects ofrnthe Brown decision claimed to understandrnit and to promote it is virtuallyrnnonexistent in the United States today.rnAs Jared Talor wrote in a survc}’ of racialrnintegration last year, “The attempt tornintegrate public elementary and highrnschools has been a hasco. All across therncountry the attempt followed the samernpattern: once the number of non-whitesrnreached a certain level, standards collapsedrnand whites moved to the suburbs.rnDuring the past 25 years, most big-cityrnpublic schools lost neady all their whiternstudents. In Atlanta their percentagernwent from 41 percent to 7 percent, inrnNew Odeans from 34 percent to 8 percent,rnin Detroit from 41 percent to 9rnpercent, in Los Angeles from 55 percentrnto 16 percent…. Today, two thirds of allrnblack children go to schools that are predominantlyrnnon-white.”rnOf course, the United States today is arnracially integrated society, but it has notrnbeen integrated by means publicly advocatedrnby the architects of Brown (or indeedrnof the “civil rights movement”)—rnthe simple removal of racial segregationrnfrom public laws, to be followed by thernyoluntar- and harmonious social mixturernof the races. Racial integration hasrncome about, quite simply, because ofrnforce—because of forced busing imposedrnb}- unelected judge and bureaucratrnwith federal troops at his back; becausernof affirmati’e action laws and policiesrnthat most Americans do not wantrnand do not believe in; because of threatsrn(not infrequently carried out) of prosecutions,rnlaw suits, boycotts, and otherrninstruments of intimidation directedrnagainst restaurants, hotels, companies,rnand other private institutions that fail tornmeet the demands of integrationists; andrnbecause of a massive and continuous inundationrnof propaganda in every conceivablernform and over every conceivablernmedium of communication tornenforce racial right-think and punish andrnscorn racial wrong-think.rnThe Brown decision, then, cannot accuratelyrnbe interpreted as the triumph ofrn”freedom” over “force.” At best, it canrnbe seen as the triumph of one level ofrnforce (federal) for one purpose (racialrnintegration) over a lesser lecl of forcern(state and local) for another purposern(racial segregation). But since the federalrnlevel of force has had to be appliedrnstrenuously and consistently to inducerneen minimal racial integration in placesrnwhere no force at all prevented it, a morernaccurate interpretation of Brown and thern”movement” for which it was the officialrnsignal and sanction would be that it actuallyrnachieved the opposite of increasingrnfreedom, that it succeeded only in replacingrnwhat often was free and noncoercivern(segregated) association with unfrccrnand forced (integrated) association.rnDefenders of Brown today generallyrndo not shrink from just this interpretationrnof it, though it is directU contrary tornthe original intent, if you will, of the casernand those who crafted it. But Brown itself,rnof course, largely rejected the wholernconcept of “original intent” jurisprudence,rnand that rejection should havernbeen a warning to those who supportedrnthe Court’s decision: those who thoughtrnit applied only to Southern Jim Crowrnstatutes and not to such things as quotasrnthat exclude their sons from law andrnmedical schools. Since the Court rejectedrnthe rule of “original intent” in thernone case, why should anyone have expectedrnit or other courts to respect thatrnrule in other eases where its applicationrnmight offer inconvenient obstacles tornthe desired results?rnThe only feasible moral defense of thernlO/CHRONICLESrnrnrn