classical republican ideal of a citizens’nmilitia. Foreign aggressors should knownthat in order to invade the UnitednStates, they will have to cut their waynthrough the streets.n(4) There must be a clear recognitionnof congressional supremacy in foreignnaffairs, as opposed to the effectivenexecutive supremacy that post-Wilsoniannliberals and post-Reaganite conservativesnhave championed. Foreign policynis not different from any other publicnpolicy, and there is no reason for thenPresident (i.e., the executive branchnbureaucracy) to exercise dictatorialnpower over it. While the President is thenCommander in Chief, negotiates treaties,nreceives and appoints ambassadors,nand is the main consumer of intelligence,nevery long-term or far-reachingnforeign or military commitment mustnhave the support of the people and thenexplicit approval of the Congress.n(5) No U.S. troops should be committednto combat in the absence ofncongressional approval and unless militarynvictory is the publicly stated goal.nTo fight to “contain” an enemy or tonfight without using all available resourcesnto assure victory is not acceptable.n(6) Lobbying on behalf of a foreignngovernment or country should be madena federal crime. Foreign governmentsnmaintain their own diplomats here tonrepresent their interests, and they don’tnneed Americans to do it for them.nCurrently, under the Foreign AgentsnRegistration Act, Americans who representnforeign governments must registernwith the Justice Department. The registrationnprovision should be repealed,nand Americans who prefer the interestsnof a foreign state to those of their ownncan either go to the foreign state or gonto an American jail.n(7) Perhaps most centrally, the qualitynof the American population, its education,nits economy and technology,nand its social disciplines are all, in onensense, “assets” by which the nationalnwell-being and security of the countrynmay be measured. They are thereforenproper objects of public concern, andnwhile that does not mean that thenfederal government should manage thenpopulation, the economy, education, ornsocial institutions, it does mean that thenconcept of “America First” implies annationalist ethic that transcends thenpreferences and interests of the individualnor the interest group and may oftennrequire government action. But thenethic of America First would be a thinnone if it were something that onlynpoliticians and administrators should respect.nIt ought to inform the totalncultural life of the nation and be thenfoundation of our social and culturalnidentity no less than of our politics andnnational policies.nThus, America First trade and immigrationnpolicies should recognize thatnwe, as Americans, owe duties to ourselvesnand our compatriots before wenowe anything to other peoples, andnrestrictions on immigration, free trade,nand technology transfer should be debatednand framed in terms of ournnational identity and interests, and notnin terms of natural or human rights ornthe interests of a fictitious “global community.”nImmigration from countriesnand cultures that are incompatible withnand indigestible to the Euro-Americanncultural core of the United Statesnshould be generally prohibited, currentnborder controls should be rigorouslynenforced, illegal aliens already herenshould be rounded up and deported,nand employers who hire them should benprosecuted and punished. As for immigrantsnfrom less backward countries, wenshould balance consideration of whateverngains they might bring to our economynwith at least equal consideration ofntheir long-term impact on our culturalnidentity (including our economic andnscientific culture). Similar considerationsnshould apply to trade policy; thenbasic test of free trade or specific restrictionsnon it should be their consequencesnfor the American national interest, andnnot whether they promote global economicnintegration, help less advancedneconomies, or facilitate individual economicnaspirations.nOne of the flaws of some of thenisolationist and neonationalist ideas thatnhave been advanced in the last couplenof years is that they recognize no definingnprinciple of American nationalitynother than the pragmatic and circumstantialnones of economic prosperity andnmilitary security. Hence, they are usuallynunable to define any national interestnbeyond these goals, and this kind ofnpragmatic nationalism is unlikely to excitenor provide a bond for Americansnoutside elites professionally interested inneconomic and military issues. In failingnto move beyond pragmatic nationalism,ncontemporary nationalists neglect thennnconcrete and historical cultural identitynof the American nation, express a narrowlyndefined “national interest” thatnrecognizes only the least common denominatornof the national identity, andnthereby reflect a similar failing thatnappeared in the nationalism of AlexandernHamilton.nHamilton, as his biographer John C.nMiller noted, “associated the nationalngovernment with no great moral issuencapable of capturing the popular imagination;nhe seemed to stand only for ‘thennatural right of the great fishes to eat upnthe little ones whenever they can catchnthem.'” Post-Hamiltonian Americannnationalism offered no public myth ofnthe nation, and the ultimate price of itsnfailure to do so was the collapse (andnsubsequent redefinition) of the nationnin the Civil War. Only when Lincolnninvested American nationality with anquasi-religious mythology was nationalismnpolitically and populariy successful.nBut Lincoln’s nationalist myth,ndrawn from a universalist natural rightsnegalitarianism, justified national unitynonly as an instrument-of “equality ofnopportunity” and the acquisitive individualismnthat follows from it. Lincoln’snnationalism soon degenerated into thenwolfish egotism of the Gilded Age andnthe naked imperialism of McKinley andnRoosevelt, and ultimately its universalist,negalitarian, and individualist premisesncontradicted and helped underminenthe particularity that a successful nationalismnmust assert and the subordinationnof individual ambition that nationalismndemands.nIf a new nationalism is to flourish andnendure, it must do more than offer anmerely narrow, pragmatic, and largelyneconomic definition of the nationalnidentity and the national interest. It willnhave to look to the historic norms of thenAmerican people and their culture tondiscover and articulate what America isnand what it should be, and it will have tonrecognize that the American culturalnidentity involves a good bit more thannmerely economic growth and individualngratification. If it fails to do so, then thennew nationalism will soon become simplynone more code word for the specialninterests of particular factions and sections,nand America will be no morensecure, no more prosperous, and nonmore first than it is today in the custodynof its self-serving and self-appointednglobalist masters. <§>nDECEMBER 1991/11n