ticipation and eager complicity of American lobbyists, powerbrokers,rnand government officials.rnGreed and self-interest in Washington, D.C., after all, arernwhat make this structural corruption possible, the “revolvingrndoor” of government at the highest levels that confuses “publicrnservice” with “personal advancement” and mistakes “legal”rnfor “ethical.” For many, a top job in the Cabinet is merelyrna sabbatical from a more permanent career as a registeredrnagent lobbying for a foreign corporation. For example, betweenrn1973 and 1992, one-half of the principle trade officialsrnof the USl’R left to become registered foreign agents; mostrndid work for Japan. During the 1992 presidential election,rnthe Clinton, Ilarkin, Kerrey, and Bush campaigns had 31 activernforeign lobbyists in key political positions. Also, sincernthe late 1970’s, half of the Republican and Democratic partyrnchairmen have worked as lobbyists for both domestic and foreignrninterests either while in office or immediately after.rnIn October 1992, while the Washington, D.C., political communityrnspeculated over whom Bill Clinton would name tornhis Cabinet if he were elected President, officials of thernJapanese government quietly circulated among themselves arnlist of the top three candidates for key White House and Cabinetrnposts. In retrospect, the Japanese list was almost completelyrnaccurate. The only big misses were who would bernnamed to head the Justice Department.rnThe Japanese information was accurate because, accordingrnto Peter Schweizer, author of Friendly Spies, the Japaneserndevote more than 80 percent of their worldwide intelligencernbudget to economic and political espionage in the UnitedrnStates. As a result, Japan boasts the best political and economicrnintelligence system in the United States of any nation.rnIndeed, one of the most important functions of the lobbyistsrnand public relations firms hired by the Japanese is tornkeep a steady flow of current information streaming back tornTokyo. According to Herbert E. Meyer, vice-chairman of thernNational Intelligence Council during the Reagan administration,rn”Every branch office of every trading company operatesrnlike an information vacuum cleaner, sucking in information.”rnNormally, the Japanese will assign three or more companies tornthe task of analyzing the same problem or issue. The redundancyrnallows them to discern the difference betweenrntatemae—the official story—and honne—the real truth. Itrnalso guarantees that they will know more than any individualrnlobbvist and permits them to tailor their response to the politicalrncircumstances, utilizing the firm or individual whosernbackground, skills, or personal relationship best fits the needsrnof the situation.rnBecause Japanese businesses hire so many senior insidersrnand coordinate their collection of information so effectively,rnthe Japanese actually have a better overview of what is happeningrnin the federal government than all but a handful ofrnthose who serve in the administration. And by having morernand better information on the inside workings of our government,rnthe Japanese are able to affect a decision before mostrnpeople even know that there is a decision to be made.rnTo put the intelligence they gather to good use, Japaneserncompanies excel at the next phase of polities, gaining access tornthe policymakers. In Washington, D.C., access and influencerngo hand-in-hand; they are the stock and trade of the lobbyist,rnthe lawyer, and the political advisor. They are, as well, thernbiggest “skill” current officeholders and staff members canrntake with them when they leave the government.rnConsider a recent case involving the 1990 U.S.-Japan Superrn301 talks on bilateral trade in high technology. During the negotiations,rnFujitsu Ltd., one of Japan’s largest electronics companies,rnhired David Olive, one of the State Department’srnprincipal experts on the substance of the talks, to be a seniorrnrepresentative in its Washington, D.C., office. Olive hadrnhelped draft State Department position papers, attended interagencyrnmeetings, had access to confidential informationrnshared by American companies, and knew the U.S. negotiatingrnstrategy for such critical high-technology industries asrnsemiconductors, telecommunications, and supercomputers.rnThe U.S. State Department defended Olive’s job change asrn”in accord with applicable U.S. laws and regulations.” Nevertheless,rnwhether intended or not, the Japanese gained twornimportant advantages over their American rivals by this onernmove: they secured the services of an individual with a finelyrnhoned sense of political possibilities, and they sowed distrustrnamong American companies about whether to share informationrnwith their own government.rnThe easiest way for Japanese and other foreign interests torngain access and establish influence is simply to pay for it.rnCenerally, an insider is hired as a lobbyist “consultant” orrn”member of an advisory board” of an agency or company. Asrnthe economic stakes have grown, the Japanese have addedrnyet another lure to attract United States government officialsrn—an equity position in a business deal, with the prospectrnof substantial and ongoing returns. The transaction is a simplernequation: equity for influence.rnThe sums of money from Japan are so large and the absencernof ideals in Washington, D.C., so complete that a substantialrnnumber of American public officials are dramaticallyrnaltering their career paths in the federal government—as wellrnas their decisions while in office. The influence of Japanesernmoney is so pervasive that there is even a name for it, “therndemonstration effect.” The huge sums of money made availablernto Japan’s friends once they leave office “demonstrate”rnthe value of a friendly Japanese policy to officials still in office.rnDozens of former government officials now make $200,000rnper year or more working for the Japanese lobby. There is arnstrong lure for those still in office.rnFunneling money to politicians after they leave ofhee worksrnat one end of the political value-added chain. An even morernimportant activity is to funnel money to them at the frontrnend—to help them get elected in the first place. WhilernAmerican election law prohibits a foreign national from makingrna direct or indirect contribution in any local, state, or federalrnelection, foreign-owned companies in the United Statesrnare allowed to operate political action committees (PACs)rnand to make political contributions as if they were Americanrncorporations. In the 1990’s, more than 120 foreign companiesrn—primarily from E.urope and Canada—used this legalrnloophole to play a direct and influential role in American politics.rnFhe Japanese use a more subtle technique; they encouragernAmericans with whom they have important businessrnlinks to make political contributions to pursue their sharedrnpolitical interests.rnAnother technique employed by Japanese and other foreignrninterests is the use of an existing organization or the creationrnof an ad hoe coalition—an association of U.S. membersrnthat allows foreign interests to put an American face onrntheir politicking. One example of this approach is a Wash-rnMAY 1993/21rnrnrn