the editors of The National Interest. Though neoconservativesnhave managed to put together a debate on the issuesnraised by Fukuyama, they generally agree with his view ofnwhere things are drifting. Krauthammer, Will, Wattenberg,nand other neoconservatives may not like the dogmatic tonenand the references to a problem-free worid, but they sharenhis progressive vision. They too envisage a uniformlyndemocratic earth without national barriers and with justnenough capitalism to provide for general prosperity. Peoplenmay continue to be quarrelsome, but Krauthammer is surenthat we know “politically” what is best for everyone: andemocratic polity with a mixed economy. Still, Krauthammernis prepared to allow history to take its own course,nunlike Kojeve. In published exchanges with Leo Strauss,nKojeve calls for a world state established, if necessary, by an”tyrant” who would end our struggle for domination overneach other.nIn his essay Fukuyama posits an indissoluble relationshipnbetween politics and conflict in the modern era. His remarksnmight indicate a familiarity with the German legal theoristnCad Schmitt (1888-1985), on whom I have publishednseveral articles. In a provocative polemic of 1927, “ThenConcept of the Political,” Schmitt speaks of intense strugglenas “the criterion of the political.” While cultural, economic,nand aesthetic activities may go on without such antagonism,npolitical ones require that individuals sacrifice themselves fornothers. Politics also divides us into friend-enemy groupings.nDespite his exaltation of heroism, Schmitt is not making ancase for continuous bloodshed. Rather he defends thennation-state, which arose in early modern Europe in thenwake of religious wars as a means for taming belligerence. Itnwas the assertion of power by national sovereigns overnfeuding aristocrats and meddlesome churchmen thatnallowed the “state” to create public order. For the sake ofninternal tranquillity, sovereigns claimed the exclusive right tonmake friend-enemy distinctions in their own societies. Theynalso maintained some degree of religious and culturalnhomogeneity among their subjects, but made life unpleasantnfor theologians who presumed to speak for the state. And itnwas the agreement by jurists and kings that wars would nonlonger be holy, but merely formal procedures (guerres ennforme) that served to institutionalize international conflict.nLimited struggles fought over negotiable issues by professionalnarmies were more appealing to national sovereignsnthan “just wars.” Struggles were no longer to be wagednagainst a diabolized enemy or proclaimed by ecclesiasticalnofflcials.nAccording to Schmitt, it was to the credit of Europeanncivilization that it fashioned a system of states thatncould limit political violence. This system endured in thenface of the French Revolution, the advance of militaryntechnology, the rise of modern ideologies, and the war onnsovereignty waged by constitutional liberals. It finally grewnweak, however, and began to collapse in the 20th century.nThe disintegration of sovereign national states and ofnmultinational sovereign states, Schmitt contended, will notnbring down the curtain on political existence. On thencontrary, human struggle and friend-enemy groupings willncontinue at a more intense level than ever before. Poisonousnwars typified by terrorism and fights over “values” arenalready replacing the limited geopolitical contests thatnEuropean states fought in the 18th and 19th centuries.nSchmitt warns repeatedly that war will accelerate in proportionnto the rate at which traditional states vanish. Strugglesnwill grow progressively worse, as enemies come to bendefined as ideological foes, not rival states.nBut the role of national states turns on the question ofnsovereignty. Sovereignty, for Schmitt, centers on the questionnof who in a society “decides” the collective course to bentaken in a critical situation, particularly in the face of a publicnthreat. Since war is the most perilous threat faced by ansociety, a sovereign, either individually or coUegially, mustndetermine friend-enemy distinctions. It is the sovereign whon(or which) decides on what steps are to be taken to combatnthe public enemy. The question of “Quis judicabit?”n(which is Thomas Hobbes’s phrase) is the one beingncurrently disputed by partisans of the American Presidentnand in the Congress. Schmitt thought this dispute aboutnwho defines and who deals with public threats inevitable in anstate in which political authority is no longer firmly fixed.nThe disintegration of sovereign nationalnstates and of multinational sovereign statesnwill not bring down the curtain on politicalnexistence. On the contrary, human strugglenand friend-enemy groupings will continue atna more intense level than ever before.nNor did he see any way out of that dispute with thenpassing of sovereign national states. Abolishing states thatnwere territorially and ethnically limited would not end groupnstruggles or the need for sovereigns. It would only transfernthose problems to a supranational level, without the frameworknof established loyalties and procedures that had characterizednthe older state system. “Humanity, as such,” Schmittnobserves, “cannot wage war because it has no enemy at leastnon this planet.” Yet, wars can be waged “in the name ofnhumanity” by particular states that seek to “usurp anuniversal concept against its military opponent.” Thusngroups that appeal to humanity as a “useful ideologicalninstrument of imperialist expansion” continue to makenfriend-enemy distinctions. They also have sovereigns whondraw those distinctions for others and who do so whileninvoking “humanity.” Those who opt to oppose suchnself-appointed spokesmen for humanity must thereafternmobilize and recognize their own sovereigns. Friend-enemyndistinctions and the threat of war thereby reemerge withoutnlimited national states, in a “battle for humanity.”nFukuyama assumes that these problems would not occur,nif we remained busy making money and practicing internationalndemocracy. However, as Schmitt understood, humansnare “dangerous, dynamic beings” who are willing to fightnover economics as well as territorial differences. Why shouldnpeople stop fighting over others’ acquisitions just becausennnFEBRUARY 1990/17n