plan was upheld by Brennan in directrncontradietion of the explicit language ofrnTitle VII, the antidiscrimination provisionrnof the Civil Rights Act of 1964. AsrnJustice Scalia noted in his astute dissent:rn”In fact, the only losers in the process arernthe Johnsons of the country [Johnsonrnwas the man who, though more qualified,rnwas passed over in favor of a woman],rnfor whom Title VII has been notrnmerely repealed but actually inverted.rnThe irony is that these individuals—predominantlyrnunknown, unaffluent, unorganizedrn—suffer this injustice at thernhands of a Court fond of thinking itselfrnthe champion of the politically impotent.”rnCrime and Punishment. Brennanrnwas an enthusiastic participant in thernrevolution in criminal procedure that isrntypified by Miranda v. Arizona (1966),rnwhere the Warren Court’s obsession withrnand invocation of the “human dignity”rnof the criminal class (somehow the dignityrnof crime victims failed to have anrnimpact on the Court’s thinking) led it, inrncase after ease, to place the most preposterousrnrestrictions on police and prosecutors.rnThe result was predictable: timernand again the jailhouse door was thrownrnopen to release criminals on trivial technicalities.rnAdditionally, Brennan workedrnrelentlessly to have the death penalty declaredrnunconstitutional, notwithstandingrnthe fact that the Constitution itselfrnexplicitly presumes its validity. The basisrnfor Brennan’s concern was again humanrndignity, but the human dignity ofrnthe convicted—not the victim whosernhuman dignity is vindicated by thernpenalty of death. This point goes to therncentral problem with Brennan’s approach;rnas Robert Bork has noted, evenrn”if there were a human dignity clause inrnthe Constitution of the sort Justice Brennanrnwould import, it would not necessarilyrngive the results he wants. A Justicernof different temperament could as easilyrndwell upon the human dignity of thernmurderer’s victim as upon the dignity ofrnthe murderer…. What concepts such asrn’dignity’ and ‘privacy’ mean in applicationrndepends entirely upon the sentimentsrnof each judge.”rnSex and Law. This ongoing phase ofrnthe revolution involves the eradication ofrnany and all sexual distinctions—nornmatter how reasonable—in the law.rnThis ideological assault gained considerablernmomentum in Frontiew v. Richardsonrn(1973). In this case (a discussion ofrnwhich Eisler omits), Brennan struckrndown federal statutes that distributedrnmilitary benefits on the basis of sex. Inrnlanguage that perfectly captures the reductivernand feverish quality of the feministrnlegal mind, he wrote: “There can bernno doubt that our Nation has had a longrnand unfortunate history of sex discrimination.rnTraditionally, such discriminationrnwas rationalized by an attitude ofrn’romantic paternalism’ which, in practicalrneffect, put women, not on a pedestal,rnbut in a cage.” This part of the revolutionrnis ongoing because Justice Ginsburgrnparticipated in this case on behalf ofrnthe American Civil Liberties Union. Inrnother words, the sort of abrasive, stupidrnlanguage that appeared in Frontiero willrndoubtless be seen with increasing—andrndepressing—regularity in the opinionsrnof the Court.rn”This isn’t bad constitutional law,”rnEdwin Meese once commented. “It isn’trnconstitutional law at all.” The casesrndiscussed above, furthermore, are only arnmere sampling, highlights from thernrevolution. Alas, Eisler’s book is silent onrnthe intellectual sources of this revolution.rnBrennan, for example, was veryrnclose to Judge David Bazelon, who canrnonly be described as a kind of extremernversion of Brennan. Who influencedrnwhom? What books shaped Brennan’srnthinking? (Eisler does mention Brennanrnreading St. Thomas Aquinas; one findsrnit, to say the least, difficult to describernBrennan’s work as Thomistic.) This informationrnwould have been helpful in arnbiography, particularly when the subjectrnhas made his name by thinking and writingrnabout the law.rnAs to the question of Brennan’s judicialrnlegacy, it can only be described asrnpernicious. The decisions he wrote orrnsignificantly influenced have fundamentallyrnchanged the way we live. Indeed,rnit is certainly not going too far tornsay that they are one of the main reasonsrnthat we have become a culture obsessedrnwith rights. And Brennan, more than anyrnother Justice, is responsible for transformingrnthe Supreme Court from a constitutionalrnarbiter into a lawless “bevy ofrnPlatonic Guardians” (again. LearnedrnI land’s phrase) and for transmogrifyingrnthe Constitution from a document ofrnordered liberty into an instrument forrncontinuous egalitarian revolution. Whatrnis especially distressing is how firmlyrnBrennan’s influence has been entrenchedrnin both the judiciary and the legalrnacademy. Aside from the occasionalrndissent by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, orrnThomas, or a law-review article by, say.rnLino Graglia, very little is written in oppositionrnto what is now an oppressivernconstitutional orthodoxy. crnReflections on Presidential Sex Preferencesrnhy Kiitlicrinv McAlpiiwrnriiough some wi.sli they could pnl I lillarvrnin a ]5illnr,rnone sinidders and cowersrnto Ihink we could have wound M|5 with (Icnnifer I lowers.rnJUNE 1994/29rnrnrn