grammatical sentences.nAn example of such a universal wouldnbe the fact that sentences in all languagesnare hierarchically rather thannlinearly organized. Because of this propertynor “constraint” the words of a sentencenare analyzable into groups ofnnested units, which in turn may be representednby a system of constituentnbrackets. Thus (ignoring most of thendetails) the sentence The argument fornliberalism that Sampson offers in hisnbook in large part originated in Popper’snnotion of falliblism would be analyzednas follows:n([The argument [for liberalism]] [thatnPrep P NPnSampson offers in his book] ] [ [in largenRelNPnpart] [originated] [in Popper’s notionl ofnadv Vnfalliblism] ] 1nPrep P Prep P VPn(where Prep P:=prepositional phrase,nNP=nominal phrase, Rel=relativenclause, adv=adverb, v=:verb, VP=nverb phrase).nAs you peel away the brackets like thenlayers of an onion the highest level constituentsnthat remain are: (the argument)n(originated) (in Popper’s notion) orn(argument) (originated) (notion). Thenother words in the original sentencenfunction as modifiers, but their locationnin the sentence is controlled by thenhierarchical relation among the threenhighest elements.nThis hierarchical characteristicnof language is revealed even morendramatically when we consider hownquestions are related back to their correspondingnstatements. Logically onenof the infinite ways a language mightnform questions is by reversing the ordernof words in statements. Thus anarchosyndicalismnof proponent a is Chomskynwould be the question correspondingnto Chomsky is a proponent of anarchosyndicalism.nYet no human languagesnhave been discovered that work this way;n14nChronicles of Culturenrather, the word that is moved to formnthe appropriate question (the verb isnin this case) is always chosen on thenbasis of its position in the hierarchicalnstructure of the original sentence.nSuch manipulation games might appearnto be merely some arcane whimsyncooked up by practicing linguists; yetnthey do point to a fundamental conclusion:nthe human brain must, in fact, benspecifically wired for language. ThisnLinguistic creativity, however, doesnoccur in the realm of semantics for it isnin terms of meaning that we truly makenthe world anew. As Sampson explains,nthe power of the human mind is revealednin sentences like “Horseless carriagesntravel rapidly,” a nonsensicalnutterance in 1700. Because we havenchanged the material condition of ournlives, such a sentence is now possibleneven though our syntax—the mediumn”In this very distasteful book Sampson . . . critiques the kind of political views foundnin Noam’s writings … Misreadings of Chomsky’s linguistics abound.”n—Library Journalnmeans that traditional empiricist viewsnof language do not stand up because thenchild does not come to the languagelearningnsituation as a blank slate, butnrather brings a brain with distinct linguisticnmappings or predispositions.nWhat Chomsky makes of this conclusion,nhowever, is not logically supportednby the facts—as Sampson in the remaindernof his book makes manifestlynclear.nL^homsky’s advocacy of the strongnnativist position regarding language acquisitionngets him into a number ofnlogical difficulties which begin with hisnpeculiar notion of creativity. Language,nhe maintains, represents a primary formnof creative behavior because althoughnlanguage contains an infinite set of possiblensentences, these sentences are generatednusing only a finite set of rulesn(the finite grammar that exists in ournheads). This grammar allows us to “create”nand understand new sentences,nsentences which have never been previouslynuttered. But, as Sampson demonstrates,nthis is an impoverished viewnof creativity because it operates only atnthe level of form or syntax. True creativity,nSampson argues, involves producingn”something which falls outsidenthe class implied by any set of principlesnthat might have been proposed to accountnfor previous examples.” And thusnin this sense uttering new sentencesnwould not be a creative activity.nnnthrough which our meanings are conveyed—hasnbasically remained the same.nBy ignoring the semantic basis ofncreativity Chomsky comes to hold anconcept of mind which, because of itsnstrong antiempiricist bias, leads himnin the direction of an authoritariannpolitical philosophy. This philosophyninvolves a definition of freedom innwhich the individual’s economic destinynis determined by collective planning.nThus from the linguistic sphere throughnthe political-economic sphere Chomskynwould have our behavior governed onnthe basis of natural but fixed rules.nSampson, on the other hand, countersnwith Karl Popper’s concept of falliblism,nwhich emphasizes the incurablenignorance of man as a corollary to hisncreative capacity. If life is an ongoingnexperiment (as empiricist methodologynsuggests), then it is impossible to knownthe outcome of our inventions in advance.nThis being the case, we need thensorting device of free competition to seenwhich ideas and goods survive, and thisnis only possible in those societies foundednon liberal principles. It is in such societiesnthat people will stake somethingnof value to see if novelty will succeed.nThus there will be winners and losers,nbut the interests of the losers are alsonserved due to the general upward spiral.nThis in contrast to the efforts of salariedncivil servants, who, as Sampsonnreminds us, “cannot advance us economically,nsince they have nothing ton