found it impossible.nAn short, the ordinary Soviet citizen isna feirly decent person. As Semprun remarks,nthe commutiist rejection of thennatural order and the imposition of anlegal system based upon that rejectionnmake it impossible for “capitalist morality”nto function in the Soviet Union. Un­nhappily, either Simis or his editors didnnot understand this, or they would havenrefrained from equating corruption withn”Soviet capitalism.” For the “parallelnmarket” in Soviet society is corrupt onlynin an abnormal sense: in a normal society,nmuch of what Simis here describes asncorruption would be seen as simply thenfruits of voluntary bargaining. DnRivals, Revulsion, and ResolvenWitnesses to the Origins oftiie ColdnWar; Edited by Thomas T. Hammond;nUniversity of Washington Press;nSeattle.nThe Sino-Soviet Conflict: A GlobalnPerfective; Edited by Herbert J.nEllison; University of WashingtonnPress; Seattle.nby William R. HaddnsnvFreat-power rivalry: in some progressivencircles, mere mention of it isnconsidered reactionary. The concept isnsomething to be relegated to the historynbooks with the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs.nLiberals since the 19th cenmrynbelieve that modern times have vanquishednthe days of constant struggle,nwar, territorial expansion, successionncrises, and imperialism. They are wrong.nThe “great game” goes on; only the playersnand their relative strengths havenchanged over time. The stakes remainnhigh.nThe centerpiece of contemporarynglobal politics is the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.nAs Thomas T. Hammond points out innhis introduction to Witnesses to the Originsnof the Cold War, this rivalry hasnentailed the use of every technique ofnconflict except direct engagement ofnforces. The U.S. has fought Soviet proxies,nallies of each have fought (aS in thenDr. Hawkins is assistant professor ofneconomics at Radford University innVirginianMiddle East), each side has attempted tonoverthrow governments associated withnthe other, the Soviets have invaded bordernstates, fections backed by each powernhave fought civil wars, both sides havenintervened to protect friendly governmentsnfrom insurgents, and there havenbeen confrontations involving the shownof force. There is a widespread feelingntoday that events may soon move beyondnthese “limited” actions to a major warninvolving nuclear weapons.nContrary to mainstream deterrencentheory, history indicates that the periodnof greatest stability occurs not wiiennpowers are equal. Parity leaves open tonquestion which side is superior andntempts the more a^ressive power tonmake an added effort to remove the ambiguity.nThis is particularly true in a systemnwhere one power has been playingn”catch-up” with a dominant power perceivednto be in decay. The use of thenterm “cold war” to describe post-WorldnWar II relations is interesting. A newnterm usually denotes something novelnor exceptional. In the American experience,na period of permanent rivalry andntension is new; to the liberal mind-set,nsuch rivalry is considered an exception,nan aberration, to the “normal” peacefiilnrelations between states. Thus therenmust be an explanation for it. Thosenseeking to provide one generally Mlninto one of two groups. There are thenTraditionalists, who see in Soviet expansion—withnor without an ideologicalnmotive—^the cause of the cold war, andnthe Revisionists, who see the UnitednnnStates as the villain. The latter tend tonhave their perceptions colored by theirnradical ideology: they simply attributenevil intentions to the U.S. because it is ancapitalist system and they apologize fornor ignore Soviet actions. Traditionalistsnmay be either liberal or conservative;nthe group is more varied.nVvitnesses attempts to address thencentral issues of conflict between thenTraditionalists and the Revisionists bynbringing together 10 men who were activenparticipants in American foreignnpolicy during the 1940’s and who havenremained involved in government andnacademic research in the years since.nThe main issues addressed are: (1) werenthe aims of the U.S.S.R. at the end ofnWorld War II defensive or expansionist,n(2) did the U.S. attempt to use its monopolynon atomic weapons to force concessionsnfrom the Soviets, and (3) whatnwas the role of economic interests innAmerican policy? The conclusionsnreached by the contributors and elaboratednon by the editor support the Traditionalistnposition.nWith the exception of George Kennan,nall of the contributors were initiallynfriendly to the Soviets as faithfiil allies innthe war against fascism. This coincidednwith the fact that, except for Kennan,nnone had had any previous direct experiencenwith the Soviets. With contact,nthey quickly discovered the Soviets tonbe secretive, stobbom, dictatorial, andngenerally unreasonable in their demandsnand conduct. Louis Mark, who was withnthe Foreign Service in Hungary, KarlnMautner, who served with the militarynoccupation in Germany, and Martin Herz,nwho was with the Foreign Service in Austria,nwere particularly affected by storiesnof atrocities committed by Soviet troops,nnot just the isolated acts of rape andnplunder committed by soldiers in conquerednterritory but the systematic actsnof the Soviet authorities in looting economicnassets for transport to the U.S.S.R.nand the police tactics used to crush allnpolitical opposition to communism.nH H M UnJune 1983n