Costello: Of course.rnSpellman: And do you want to gornto Heaven?rnCostello: Of course.rn”Then we need you to get us …” andrnCardinal Spellman named the specifiedrnsum, to be turned over as quickly as possible.rnThe funds were supplied forthwith,rnand presumably Frank Costello receivedrnhis pass for the Pearly Gates.rnFantastic as it seems, this story has beenrnchecked out, though it will probably berndenied by the CIA, which was involvedrnin Operation Brook Club.rnBurnham, Hess, and I decided thatrnperhaps Frank Costello might be willingrnto finance our nickel-and-dime operation,rnwith the understanding that shouldrnthe law crowd him too much, his participationrnmight be considered an extenuatingrnfactor. We knew, as well, that thernMafia had little love for any political systemrnthat impinged on its scope and itsrnoperations. To approach Costello wasrncertainly worth trying. Costello’s lawyer,rnI knew, was Ceorge Wolfe, so we calledrnhim and made an appointment. At ourrnfirst visit, we gave Wolfe a schematic account,rnwith almost no particulars, ofrnwhat we were hoping to achieve, and wernhinted diplomatically at how Costello’srnhelp might also help him in the future.rn”You know, of course, that Mr. Costellornis not a rich man,” Wolfe said blandly.rn”But I’ll talk to him. See me next week.”rnWhen we returned the followingrnweek, Wolfe told us that “Mr. Costello isrninterested and would like to know morernof the details.” But, he warned us again,rn”Mr. Costello is, as you know, not a richrnman, and $50,000 is a lot of money.”rnWe suggested that he might have friendsrnand elaborated on our plans. Again wernsere asked to return the following week.rnAt the next meeting a much more expansivernMr. Wolfe assured us that “Mr.rnCostello” was very interested but wantedrneven more details. These we happilyrnsupplied, certain that he was ready tornparticipate and to give us the monev wernneeded.rnBut clearly, Frank Costello was notrngoing to be taken in by what could be arnscheme to relieve him of 50 grand. Asrnwe talked to Ceorge Wolfe, there was arnknock on his office door and three ofrnthe biggest, most sinister-looking bruisersrnwalked in. “We come to get de papers,”rnone said, and for several minutesrnthey carefully stared at us in what wasrnsurcl) an eyeball frisk. Then, havingrnmemorized our faces, they picked up arnhandful of papers from Wolfe’s desk andrndeparted. We got the message and leftrnwith the injunction to return the followingrnweek to get our final and, we wererncertain, affirmative answer.rnBut another kind of history was onrnthe move. Between the time of our visitrnand the time we were to return, EstesrnKefauver and the Senate Committee tornInvestigate Organized Crime set up shoprnin New York, sending out subpoenas tornFrank Costello and other crime figures tornappear at a series of sensational televisedrnhearings. (Frank Costello refused to sitrnfor the cameras, and he made investigatoryrnhistory by allowing only his hands tornbe shown.) When we called Wolfe’s officernto confirm our appointment, it wasrn”James who? Ralph who? Karl who?”—rnand most important, “Frank who?” Thernproject was dead, and Jim Burnham neverrnmentioned it again to either of us or,rnI believe, to anyone else.rnYears later, Karl Hess and I blessedrnthe Kefauver Committee. For on morernserious thought, we realized that thern”triangulation” could easily have blownrnup in our faces. Neither Kari nor I hadrnmuch to lose, but it would have meantrnthe destruction of James Burnham as arnprofessor, a writer of important books,rnand a figure who in the realm of politicsrnand ideas commanded great respectrnfrom most intellectuals, though notrnCeorge Orwell. But even had our halfbakedrnscheme worked, we would havernbeen the target of an enemy not to bernunderestimated, the KCB. Even myrnjournalistic efforts at exposing Soviet espionagernand subversion led in time tornphone calls to my wife, threatening to killrnme and our children. Even here therernwas irony, for when I applied for a permitrnto own and carry a gun, a New Yorkrnsergeant of detectives said, “Nah. Ifrnsomebody takes a shot at you, we’ll letrnyou have it.”rnRalph Robert Toledano writes fromrnWashington, D.C.rnSanctionsrnby Murray N. RothbardrnWar on the CheaprnThe modern weapon of “sanctions”rnseems made-to-order for the foreignrnpolicy of Bill Clinton. Remarkablyrnevasive and unprincipled even for a modernrnpolitician, Clinton is possessed of arnhorror of commitment in both his personalrnand his political life. The armamentariumrnof minute differentia in sanctionsrnallows Clinton to posture at lengthrnas a man of peace or of toughness in foreignrnpolicy while seemingly keeping allrnof his options open. In particular, sanctionsrnallow the President to assumernmoral stances while avoiding any unpleasantrnconsequences.rnSanctions are measures to inflict economicrnpain on countries whose governmentsrnin some way displease the UnitedrnStates. They can range from seizure ofrnthe other country’s assets in the UnitedrnStates to embargoes on financial dealings,rninvestments, or trade. The embargoesrncan range up to all imports to, or exportsrnfrom, the sanctioned country. Thernattractive point to the President is thatrnthey exert coercion upon another countryrnwithout actually dropping Americanrnbombs or sending American troops intornharm’s way. War on the cheap; exertionrnof American force on relatively defenselessrnnations. What could be more attractive?rnBill Clinton, it is true, scarcely inventedrnthe sanction device. It has beenrnused ever since Woodrow Wilsonrnlaunched the perpetual global crusade tornimpose replicas of American institutionsrnthroughout the world. Franklin Roosevelt’srnsanctions against the Japanesernin the late 1930’s—embargoing oil tornJapan and confiscating Japanese financialrnassets in the United States, coupled withrnSecretary of State Hull’s ultimatum tornthe Japanese in late November 1941 tornget out of Indochina, or else—drovernJapan in desperation to attack Peari I larbor,rnthus falling for the trap set by FDRrnto get the United States into World WarrnII against the wishes of the Americanrnpeople. Presidents Reagan and Bush enforcedrnstringent economic sanctionsrnagainst South Africa, under cover ofrnUnited Nations agreement. But withrnBill Clinton, sanctions seem to have tak-rnOCTOBER 1994/45rnrnrn