These diplomats and lawyers also heard about America’s dutyrnand responsibility as a great power to open its market widernto the exports of poor countries facing an international communistrnthreat.rnUneasy about long-term career opportunities in the competitivernforeign service, State Department recruits learned torncultivate foreign contacts and build personal escape routesrnfrom bureaucratic caprice. A strong network of foreign associationsrnmight some day offer a remunerative postgovernmentrncareer. One such State Department official was NoelrnHemirrendinger, a lawyer destined to become one of Japan’srntop foreign agents in Washington. A graduate of Princetonrnand Harvard Law School, where he edited the law review,rnI Icmmendinger served in Wodd War II and then entered thernState Department in 1946. He specialized in Japanese commercialrnmatters at a time when the Truman aird Eisenhowerrnadministrations sought to promote markets for Japanese exportsrnand thus undercut the appeal of communism. Sensitivernto Japanese interests from his years of service in the department,rnIlemmendinger helped write the 1955 bilateral tradernagreement. That pact opened the American market wide tornmost Japanese products, but left the Japanese market relativelyrnclosed to American exports.rnHaving done his public best to rehabilitate the Japaneserneconomy and promote a strong bilateral relationship, Hemmendingerrnleft the State Department to open a trade lawrnpractice. His client base consisted of Japanese. Over timernHemmendinger became an unofficial trade ambassador forrnthe Japanese government and maintained a close associationrnwith the Japanese Embassy in Washington and the ForeignrnMinistry in Tokvo. Repeatedlv, he registered with the JusticernDepartment as a foreign agent.rnOnly a few hundred miles separated Washington, D.C.,rnfrom Bernardsville, New Jersey, population 6,700, where NoelrnHemmendinger began. But after punching his ticket at thernState Department and befriending Japanese export interests,rnHemmendinger found his pot of Potomac gold. The smartrnboy from Bernardsville became an advance agent for Japan’srnexport offensive. In Washington he would extol the virtues ofrnfree trade while deflecting criticisms of Japanese home-marketrnrestrictions, and he would vigorously defend Japanese businessrnwhile laboring to discourage vigorous enforcement ofrnAmerican trade-remcdv laws.rnOver the succeeding years Japan would hire many Hemmendingers,rnformer officials with the State Department orrnother trade agencies who knew the corridors of power. Soon,rntoo, other competitors imitated the Japanese example. Canada,rnTiiwan, Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and many other countriesrnhired former federal government officials to advance theirrncommercial interests.rnDuring the 1970’s and I980’s, as the import assault intensified,rnthe Washington revolving door began to spinrnfaster and faster. Washington, D.C., had discovered Say’s famousrnlaw of economics—supply creates its own demand.rnWith more baby boomers attending law school and scramblingrnfor high-paying professional careers, many turned torngovernment for a career boost. In government, far faster thanrnin a large law firm, they could gain substantive experience, arnnetwork of contacts, and potential clients. Government offeredrnthe fast track to a high-paying partnership.rnOther circumstances benefited trade lawvers. After steeprnKennedy-Round tariff concessions exposed American manufacturersrnand workers to intense competition in the earlyrn1970’s, American public opinion turned against unrestrictedrntrade. For lawyers and lobbyists, the threat of protectionism inrnCongress presented bountiful opportunities—more foreignrnclients and more billable hours.rnResponding to the negative public mood, legislators andrnlawyers on Capitol I lill fashioned a classic inside-the-Beltwayrnresponse. They constructed a complex quasi-judicial procedurernfor adjudicating trade disputes away from politics andrnpolicy concerns. Not surprisingly, the process relied on morernlawyers and litigation. The Trade Acts of 1974 and 1979 couldrnhave been titled “Full Employment Acts for Trade Lawyers.”rnDuring the I980’s, trade-remedy practice became a thrivingrnsource of profit for many Washington law firms. The simplestrnantidumping or countervailing duty case inight cost domesticrnpetitioners $300,000 to $400,000. With multiple foreignrnparties having differing priorities, respondents mightrnspend well over $1 million to defend their interests. Thernbiggest cases involved hundreds of attorneys and expert witnesses.rnThey produced billings in excess of $100 million.rnWith so much money in the regulatory valleys of Washington,rnother professionals sought to join the “gold rush.”rnEconomists succeeded. At the International Trade CommissionrnRichard Boltuck, a Lhiiversity of Chicago all-but-the-dissertationrneconomist, designed a computer-assisted money machinern—that is, an economic model to measure the impactrnof imports on domestic industries. With assistance from severalrncommissioners, eager for ideological reasons to discouragerncase filings, parties to trade-remedy proceedings soon encounteredrnanother costly expense. To win a trade case, theyrnneeded to retain not only lawyers but also economists. Havingrnimposed a new form of tariff on imports—one that divertedrnadditional money from producers of wealth not to fundrngovernment but to retain economists—Boltuck and severalrncolleagues left public employment to prospect for gold.rnDuring my nine years on the ITC from 1981 to 1990, Irnwatched the revolving door spin round and round. Friendsrnand colleagues brieflv punched tickets in the public sectorrnand then left to enjoy foreign lucre.rnI remember vividly certain episodes. One day a senior attorneyrnin our General Counsel’s office came in to shake myrnhand; he was departing for the green fields of private law. Herndid not leave the corridors of government for long. The nextrnbusiness day he reappeared in the Commission hearing roomrnto represent a foreign client in an ITC proceeding. Althoughrnno laws were broken, the episode left a sour taste—and anrnappearance of impropriety.rnOn another occasion, a senior legal counsel walked the ITCrncorridors to lobby staff against an affirmative finding in arnconnnodity case. A few weeks later the same attorney resignedrnto take up employment with the very law firm thatrnhad represented the foreign producers. Some months laterrnwhen a similar case was filed, the former government attorneyrnnow appeared on behalf of foreign respondents. It was anotherrnexample of the revolving door in action.rnSome of the most revolting episodes have involved presidentialrnappointees, especially fellow commissioners. FormerrnITC Commissioner Daniel Minchew gained notoriety in 1978rnwhen he traveled to Japan and signed a private agreement tornrepresent Japanese business interests before he had resigned hisrngovernment post. Several of Minchew’s successors learnedrnMAY199,V31rnrnrn