regime, and the lessons to be learned from the Western experience.rnIndeed, Russia’s neowhites embrace private propertyrnand the market, and, while some remain monarchist, they are,rnin the main, constitutional monarchists. Hence, nationalpatriotsrnreject the patrimonial state, a state in which, accordingrnto historian Richard Pipes, “authority over peoplern(sovereignty) and objects (proprietorship) is combined.” Theyrnpropose instead to build a paternalistic state (they stress “socialrnprotection” for those suffering under “shock therapy”) and findrntheir political and economic mentor in czarist reform ministerrnPytor Stolypin. They envision a New Russia based on thernpeasantry (free farmers owning their own land), a middle classrn(small-business owners, white-collar workers, intelligentsia),rnindustrial workers, and clergy. This vision of a revamped,rnstreamlined Russia combines the elements of effective governancernand economy (rule of law, representative government,rnprivate property) with spirituality (a special place for the churchrnin society) and protection of Russia’s historical patrimonyrn(monuments, churches, natural resources). It is this belief inrnChristianity as the moral basis of society that separates the national-rnpatriots from the extremist elements of the opposition:rnthe virulent anti-Semitism and chauvinism of the secular nationalistrndemagogue Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the flirtations withrnpaganism of the black-shirted storm troopers of Pamyat (Memory),rnthe national Bolshevism of “brown” ex-KGB GeneralrnSterligov, and the communism of the “reds.” The nationalpatriotsrnaccept on the basis of observation and of the historicalrnexperience of Europe, America, and Japan that individual libertyrncoupled with property rights and limited government hasrnbeen largely successful in producing wealthy and relativelyrnstable societies; to that extent they are not anti-Western at all,rnas they are often labeled. The national-patriotic contentionrnthat such a system must be built within the parameters of Russianrnculture and history, with an eye to a revival of Russian traditionsrnand the ideal of a society of small-holders and businessmen,rnis hardly an absurdity. Japan’s success, after all, isrnbased on just such an enterprising plan of national reconstruction.rnYet the label “xenophobia” hangs like an albatross about thernneck of national-patriots. Their reluctance to countenancernlarge-scale foreign investment, a position not held byrncenter-rightists like Rutskoy, doubtless feeds this misperception.rnThe fear of more extreme elements that the West wishesrnto “buy up” Russia as part of a plan to turn her into an exploitedrnmilk-cow, drained of natural resources and receivingrnnothing in return, is balanced by a more levelheaded assessmentrnof massive Western investment as the possible carrier ofrnthe disease that is corroding the West itself from the inside: secularrnhumanism. Again, such sentiments echo those ofrnSolzhenitsyn. In a 1974 interview, while defending himselfrnagainst his critics, Solzhenitsyn pointed to the source of thernWest’s moral decay: the Enlightenment. “Just as mankindrnonce became aware of the intolerable and mistaken deviationrnof the late Middle Ages and recoiled in horror from it, so toornmust we take account of the disastrous deviation of the late Enlightenment.rnWe have become hopelessly enmeshed in ourrnsla’ish worship of all that is pleasant, all that is comfortable, allrnthat is material—we worship things, we worship products.rnWill we ever succeed in shaking off this burden, in giving freernreign to the spirit that was breathed into us at birth, that spiritrnwhich distinguished us from the animal world?” The Enlightenmentrngave birth to the Jacobinism that inspired the Bolsheviks,rnwhile Jacobinism’s errant half-brother, social democracy,rnburrowed itself into the impressionable minds of chatteringrnclasses everywhere. Thus did the “democratic” Trojanrnhorse, complete with a belly full of secular humanist liberalism,rnenter the domain of our own Republic’s borders. Nationalpatriotism,rnhaving survived the Bolshevik virus, understandablyrndoes not wish to expose the battered Russian organism tornanother, albeit milder, strain of that same disease.rnIn his 1990 pamphlet “How Are We to Reconstitute Russia?”rnSolzhenitsyn stresses the importance of the spiritual and moralrnhealth of the individual as the guarantor of a moral and democraticrnsociety. For Solzhenitsyn and like-minded thinkers, thernmistake of man-centered Enlightenment rationalism is misplacedrnfaith in legalistic mechanisms as the foundation of arnlaw-based state. He therefore rejects the humanist faith in bureaucraticrninstitutions with its concomitant legalism. LikernTocqueville, who opined that “if faith be wanting in [man], hernmust be subject; and if he be free, he must believe,” thernnational-patriots, in the words of Solzhenitsyn, hold that “thernmoral origins [of a just society] must stand higher than the judicial”:rnthus their stress on obligations as well as rights, the elementalrnimportance of religion in society, and self-restraint.rnRutskoy’s call for the reanimation of Russia through the village,rnthe whites’ belief in the political power of Russian Orthodoxy,rnand Solzhenitsyn’s stress on individual morality are not onlyrnmodern-day reflections of 19th-century Slavophile articles ofrnfaith, but manifestations of a deeper insight, once commonlyrnheld in the West: that democratic institutions are built fromrnthe bottom up through an organic civil society, which evolvesrnfrom voluntary associations of individuals acting within restraintsrnbuilt on religion, tradition, and custom. Tocquevillernwell knew that liberty and individualism may degenerate intornselfish egoeentrism, that men must “preserve their religion asrntheir conditions become more equal” to counteract the “dangerousrnpropensities” present in the democratic system thatrn”tend to isolate [men] from each other, to concentrate everyrnman’s attention upon himself [thereby opening] the soul to anrninordinate love of material gratification.”rnFor the national-patriots, democracy is not an end in itself,rnwhose establishment has meaning through the fulfillment ofrnprophesies about the “end of history” or through acceptance intorna New World Order. Democracy is a means to revive Russiarnand free her from the tyranny that curbed her developmentrnas a nation during “times of trouble” in the prerevolutionaryrnperiod and sought to destroy or warp her national identity underrnthe communist regime. Victor Aksyuchits, Chairman ofrnthe Russian Christian Democratic Movement, sees democracyrnas “a system in which society itself can act on its politicalrnwishes.” Rutskoy envisions Russia as a great power once more,rnrevived and strengthened by democratic reforms. Solzhenitsynrnsays “we choose democracy with an awareness of its shortcomings,”rnprimarily to “avoid tyranny.” Likewise, nationalpatriotsrnchoose democracy as an instrument for the bettermentrnof the nation, not as a replacement ideology for communism.rnThe secular, ideological “democracy” of the universalists of thernGlobal Village school is what Solzhenitsyn identifies as one ofrnthe West’s “weaknesses,” a pitfall national-patriots hope tornavoid. Believing that only Russians can determine what isrnbest for Russia—and where and how to proceed with reforms—rnit is no surprise that the national-patriots resent the diktat ofrnIMF conditions for economic reform and reject dependency onrn26/CHRONICLESrnrnrn