original Leninist sense, i.e. that the Russiannrevolution would spark similar revolutionsnelsewhere, was always a mirage.nPerhaps if they had been better led, communistsnmight have succeeded in seizingnpower in Berlin and Vienna in 1919, butnthey could not have retained it. Evennsuch a temporary victory was possible onlynin countries that had suffered defeat:nthere was no possibility of a successfulncommunist takeover in advanced countriesnin 1919. The Russian, Leninist, typenof revolution could not be repeated innthe West because of the structure ofnmodern societies. (In fact, it could not benrepeated elsewhere, either—communistnrevolutions in underdeveloped countriesnhave all been quite different from thenoriginal Bolshevik takeover.) Only in anfew countries have a majority of industrialnworkers been converted to thensupport of the Communist Party—andneven this is no real indication of a revolutionarynmood or true willingness to fight.nIn the rare cases where a revolutionarynmood has actually existed, it has beennshown that communist-led workers cannotntake over a modern society; the governmentnand the other classes of societynare simply too strong. The idea of an”world revolution” in the sense of a totalncommunist victory by other niethods,nhowever, is not impossible at all. Suchnrevolution by way of Soviet military conquest,npolitical manipulation and communistntakeovers in backward countriesnis not in any sense a mirage.nBy exaggerating the influence of thenComintern and the strength of CommunistnParties, the authors distort thenhistory of communism. It is not true, fornexample, that Comintern directed then1919 uprisings, and most EuropeannCommunist Parties were not originallynSoviet puppets. It was several yearsnbefore European communism camenunder Soviet control through the Comintern.nThe authors seem unaware of thisnlong and difficult process. Indeed, theynseem barely aware of—or are uninterestednin—the real inner history of thenComintern, its policies and the terriblenthings it did do.n40inChronicles of CttlturenThe real influence exerted by thenComintern in the era between the warsnwas not through the intrigues that Brownnand MacDonald discuss, but in its “missionarynefforts” and its manipulation ofnCommunist Parties abroad. While thenComintern did not succeed in actuallynmaking a revolution anywhere, it creatednthe communist movement in Asia. InnEurope, the Comintern’s actions didncontribute to events which precipitatednWorld War II, although it is one aspect ofnthe nazi era that is usually downplayednby fashionable historians. The policiesndictated by the Sixth Comintern Congress—andnsupported by Stalin—madenthe Weimar Republic and its supporters,nrather than the nazis, the main enemynfor the German Communist Party. It isnunlikely that the nazis would have beennable to take power in Germany had thenReds followed a different course.n(Whether a nazi victory was Stalin’s realnaim is still an open question.) Thentremendous role of the communists innthe German catastrophe is virtually ignorednby Brown and MacDonald; theynmention it only in the context of discussingna rather unlikely claim that Stalinnonce subsidized the nazi party.nIn October 1956 Britain and France,nenraged by Egypt’s seizure of the SueznCanal and Nasser’s hostility, combinednwith Israel to attack Egypt. With an easynvictory almost complete, they werenforced to back down by a weird alliancenof the United States and the SovietnUnion. President Eisenhower’s belief innthe mle of international law, and somenspecific doubts about the wisdom of ournIn the Mailnallies’ policies, forced him into thatndistasteful action. He could hardly havenforeseen that some would perversely hailnit as his finest hour.nDonald NefPs repellent, sleazy, misleadingnaccount of the Suez-Sinai Warnmarks a new step in fashionable thinkingnabout the Middle East. A new step, butnnot a new trend, for Neff merely continuesnthe well-established tradition of leavingnbehind reality and truth when dealingnwith the Middle East. He portrays thenAnglo-French-Israeli war against Egyptnas a brutal act of aggression, a “last effortnto pound Egypt and the Middle Eastnback into subservience to colonialism.”nIn addition to elaborating on an oldnmyth, Neff tries to concoct a new one—nnamely that President Eisenhower “tooknAmerica into the Middle East.” BeforenSuez, Neff says, “America’s involvementnin the region was minimal.” Thisnclaim is absurd; the Middle East was onenof the major theaters of the Cold Warnfrom the moment that stmggle started.nNefFs treatment of Israel and its rolenin 1956 verges on the bizarre; in essence,nit is an attempt to publicize the Arabnpropaganda version of events and an effortnto link Israel to the bugaboo ofn”colonialism.” According to Neff, then”real problem” in the Middle East is thenArab-Israeli conflict; if only that problemncould be solved to the satisfaction ofn”the Arabs” (which Arabs?) all would benwell —there would be peace in the MiddlenEast. In light of the Iran-Iraq war andnthe numerous conflicts between thenArab states, the absurdity of his claim isnmanifest. Unfortunately it appeals to thenwishful thinking of many.nConstraining Inflationary Government by Antonio Mattino; The Heritage Foundation;nWashington, D.C. An analysis of the nature of inflation and government growth, with particularnreference to the Italian fiscal constitution.nChristianity and Politics: Catholic and Protestant Perspectives edited by Carol Friedley Griffith;nEthics and Public Policy Center; Washington, D.C. A collection of essays dealing withnthe relationship of the Christian ethic to a broad political and social order and the applicationnof the Christian ethic to particular areas of public policy.nCatching Kre by Kay Nolle Smith; Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; New York. A conservativenthriller about unionism as a villain, which hardly makes it a mystery.nnn