Inquisition. The Ombudsman “shall have access to and mavrnexamine all official documents, including classified ones, asrnwell as judicial and administrative files, and can require any person,rnincluding a government official, to cooperate by providingrnrelevant information, documents and files.” A party “identifiedrnas violating any human rights shall, within a specified period,rnexplain in writing how it will comply with the conclusions” ofrnthe Ombudsman. In the event that “a person or entity doesrnnot comply with his or her conclusions and recommendations,”rnthe Ombudsman can forward a report to the High Representative;rnthat is, to the person who will serve as the U.N. SecurityrnCouncil’s colonial governor of Bosnia (despite Clinton’s claimsrnthat IFOR is a NATO operation, Article VI of Annex 1-A seeksrnto justify intervention under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,rnas were the other “peace enforcement” operations in Somaliarnand Haiti).rnThe High Representative is “the final authority in theater”rnregarding the interpretation of the civilian aspects of the DavtonrnAccord. He will monitor the peace settlement; promoterncompliance b}- the Entities and coordinate the activities of allrncivilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.rnThe High Representati’e will also chair the Joint Civilian Commission,rnwhich will include representatives from the Bosnianrngovernment, the Entities, the IFOR commander, and “thoserncivilian organizations and agencies the High Representativerndeems necessary.” This will be the real goernment of Bosniarnand Herzegovina. The High Representatives can even set uprnlocal versions of the Joint Civilian Commission anvwhere inrnBosnia and establish other commissions as needed to “facilitaternthe execution of his or her mandate.”rnThe High Representative will give “guidance” to the U.N.rnInternational Police Task Force (UNIPTF), which in turn willrnadvise, train, monitor, and inspect all law enforcement activitiesrnand facilities, including associated judicial organizations inrnBosnia and the Entities. Bosnia and the Entities will “upon requestrnby the UNIPTF . . . make available for training qualifiedrnpersonnel.” Any failure to cooperate with the UNIPTF or tornobstruct its operation will result in a complaint to the HighrnRepresentative and the IFOR commander.rnIFOR is the muscle behind any policies pursued by the civilianrnadministrators. The greatest danger of renewed war willrncome from any concerted movement of refugees across the partitionrnlines to reclaim lost territory. The possible use of refugeesrnas a tool to expand the domain of the Bosnian regime was raisedrnby Bosnian Ambassador-at-Large Muhamed Sacirbey at BrownrnUniversity on November 30. “It is not a just peace,” said thernambassador. “We don’t want to be divided… . We don’t wantrnpaper with signatures, we want. . . freedom of movement andrnthe right to return to home villages.” It is well known that suchrna “peaceful” invasion would be resisted. Refugees are unlikelyrnto cross the lines without armed escorts, but neither the Muslim-rnCroat Federation nor the Serb Republic have the strengthrnto carry out such an expansionist polic}-.rnBut the international regime in Bosnia does have the powerrnand the ideological commitment to multiethnic integration.rnAnnex 1-A, Article VI gives IFOR the mission “to observe andrnprevent interference with the mo’ement of civilian populations,rnrefugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriatelyrnto deliberate violence to life and person.” Annex Se’enrngives refugees and displaced persons “the right freely to returnrnto their homes or origin. They shall have the right to have restoredrnto them property of which they were deprived in therncourse of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for anyrnproperty that cannot be restored to them.” A Commission forrnDisplaced Persons and Refugees will supervise this process andrnrule on the validity of claims. This commission will have ninernmembers, two from each ethnic group, and the remainingrnthree (including the chairman) appointed bv the EuropeanrnCourt of Human Rights.rnWith the constitution, police, central bank, refugees, andrn”human rights” in the hands of foreign officials for the rest ofrnthe century, Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be considered arn”state” in any meaningful sense. It has been turned into an internationalrnprotectorate at best, a laboratory for liberal politicalrnand social experimentation at worst. A one-year commitmentrnof IFOR troops will not suffice to keep this intrusive regime inrnplace for the five- or six-year transition period envisioned in thernDayton Accord. The constitutional gridlock imposed on Bosnianrninstitutions would normally result in the strengthening ofrnthe Entities as the only effective goernments. Howe’er, thernforeign authorities are not constrained by any constitutionalrnchecks and balances, nor by the workings of democrac)’ for thatrnmatter, despite the rhetorical emphasis being placed on preparingrnBosnia and the Entities for free elections.rnThis is a much broader and deeper commitment than thernAmerican people realize. It runs far beyond mere “peacekeeping.”rnIt is nothing less than the total, systematic restructuringrnof Bosnian society in accord with liberal-utopian values thatrnhave little chance of taking root. This is a full-blown expressionrnof the “enlargement” of American foreign policy, which hadrnbeen the hallmark of the Clinton administration. The case forrnthe massive reconstruction of war-torn societies was set out byrnAnthony Lake long before he became National Security Advisor.rnThe expense will be enormous in terms of foreign assistancernon top of the costs of the military deplo}ment. As Lakernargued in a 1990 monograph for the Overseas DevelopmentrnCouncil, “it is safe to say that the needs of these societies . . .rnwill outstrip the available assistance. This should not be so. Asrnmany have argued, enhanced foreign aid programs would takernup only a very small share of expected peace dividends in thernUnited States and other donor nations.” He then went on tornurge that “the response of the United States, and others, shouldrnnot be based only on a narrow definition of national interest.”rnAdministration officials have looked far and wide for somewherernto implement these notions. Bosnia is their new laboratory,rnproviding a larger scope for experimentation than eitherrnSomalia or Haiti.rnThe American public has not been treated to a very deep discussionrnof the broader issues. Debate has not moved much beyondrnthe question of whether Bosnia is worth the cost of thernpurely military intervention on which the media have concentrated.rnClinton’s lackluster trip to Bosnia failed to spark renewedrndiscussion of American policy. Indeed, the trip’s veryrnlack of substance seemed calculated to reinforce the administration’srnclaim that the mission is of limited scope and duration.rnYet, if the public is unconvinced of the wisdom of even thernminimalist view of the operation which has been presented tornthem, thcv vill find the full implementation of the Dayton Accordrnhard to swallow. This larger agenda, with its many dangersrnof confrontation and prolonged involvement, is only slowlyrncoming into view. If mission creep is not to break into full gallop,rntight oversight by Congress and concerned outside groupsrnwill have to be exercised in the months ahead. crn14/CHRONICLESrnrnrn