Hon of Lebanon, and is now pushingnfor another on the West Bank.nRichard H. Shultz Jr., of the FletchernSchool of Law and Diplomacy, examinesnSoviet strategy based on four casenstudies: Vietnam, the PLO, Angola,nand Nicaragua. From these he identifiesnpatterns in Moscow’s use of politicaln(propaganda, front groups, internationalnorganizations) and military (training,nadvisors, arms shipments, and surrogatentroops) measures.nPropaganda seeks to isolate the targetnregime from outside support while promotingnthe rebels as the only legitimatenrepresentatives of the people. The programnof the rebels may vary, but thenregime is always portrayed as anreactionary tool of the United States,nregardless of the actual state of USnrelations with the target. Thus all propagandanserves to reinforce the mainnSoviet theme that the US is the principalnevil in the world. Interestingly, thisnanti-American line works as well insidenthe US as outside. In Cuba, Iran, andnNicaragua, rebel success followed thentermination of US support for the targetnregime.nAmong the front groups, the WorldnPeace Council plays a major role innevery case. Front group propaganda isnharsher in tone than Soviet efforts,nreflecting its closer association with activists.nThe Soviets also use internationalnconferences, the UN, and the Non-nAligned Movement (led by Cuba) tonpromote the legitimacy of the revolution.nThe UN has been particulariynuseful in the Middle East and Africa.nThe Soviets are lavish in their supplynof arms. Moscow will use covert methodsnuntil their propaganda has made thenrebels sufficiently acceptable to providendirect supplies. World opinion allowsnthe Soviets a high degree of deniability.nEven weapons shipped through Cuba,nNorth Vietnam, or Syria do notn”prove” Soviet involvement. Training isnprovided in surrogate states by SovietnFor Immediate ServicenChroniclesnSUBSCRIBERSnTOLL FREE NUMBERn1-800-435-0715nILLINOIS RESIDENTSn1-800-892-0753n24/CHRONICLESnand East Bloc advisors, with selectedncadres taken to the USSR itself Politicalnindoctrination is as important as militaryntraining. However, training foreign radicalsndoes not guarantee a future commitment,nsince Moscow trains manynterrorists simply as agents of disruption.nThey may never be able to seize power,nbut they can spread anarchy in thennoncommunist world with a minimalninvestment of Soviet resources.nThe Soviets also provide help innconsolidating power in captured territory.nEast German and Bulgarian advisorsnspecialize in the creation of secret policenand internal security troops, while Soviet,nCuban, and Vietnamese advisorsnconcentrate on mobilizing resources forna military buildup, turning the conquerednnation into a base area for thennext advance.nThe hammer and anvil strategy evidentnin revolutionary war, wherenpropaganda and terrorism weakens antarget state until a final offensive isnlaunched by heavily armed conventionalnforces, is also part of the Soviets’ ownnplan for a general war. Viktor Suvorov isnthe pseudonym for a former Red Armynintelligence officer who defected to thenWest. As a member of the CRU, Suvorovnwas involved in the training of elitenSpetsnaz troops and the formation ofnplans for their use. It is Spetsnaz thatnwill play the role of guerrillas, strikingndeep behind the lines in Europe andnAmerica in the days and hours beforenthe Soviets unleash their tank arrriies inna blitzkrieg across the North Germannplain.nThe Soviets made extensive use ofnpartisan bands behind German lines innWorid War II to make the kind ofntheater interdiction attacks that the USnused airpower to perform. WhennNATO introduced nuclear weapons toncounter the larger Warsaw Pact armies,nSpetsnaz was created as a force thatncould destroy nuclear weapon storagenareas and launch sites by surprise attack.nThe list of targets has grown asnSpetsnaz has grown. Ports and navalnbases, railways and bridges, oil storagensites and pipelines (including those innAlaska), power plants and communicationsncenters are obvious targets. So arenpolitical leaders, both those in powernand among the opposition — anyonenwho could provide legitimate nationalnnnleadership. Key military commandersnwould also be assassinated. Suvorovnemphasizes the importance attached tonkilling the President before he can benalerted and moved to a secure commandnpost.nSpetsnaz units would infiltrate thenopen societies of the West in peacetime,nusing resident agents in the Westnto provide them with safehouses, food,nand vehicles. These agents are quiet,neveryday people who avoid politics.nThe Soviets want older, settled people,npreferably retired, far removed fromnany sensitive jobs. People no one wouldnhave cause to investigate. They worknfor pay, waiting for the day when then”visitors” arrive to use the supplies theynhave set aside.nSuvorov’s final chapter oudines operationsnthat might take place beforenopen war breaks out. Included: phonynscandals discrediting key NATO generals,nthe “accidental” sinking of anfreighter in the Panama Canal, and thenbombing of the White House. Suvorovncould keep writers of political thrillersnin business for the next decade, but henis not, unfortunately, spinning fiction.nHe also gives details of the brutalntraining Spetsnaz troops withstand andnof their weapons and tactics.nOf interest is the connection betweennSpetsnaz and the Soviet sportsnprogram. “The Soviet Army needs annenormous number of people with exceptionalnathletic ability at Olympicnlevel to carry out special missions behindnenemy lines,” writes Suvorov.nThis makes Spetsnaz “a mixture ofnsport, politics, espionage and armednterrorism.” The army maintains a vastnsystem of teams to which most of thennation’s top athletes are recruited (thenlargest sports organization in the USSRnis the Central Army Sports Club).nSports without any military application,nlike golf, receive no support. Sportsnpractice is mixed with commandontraining. Through participation in internationalncompetitions, these soldierathletesnare able to travel to targetncountries to get a feel for the territory.nWhile the Soviets have worked hardnto improve their techniques, the USnhas found it increasingly difficult to act.nIn the early, days of the Cold War,nSoviet drives were turned back innGreece, Korea, Guatemala, and Iran.nBut by the 1960’s, liberal opinion wasnfinding such wars distasteful. Cuba wasn