gue views ideology as “a purportedlynscientific doctrine which reveals thensecret of the human condition” and isn”associated with a specific class ofnperson nominated as the bearers of thenmotor of history.” “Ideology explainsnevil and facilitates change” and announcesnthat “the business of life isnliberation,” even if most people livenunder the illusion that they are freenand do not realize that “what we donand what we think are actually determinednby the structure” of society.n”Ideology’s core,” Minogue finds, “isnreason’s protest against an irrationalnworld.”nModern ideology, says Minogue,nwas born in the 1840’s when Marxntransformed the Christian doctrine ofnalienation of man from God into anmaterialist doctrine of alienation ofnman from man and from himselfnIdeologists rejected free will andnblamed alienation on men’s livingnwithin a “system” that determines allnthoughts and actions. Marx claimednscientific status for his theory butncould not keep moral condemnationnout of his analysis, although logicallynthe oppressors, too, are products of thensystem. The ideologist must unmasknthe hidden structure and raise thenconsciousness of the now-passive victimsnso that they will share his “revelation.”nThe world is divided into thosenwho know and everyone else. Ideologynis, then, essentially elitist, although itsnbearers see themselves as humblenteachers of the truth.nIn arguing with opponents, the ideologistndoes not behave like a scholar,nwho admits the fallibility of his reasoningnand weighs evidence impartially.nThe ideologist uses ad hominem argumentsnand other illegitimate techniquesnof rhetoric to discredit his adversaries,nfor there can be no realndebate with mouthpieces of the enemynor victims of false consciousness. Innhis effort to propagate the truth, thenideologist must take possession of thenpast, for ideology “turns history into anbackdrop to liberation.” Wherever ideologistsnhave won power, however,nthey have instituted more tyranny thannthey have overthrown; “the charge thatncapitalist society suppresses all exceptncapitalist ideas”—which of course isnuntrue—“is a blueprint for the censorshipnand control exercised by ideologicalnsocieties.”nThe ideologists’ goal of Utopia isnambiguous. Being perfect, the futurensociety must be static. But because it isnto follow the liberation of humanitynfrom alien constraints, it must be opennto whatever changes free people bringnabout. A related ambiguity clouds ideologicalnpolitics: “whereas the doctrinenof ideology assumes that mankind isnenslaved, politics is an activity of thenfree.” Ideologues involved in politicsnstill somehow interpret everything politically.nThey see politics as the clashnof “interests,” which are “ultimatelynderived from the structure of domination.”nPolitics aims at compromise andntemporary occupancy of office; ideologistsnwork for one revolution, once andnfor all. The state is not neutral but anninstrument of the dominant interest.nIdeologues are confused at this point:nthey sometimes succeed in their campaignsnfor change, but “if popularnpressure can achieve so much, whatncan it not achieve?”nMany readers will find these propositionsn(and Minogue’s refutations) allntoo familiar. Yet Minogue’s referencesnto previous studies are scanty andnsometimes misleading. He virtually ignoresnthe contributions of GordonnLeff, Peter Berger, and my own ThenRadical Persuasion, 1890-1917, asnwell as important contributions bynGerhart Niemeyer and Eric Voegelin.nI mention these omissions only tonstress the difference between insightsnthat depend on the accidental brilliancenof a rare individual and thosenthat are accessible to anyone with thenrequisite knowledge and interest. Thisndifference has implications for thenanalysis of the epistemological questionnthat Minogue explicitly recognizesnas central to his project.nA substantive weakness of Minogue’sncritique derives from his perceptionnof the relationship, in thenideologist’s mind, between beliefs andnemotion. Minogue says that the ideologistnis dominated by his one rulingnthought and insists on bringing everynfact and event under that one rubric.nYet we all know people who believe innfeminism or some other ideology butnare not possessed by it and do notnexplain everything in its terms. Wenalso know people who are possessed bynwhat most people would ordinarilynregard as sensible opinions—such asnanticommunism—but who fail to dis­nnnplay other traits on Minogue’s list.nEvidently, it is possible to embrace annonideological belief-system in an ideologicalnway, and an ideology in annonideological way. Minogue’s confusionnon this point leads to uncertaintynabout American liberalism—whethernit is or is not an ideology. (Throughoutnthe book he uses “liberalism” in itsnEuropean sense, as a Good Thing.) Atnone point he implies that “reformism”noccupies a gray area or stopping-placenbetween ideology and truth, but thenquestion is left hanging.nStill another weakness is the failurento present opponents’ arguments inntheir strongest forms and to anticipatentheir responses to his refutations.nSince ideologies are polemical by nature,ntheir defenses areintegral parts ofntheir very structures. As a former ideologistnmyself, I easily thought of repliesnto many of Minogue’s refutations.nUnfortunately, he did notnpresent the rejoinders that would havenstrengthened his arguments. Moreover,nhe presents a Marx who couldnnever have won millions of intelligentnfollowers. He misstates Marx’s theorynof surplus value in four widely separatednplaces in the book. Minogue’sninterpretation—that the worker’s surplusnproduct is stolen from him by hisnemployer—was precisely the theorynthat Marx set out to refute. Marxnproposed a “scientific” explanation innwhich the employer makes a profitnafter paying the worker the full valuenof the letter’s labor power. The employer,naccording to Marx, owns thenproduct the moment it comes intonexistence, and therefore cannot steal itnfrom the worker, because the workernhas sold him not the product but hisnlabor power for a certain period.nMinogue also ridicules Marx’s statementnthat man makes his own historynbut within certain constraints on thengrounds that Marx’s “but” re’eals thencontradiction in environmental determinism.nBut every philosophy mustngrapple with this problem; the relationshipnbetween free will and externalninfluences is more difficult, and Marxna more subtle thinker, than one wouldngather from Minogue’s critique.nOn other occasions, Minogue winsnhis arguments with ideologists by redefiningntheir terms his way. For example:n”freedom is the nonentity of thenideological terminus” — meaning (InAPRIL 1986/33n