promising them that if elected, he will put a stop to the unconstitutionalrnaggrandizement of the welfare state, pursued aggressivelyrnby ever}’ Canadian government since Trudeau came tornpower in 1968. He has also promised to end social engineeringrnby the courts, which began when I’rndeau imposed a writtenrnbill of rights in 1982. To the horror of the elites, Day insists thatrnCanada is more than a U.N. ranking, more than the sum of itsrn”sacred” (Mulroney’s word) social-safety net. Day offers arnchoice, not an echo, hi response, the national newsweeklyrnMaclean’s, in best “threat or menace?” style, headlined its firstrncover story on Day, “How scary?”rns tockwell Day is the first avowedlyrnconsewative leader of a majorrnnational Canadian party inrnliving memory.rnThe same claims were made about another Canadian politicalrnleader, Preston Manning. But to understand why Manningrnwas never a threat to the establishment, we need to consider hisrnReform Partv (the Alliance’s predecessor) and why it failed.rnReform was founded in 1987, mostly by disgruntled Consen’ativesrnand Western separatists willing to give Canadarnanother chance, and as a solution to the alienation of the West,rnwhose wealth is confiscated for the benefit of the more populousrnEast. (Note the striking similarity to Umberto Bossi’s LegarnNord.) Its first slogan was “The West Wants In.” What Manningrnwanted, however, was something else. The party originallyrnrepresented only the Western provinces of British Columbia,rnAlberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba; but in 1991 Manningrnpersuaded part)- members to take it national. This eliminatedrnits raison d’etre but allowed Manning the possibility of becomingrnprime minister. He continued to campaign for structuralrnreform, specificall) an American-style Senate and directrndemocracy in the form of referenda and citizen initiatives.rnDespite Reform’s successes in the elections of 1993 and 1997rn(when it became the official opposition), it won only one seat inrnEastern Canada in 1993 (when the ruling Conservatives werernreduced to two seats) and none in 1997. Reform twice managedrnno better than 19 percent of the vote in Ontario, equalrnwitii the Conservatives. ‘This vote-splitting allowed the Liberalsrnin both elections to capture almost ever)’ Ontario seat; in 1997,rnthev took 101 of 103 seats there and thus won a pariiamentaryrnmajority with only 38 percent of the national vote. (Quebecrncontinues to be dominated by the separatist Bloc Quebecois.rnYet with the passage of the Clarit)’ Act, which dictates secessionrnconditions, the Liberals have removed fear of separation—whatrnPeter Brimelow named “the Patriot game”—from the politicalrnagenda. The moribund Consenativcs hold 15 seats, the sociaLrnist New Democrats 19.)rnManning never understood tliat his triumphs in the West,rnwhere Reform became the leading party, were due to regionalrnalienation, not to any great fondness for systemic restructuring.rnIt never made sense that Eastern Canadians would vote Reform:rnOntario and Quebec together command an absolute majorih’rnin the House of Commons, and tiiey like the system thernway it is. Other parties would have dealt with this problem byrnselecting a new leader, but Manning persuaded party membersrnthat the fault was not witir him but with Reform’s regional “image.”rnThe result was the Canadian Alliance: a merger betweenrnReform and disaffected federal and provincial Conservativesrnthat was Manning’s attempt to reconstruct the very nationalrncoalition he had deconstructed in 1987.rnReceived wisdom is that Manning failed in Ontario becausernhis “scary” social conservatism frightened the supposedly liberalrnOntario electorate, but this profoundly misjudges the man.rnDespite his personal beliefs, which are almost identical tornDa’s, Manning refused to appeal to natural Reform supportersrn—blue-collar workers, European immigrants. Catholics —rnbecause he refused to admit that politics is a zero-sum game.rnDescribed routinely b}’ the Canadian and foreign media as arn”conservative,” Manning was nothing of the sort, as he was thernfirst to point out. He was a “populist,” and he liked to comparernReform to a hockey team, which has a left wing, a right wing,rnand a center. He was described as a “policy wonk,” but his realrnobsession was process. Always becoming and never being.rnManning was, in the words of former advisor Thomas Elanagan,rn”waiting for the wave”: the tide of national alienation hernwould ride to power. “Everywhere that rises must converge,” asrnPierre Teilhard de Chardin said, and it is strange that no onernhas ever noted the parallels between Manning’s thought andrnthat of the heretical French Jesuit: Like Teilhard, Manning believedrnthat greater complexit}- would lead to higher consciousnessrnand that man (or, at least, Canadian man) was evolving tornan omega point. And at the end, presiding over the great reconciliationrnwould be .. . Preston Manning.rnThus, Manning’s concerns were more sacred than profane,rnand Reform was not so much a political party as a cult. My colleaguernColby Cosh dubbed Manning’s shock troops the “Presuits,”rnand they rooted out heresy assiduously. Purges came asrnnaturall}’ to Reform as they do to the Randians. Anyone whornthreatened to create a rival power base, doubted Manning’srnleadership, or stood firm on matters of principle was frozen outrnor expelled.rnThe most egregious example of Manning’s tyrannical leadershiprnwas his temporary expulsion from the caucus in 1996 ofrntwo MPs who had spoken out against the legal recognition ofrnhomosexual equalit}’—which was Reform’s own position. Accusedrnof “homophobia,” Manning panicked. He later justifiedrnhis action in a bizarre article in which he declared that discriminationrn—anywhere, under any circumstances—would not berntolerated by the Reform Party.rnMuch as Refornrers chafed under Presuitical rule, it was acceptedrnthat, so long as the party existed. Manning would lead it.rnUnfortunately for him, however. Reform had a sunset clause inrnits constihition: Unless it formed a government by the end ofrn1999, die part- would dissolve. Coodbye Reform Party, hellornCanadian Alliance. The Alliance, however, was mocked as arnmere makeover: as Mulroney put it, “the Refonn Party in pantyhose.”rnManning understood that, if the Alliance was to havernan’ credibility, he must allow a leadership contest. Manningrndid not help his own cause by waging a particulariy insouciantrncampaign, acting as if he were running for president of the ElksrnClub or student council. He advanced no policies and appealedrnexclusively to residual party loyalt’. After the first ballot,rnin which he trailed Stoekwell Day 36 percent to 44 percentrn(there were three other candidates), he sealed his doom by per-rn22/CHRONICLESrnrnrn