both the left and the right. Only briefly,nin 1970, as a result of an “hysterical”ndecision by Nixon (whose attention tonthe Chilean problem was erratic) did thenCIA ever become involved in a plot tonoverthrow the Chilean government.nMeyer’s account is similar to thosenwritten by such Chile experts as PaulnSigmund and Robert J. Alexander, albeitnmore favorable to the Agency.nOince the Iranian revolution, manynpeople have had second thoughts aboutnthe value and morality of covert action.nIt is therefore important to note Meyer’snemphasis on the use and limitations ofncovert action. “Covert political actionnshould not be viewed as a last-minutenquick fix or as a desperate alternativento sending in the U.S. Marines. Its effectivenessndepends upon a correct analysisnof the complex political forces at worknin a foreign country. It can succeed onlynif it is consistently pursued over a periodnof time, as it was by Kennedy andnJohnson in Chile, and is justified onlynby the extent of the threat posed by thenSoviet’s covert intervention on the sidenof their Communist allies.” Meyer insistsnthat until the Hughes-Ryan amendmentnis repealed, covert action will notnagain be a viable option. He also warns:n”So long as the Soviets remain committednto continuing massive intervention,nthe policy of nonintervention innthe internal affairs of other countriesnis a declaration of unilateral politicalndisarmament by the United States.”nMeyer’s account of external interventionnin the Angolan war is perhapsnthe best brief account yet available. Innpassing, he penetratingly analyzes thenfolly of the Kissinger, Nixon and Fordnforeign policies as revealed by the Angolannaffair. In dealing with Angolan”the appearance of detente was maintained,nwhile we attempted to competenin a covert rivalry in which the Sovietsnheld the high cards because of the pervasivensecrecy of their system and thenvulnerability to exposure of the CIAncovert capability.” In fact covert actionnwas asked to do the impossible. ThenSoviets’ overt, if indirect, interventionnwith Cuban puppet forces simplynswamped anything that the CIA couldnsecretly do against them.nMeyer is not too optimistic aboutnthe future in Africa, where the Sovietsnhave moved skillfully and decisively,nmaking the most of even initially unfavorablensituations. “By the time Inleft the government and retired fromnthe Agency at the end of 1977, thenSoviets seemed to me to be well on thenway to positioning themselves for thenfinal assault on their major geopoliticalnAfrican objective. South Africa itself.”nThe South Africans must be pressed tonmake a settlement with their blacknmajority subjects; should they fail tondo this, Meyer does not seem to thinknwe can do much. A position almost asnfavorable has been created in Yemennand the Horn of Africa, which, withnSoviet activities to the north, has putnthe Middle East in the jaws of a widenpmcer.nThe last third of the book skillfullynpresents the facts of our present predicamentnand Meyer’s experienced viewnof the situation, making Facing Realityna worthy companion to Norman Podhoretz’snexcellent book. The PresentnDanger. Meyer notes that since the earlyn70’s, even the gloomiest prognoses ofnthe Soviet arms build-up have been consistentlynoveroptimistic; the Sovietsndefinitely aim at achieving a superiornwar-fighting ability for the purpose ofnpolitical blackmail, Meyer believes,nrather than of premeditated attack.nAmerica needs a new foreign-policynconsensus and a sensible overall policy.nMeyer is basically proud of the CIA’snrecord, perhaps overproud, but, henwarns, “even the best intelligence onnthe intentions’ and capabilities of othernnations cannot rescue a basically misconceivednand incoherent strategy fromnfailure…” DnThe Beautiful Person of PleistocenenJeanM. Auel: The Clan of the CavenBear; Crown Publishers; New York.nby Robert B. EckhardtnIn a recent essay in the Wall StreetnJournal, “The Conservative Ideas innReagan’s Victory,” Leopold Tyrmandnoutlined the two dominant brands ofncontemporary conservatism: libertarian,nwhich emphasizes the pre-eminent prioritynof freedom (with boundaries being setnby the juxtaposed claims of other freenindividuals, in a manner which appearsnanalogous to the way in which territoriesnare staked out by many free-living animals);nand social-ethical, in which freendom is also valued, but as one good amongnothers such as religion, reason and tra-nDr. Eckhardt teaches biological anthropologynat Pennsylvania State University;nhe is the author of The Study of HumannEvolution.nnndition (to parallel the previous analogy,nwith fences set to keep Abel’s sheep fromnconsuming Cain’s corn). Although Inconsider myself a traditionalist in manynmatters, I nevertheless suspect that manynwho belong to the social-ethical camp willnfind my way of making a living—studyingnand teaching evolutionary biologyn—sufficient basis for relegating me tonthe libertarian realm, if not to a deeperncircle of hell. The point, though, is thatnthere are some things even worse thannbelieving in human evolution: for example,nthe widely accepted alternativenof believing whatever is currently “in,”nwhich is to say, believing in nothing atnall. To those afflicted with this cursenthe facts of history (or prehistory) havenno bearing at all on whatever ideologicalnissue has caught the fancy of thenmob. One of the major faults of thisnbook, for example, is that although itnis ostensibly set in Eurasia about 35,000nyears ago, during the Upper Paleolithicnmi^^mm^^nMay/June 1981n