tions as politically cynical puffery. Innaddition, he suggests, it is only thenprejudices of secularism that can explainnthe cavalier dismissal of religionnin the thinking of John Locke, uponnwhom some of the founders drew sonheavily. Reichley acknowledges thatnnot all the founders would pass recognizedntests of Chrishan orthodoxy, butnsome of them would, and almost all ofnthem were quite explicit in their commitmentnto transcendent beliefs whichnare unmistakably biblical in sourcenand form.nThe book begins and ends with anvery typical affirmation, in this case bynWashington: “Of all the dispositionsnand habits which lead to political prosperity,nreligion and morality are indispensablensupports. In vain would thatnman claim the tribute of patriotism,nwho should labor to subvert these greatnpillars of human happiness, thesenfirmest props of the duties of men andncitizens.” After a historical survey ofnthe ways in which this insight hasnworked and has been frustrated innAmerican life, Reichley concludesnwith a chapter titled “Religion andnDemocracy.” He writes, “The questionntherefore must be faced: can democracynflourish without support fromnreligious values?” In answering thatnquestion he notes that there are indeednsecular alternatives to religion. Thenalternative secular values, he believes,nmust be based on either self-interest ornsome kind of social interest, and ofnthese value systems he suggests therenare basically three kinds: egoism (basednentirely on self-interest), authoritarianismn(based entirely on social authority),nand civil humanism (based on anmix of concern for self-interest and fornthe public good).nSince authoritarianism is by definitionnnondemocratic, it can be speedilyndispatched. Egoism on both the leftn(Herbert Marcuse) and the right (MiltonnFriedman) is very much alive andnkicking in American culture. Egoismnincludes both left and right versions ofnlibertarianism, plus the utopianisms ofnsundry “human potential” and “liberation”nmovements. (Reichley notesnthat, come to the crunch, even MiltonnFriedman abandons the dogmas ofnegoism and acknowledges the need fornaltruistic behavior in society). Asnstrong as the egoistic impulses are,nhowever, civil humanism is the mostnrespectable and common secular alternativento religion.nCivil humanism takes several theoreticalnshapes, from Aristotie to JohnnRawls, but none of them “meet thentest of intellectual credibility.” Studentsnof the classical tradition willnlikely object that Reichley does not donjustice to Aristotie, but then neither donmost of the secularists who claim hisnmantie today. When Reichley saysnthese secular theories do not meet thentest of intellectual credibility, henmeans that those who claim that allnvalues come from the self (Hobbes) ornfrom the social whole (Marx) are simplynflying in the face of psychologicalnand historical evidence. If one did notnlearn it from Jeremiah or Saint Paul,nFreud has instructed us on the darkernsides of the self. And, as to theoriesnabout the social whole, after the Holocaust,nthe Gulag Archipelago, andntheir myriad imitations, only the purblindnentertain illusions about thenrighteousness of the collective.nReichley concludes that the constitutivenideas of democratic governance,nhaving to do with rights and duties,ncan only be supported by appeal tontranscendent truth. He believes thatn”the founding fathers after all werenright: republican government dependsnfor its health on values that over thennot-so-long run must come from religion.”nNot just any religion will do,nhowever. Aware that some forms ofnreligion make democracy impossiblenand life itself intolerable, Reichley rejectsnthe “idealistic” religion that leadsnto collective crusades which tramplenupon individual rights and “personalist”nreligion which exalts the individualnabove the bonds of civility andnpositive law. The terms “idealistic”nand “personalist” are not the happiestnchoice, since these terms have been sonvariously employed in the history ofnideas, but Reichley’s point is clear.nThe theory that he embraces he callsn”theist-humanism,” which is perhapsna bit clumsy, but indicates a commitmentnto the ordering of human life innaccountability to transcendent truth.nThere is a certain messiness innReichley’s idea of democratic society,nbut it is a necessary messiness. Thenmessiness has everything to do withnthe First Amendment. Those whonwant a more coherent social theorynand system, those who want to “get itnnnall together,” find it intolerable thatnreligion, which is essential to the democraticnorder, should be permitted tongo its own way beyond the reach ofngovernmental control. “Democraticngovernment, therefore, finds itselfnbound by the uncomfortable but necessaryncondition that, while dependingnon religion for much of its moralnsustenance, it must leave the churchesnand other religious institutions almostnentirely free to develop and promotenwhatever values or beliefs their spiritualninsights may inspire.”nRousseau and a host of others whonrecognized the social need for religionnproposed that religion is too importantnto be left to believers and should benbrought under state control. Rousseaunwas only more consistent than somenothers in setting forth an elaboraten”civil religion” which should replaceninconvenient particularisms such asnChristianity. The American idea thatnthere should be no established religionnwas truly revolutionary. It must also benadmitted, however, that that idea wasngrievously compromised in the middlenof the I9th century when, in the facenof “the immigrant hordes,” the commonnschool movement produced angovernmentally established religion innthe guise of education. But that is ansubject that Reichley does not address.nAnd now I may have given thenimpression that Religion in AmericannPublic Life is chiefly a book of socialntheory. That would be a mistake, for itnis chiefly a book of history, telling thenstory of how in fact religion has impingednand continues to impinge uponnthe public arena. Abolition, Prohibition,nthe Social Gospel, the rise of thenReligious Right, the twists and turns ofnCatholic and Jewish leaderships—thenstory is told authoritatively and in briefncompass. In a nonpolemieal manner,nReichley puts his sharpest challengesnto the leaders of main-line liberal Protestantism.nHe argues that in recentndecades they have manifestiy failed tonunderstand both the imperatives andnlimits of religion’s role in democraticnsociety. Correctives have been attempted,nbut they have gone largelynunheeded by main-line leadership. Hennotes that the 1975 Hartford Appealnfor Theological Affirmation was “thenfirst major attempt to act against destructivenaspects of modernity withoutnrejecting pluralism or social responsi-nMAY198B/21n