in Chapter II, in which Kissinger diseussesrnNATO and missile defense. Kissingerrnis a dedicated “NATO forever” enthusiastrnand a firm proponent of the missile-defensernsystem. I’o him, NATO “shll remainsrnas an insurance policy against arnnew Russian imperialism.” It must notrnlose its sense of purpose and dissolve “intorna mnltilatcral mishmash”; if it did,rn”both Germany and Russia woidd berntempted to view each other as their bestrnforeign policy option.”rnSuch views are problematic bv Kissinger’srnown standards of America’srnnational interest: A hard-boiled realistrnshoidd have noted that missile defensernhas prompted an ongoing improvementrnin Russo-Chinese relations. Ever fond ofrnhistorical parallels, Kissinger ought tornrecognize the similarity between thernRussian-Chinese trcafv’ of Jidy 2001 andrnthe entente cordiale between Great Britainrnand France of a century ago. Thatrnarrangement also was not a formal alliancernto start with, as the Germans consoledrnthemselves at the hme. Nevertheless,rnit did have a comparable underlyingrnlogic in creahng a pattern of relations diatrnwas to become fullv apparent in Augustrn1914.rnBy refusing to acknowledge that NATOrnand missile defense will perpetuaternan open-ended and inherendy adversarialrnrelationship between Washington andrnMoscow, Kissinger activates a predictable,rnand possibly intended, paradox.rnThe necessity to contain a potentialrnthreat from Russia —his fundamentalrnreason for NATO’s continued existence—rndistorts Russia’s postcommunist evolutionrnin favor of its traditional distrust ofrnWestern intentions. The realists who arernnow in charge in Moscow arc not a priorirn”anh-Western,” but Hiey harbor no illusionsrnabout the West, either. Theirrnstrategic thinking now entails an imabashedrnreliance on nuclear weaponsrnand their possible first use. This is detrimentalrnto American securitv’ and cannotrnbe offset by any conjectural benefit inrnmaintaining an alliance that has outlivedrnits usefulness. The only proper rationalernfor a countr}’ to enter into an alliance is tornenhance its sccuritv’. By prolonging Russia’srnstatus as America’s adversary, NAI’Orndocs the opposite. FACH in its weakenedrnstate, with all its economic and demographicrnproblems, Russia remains a nuclearrnpower widi thousands of nuclearrnwarheads. If NATO is enlarged andrnAmerica proceeds widi its antimissile ,svstem,rnRussia will place more nuclear warheadsrnon its ballistic mfssiles, and Americanrncities will remain on the list of targets.rnIt almost defies belief that a “realist”rnsuch as Kissinger would fail to considerrndangers to America inherent in NATOrnexpansion. The United States is extendingrnits sccurih’ guarantee to new clients inrnRussia’s geopolitical backyard. Theoretically,rnit is accepHng the risk of an all-outrnwar in defense of an area diat has neverrnbeen deemed ital to this countr’s interests.rnIt is guaranteeing a host of disputedrnfrontiers, which often were drawn arbitrarilyrnand bear little relation to ethnicitv,rngeography, or histon’. It is underwrihngrndie freezing in time of a post-Soiet outcomernthat is not inherend’ stable, “ju,st,”rnor “democrahc.” America is submittingrnitself to a calcifving organizahonal frameworkrnthat will make eentual adjustmentsrn—if and when diey occur —morernpotentialh^ violent not only for the countriesrnconcerned but for the United Statesrnitself which does not and shoidd not haverna vested interest in preserving an indefiniternstatus quo in die region,rnWashington and Jefferson would bernhorrified; even Kissinger’s beloved Metternichrnwoidd frown upon this simply illogicalrnpolicy, which means that thernUnited States is seriousK’ ready to arnthermonuclear war for die sake of, sa’,rnPoland’s border with Belarus. HasrnKissinger overlooked the residts of prciousrnWestern security guarantees in thernregion (for instance, Czechoslovakia’srnpartition in October 1938, or Poland’srndestruction in September 1939), whichrnprovide a warning that promises nonchalantlvrngiven toda’ may turn into bouncedrncheeks or smoldering cities tomorrow?rnDocs he not recall the lesson of Locarno:rnthat securit}’ guarantees that are notrnbased on the provider’s complete resoKernto fight a fidl-blown war to fulfill diemrnare worse dian no guarantees at all?rnApplying Kissinger’s own dicoretiealrnframework (that of a pragmatically definedrnAmerican interest), it is possible tornmake a strong case for the abolition ofrnNATO, die withdrawal of all U.S. troopsrnfrom Furope, and a partnership withrnRussia. For starters, this woidd boostrnRussia’s democratic institutions, whichrnwould make its aggressive comeback unlikely.rnIn light of September II, it isrnobvious diat Russia needs help to becomernthe Wcsf s bulwark against the realrndireat to our common sccurih’, die newrnautemurale christknsitatis, as we enter arncentury that is certain to see a renewedrnassault by militant Islam—to which Kissingerrnis curiously oblivious — on an enfeebledrnFurope. America needs Russia’srneconomic reival focused on its linksrnwidi Furope, and a strategic understandingrnwith Moseov’ based on the underlyingrncommon interest in keeping Islamicrnmarauders at bay.rnKi.ssinger does not nofice that NATO’srnconfinued exfstenee strengthens the unholyrnalliance of die very people he professesrnto despise, of all diosc one-worldrnWilsonians and neoeonservative globalrninterventionists who presently run thernshow in Washington. They have jointlyrninvented a new mission for NATO: that ofrnself-appointed promoter of democraeyrnand protector of human rights. Its area ofrnoperafions is no longer limited; its “mandate”rnis entirely self-generated. Its warrnagainst Serbia in the spring of 1999rnmarked a decisive shift in its mutationrnfrom a defensive alliance into a supranafionalrnsecurit}’ force based on the doctrinernof “humanitarian intervention.” This remarkablerntransformation has mirroredrndie longer (and almost complete) colutionrnof the U.S. government into a Leviathanrnunbound by constitutional rc-rn.straints. The reinvention of NATO as thernpermanent iron fist of die ideology ofrnneoimperial intcrventionism proves yetrnagain die old adage —once advanced byrnHenry Kissinger himself—that foreignrnpolicy is an extension of domesfie politics.rnAfter reading Henry Kissinger’s latestrnbook, sonic Furopeans may concluderndiat the latter-day, U.S.-led Drang nachrnOsten is a poisoned chalice fiiat die Germansrnwill accept only at their peril. Theyrnwill be jusfified in snspecfing diat there isrnno better way to ensure American dominancernin Furope in perpetuitv’ dian byrnpre’eiitiiig the long-overdue Russo-Gcrnianrnrapprochement. Kissinger, who isrnfrank about his desire to prevent this fromrnhapi^ening, should be eommended forrnhis openness. The wisdom in seeking tornpre’cnt this historic step, however, isrndoubtful, since the reestablishment of arnGerman-Russian rapport is the last prerequisiternfor a long period of stable peacernthroughout Furope. Kissinger wants tornpostpone it in favor of what is becomingrn—perhaps contrary to his wishes —arnpsychotic imperial Utopia utterly divorcedrnfrom the interests, polifical traditions,rnand natural inclinations of thernAmerican people.rnKissinger’s views on NATO and hisrnunwillingness to acknowledge the validityrnof arguments diat do not fit his para-rn.30/CHRONICLESrnrnrn