Paris office in 1987. In a move to reduce the intellectual contentrnof the Radios, management declared that it had to cutrnback the staff in Paris in order to save monc- and followedrnthe principle “last hired, first fired.” The issues in the book,rnfrom that devious move to all the other problems of recentrnears, arc verv much the issues that are now generating most ofrnthe protest in Russia against RL management.rnA large part of Gladilin’s book is devoted to depicting thernbureaucracy of the Radios, which he compares to the Sovietrnnomenklatura. If the Radios were once staffed by creativernprofessionals, journalists and philosophers, commentators andrnannouncers, with a small layer of American management onrntop, toda’ the layers of management have piled one atop thernother while the number of writers beneath them grows smallerrnand smaller. For each journalist, Gladilin mentions with regret,rntliere is a nachalnik—a boss (usuallv titled director orrndeput- director or assistant director)—who knows less but hasrnmore autlioritv, so that there is even more supervision than inrnthe old Soviet ideological enterprises. The basic goal of the burcaucracvrnis to increase its numbers—eleate its ranks, providernitself with privileges while explaining to the creative staffrnthat there are no funds—and preserve its own positions. It isrnnot dependent on the market; it is appointed and supportedrnaccording to other criteria. The management behaves likernfeudal lords in its treatment of the journalists. It seems to berntr ing to dismantle everything that made the Radios great.rnIn Gladilin’s opinion, the main concern of the management isrnto not broadcast aiwthing that might draw unwanted attention,rnand that means not broadcasting anvthing too controversial,rntoo interesting, too useful. The result is the exact opposite ofrnthe kind of seminal preseirtations that made the Radios sornimportant a part of developments in the countries to whichrnthey broadcast.rnThe “Pell” in the title of Gladilin’s book stands not so muchrnfor the Radios’ president as it does their entire management.rnThe book gives the impression that the American bureaucracyrnat the Radios has become, for many of the dissidents and emigresrnworking for them, a bizarre replica of the bureaucraticrnapparatus of their former countries. The picture of Americarnthat this bureaueracv presents—overbearing and undereducatedrn—has not helped to build respect for this country.rnWhile manv praise America’s decision to create the broadcastsrnin the first place , when they see how the Radios are actuallvrnrun, they nevertheless end up appalled. Gladilin, alongrnwith his Russian countrymen, has long experienced bureaucraciesrnthat preach one thing while practicing another. Andrnif there is one thing that could destroy the Radios’ effectiveness,rnhe shows, this is it.rnThe bureaucracy has typically responded to this kind ofrncriticism bv writing off all dissidents as troublemakers.rnThe grain of truth in this easily obscures the broader issues, especiallvrnfor the bureaucrat; whether regimentation of the crcatirnc works of the dissidents is in fact necessary or justifiedrnand whether ideas are now discussed timidlv for professionalrnreasons or for fear of even more timid people higher up. Peoplernwho accomplished heroic acts against the genuinely fearsomernbureaucracy of the old communist dictatorships canrnhardly be expected to bend in fear to the social pressures of arnWestern bureaucracy.rnWith the arrival of glasnost, Gladilin points out, peoplernwho had pre’iously praised the Radios and who continued tornadmire what they represent, began to get the impression thatrnthe’ were more heavily censored than the Soviet press. Meanwhile,rnat the Radios, the censors, or self-censors, leaked to thernpress their view that they were “professionals” locked in arnstruggle against the “Cold War ideologues” at the Radios,rnwho were trving to get the Radios to broadcast what the censorsrnconsidered to be a ridiculous proposition: that the SovietrnUnion and its economy were coming apart at the seams. Truernprofessionalism is valuable indeed, but the Gladilin book raisesrnthe question of whether in this case the slogan of professionalismrnwas not being used in a self-deceiving way by the supervisoryrncommunity.rnThe way to make a career at the Radios, in Gladilin’s portrayal,rnis by blindly following orders, no matter how badlyrnserved the Radios may be, and by not disagreeing with superiors,rnno matter liow desperately the might need improved insight.rnThis may help explain why communist spies often hadrnso much success in rising to high positions at the Radios, thernlast ease being Oleg Tumanov, Acting Ghicf Editor of thernRussian Language Service—the biggest and most importantrnsection of both Radios—who returned to the Soviet Unionrnin 1986 and made anti-American, anti-Radio propaganda forrnthe KGB on Soviet TV. For years, there was a joke at the Radiosrnthat thev were under the direction of American bureaucratsrnwho do not understand anything about communist countriesrnand spies who understand everything onlv too well.rnIf Gladilin is right, then one would have to say that thernwrong people—the managers attacked in the no’el, not the authorrnand others like him—have receied the applause for thernRadios in the last several years and the glor for their role in thernfall of communism. And in fact, the most important dissidentrnwriters either were fired from the Radios, as Gladilin was, orrnwere, like the poet Alexander Galich, in constant conflict withrntheir management.rnIf Gladilin’s thesis is correct, then the glory of the Radios hasrnnot come from broadcasting news and “news features,” whichrnwere possible to get in almost identical form from the BBC,rnthe VC)A, and Deutsche Welle—all of which had periods whenrnthey were not jammed at all. It came instead from the famousrnwriters and dissidents, such as Galich and Gladilin, who staffedrnthe Radios; from Nckrasov, Aksyono’ and Voinovich, whornfreelanced for the Radios; and from dissidents like Yelena Bonner,rnwife and widow of Sakharov, who did not hesitate to cooperaternwith the Radios long before thev were legalized inrnthe Soviet Union at the end of 1988.rnIt seemed, to many observers, that from the very beginningrnof the Radios there was an ongoing conflict within them betweenrntwo philosophies: one, that they were supposed to bernprimarily a source of free and accurate information; the other,rnthat they were also to be a source of new and creative ideas inrnthe sphere of politics and culture—a surrogate means of communicationrnwithin communist societies about their politicsrnand culture. The legislation that originally established thernRadios and the repeated decisions to fund them all contain referencesrnto “ideas and information” and almost invariably referrnto the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or to the connectionrnbetween freedom and the free flow of ideas. Duringrnmost of the history of the Radios, much of the managementrnsupported that concept. But, Gladilin suggests, with the presentrnrise of a “class” of managers, committed to their careersrnand not to ideas, those who respected the minds of the broadcastersrnhave left. It was only natural that the new managementrnFEBRUARY 1993/2 Jrnrnrn