cle for their personal criticism of thensystem should be called to task. Evidencenof such ulterior motives abound in thenGarland case. Consider the example ofnSister Ramona, the self-disavowed archi-ntion to prove the accused’s sanity. Thus,nAmerican judiciary seeks to add the presumptionnof insanity to the presumptionnof innocence.nTo be sure, both presumed innocencen”Extracts from the interviews and the letters leave an indelible impression of a winningnyoung man. . . . Hence they virtually compel us to adopt some sort of psychiatricnunderstanding of his act, and, as we know from Madame de Stael, to understand is tonforgive.”n—Paul RobinsonnThe Neui Republicntect of Herrin’s public support, interviewednin her apartment. The text is fullnof what she wanted Herrin to feel, hownshe wanted Herrin to look, or how hurtnshe was when one of her compatriotnpriests left the effort to get married.nGaylin’s failure to comment on the marriagenof the priest, which was so clearlynsymptomatic of the aberrancy of the YalenCatholic leadership, strongly suggests hisnlack of understanding of the turmoilngripping the Catholic Church in Americanafter a generation of liberal meddlers:nthe events surrounding the trial of BonnienGarland’s killer are but a tiny examplenof that chaos.nJust as the conduct of niunerous religiousnpeople involved with the case was,nfinally, an error in practice, Herrin’sndefense rested, basically, on errors ofnlegal principle. Gaylin persuasively demonstratesnthat nearly every piece ofnevidence introduced by the defense tonshow Herrin’s “extreme emotional disturbance”ncould have been easily attributednto a responsible individual. Thencourts must be broiight to face reality:nunless confronted by an individual whonacts in an incomprehensibly bizarrenfashion, the defense simply cannot/’rawnthe accused’s insanity, at least not as longnas anything more than lip service is givennto a “beyond a reasonable doubt” orneven “clear and convincing evidence”nstandard of proof at a trial. But thereinnlies the error of legal principle: Thenburden is not upon the defense to proventhe accused’s insanity; it is, rather, withnlitde more than a pro forma claim by thendefense of insanity, upon thtpmsecu-nand insanity have a proper role to play innlegal justice. The fact remains that officersnof the state do occasionally accusenpersons of crimes they did not commit,nand some people really are insane. Bothnpresumptions, and especially the latter,ndraw heavily from a post-Enlightenmentnreluctance to assign personal guilt to antransgressor. This, in turn, springs from anrefiisal to acknowledge the existence of anfree will, and hence the abdication of anynresponsibility to control the will or accountnfor its use.nAt his trial, Herrin was askednwhether, when he entered—hammer innhand—the room where Bonnie lay sleeping,nhe intended to kill her. “Yes,” henanswered. “No,” answered the jurynwhen asked to return a verdict of guilty ofnmurder. “Where,” asks Gaylin, betweennthese two roundly opposed statements,n”is justice?” Questions of justice willnalways involve questions of principle andnpractice. Keeping these two guides innmind is an excellent way to begin the ancientnsearch. DnThe Corporation: Culture or SubculturenTerrence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy:nCorporate Cultures: The Ritesnand Rituals of Corporate Life; Addison-Wesley;nReading, MA.nby Thomas L. AshtonnJTenry James said that Americannbusinessmen considered culture the concernnof “women, foreigners and othernimpractical people.” Today George Willnwrites that “the audience for MasterpiecenTheater is unlikely to be seduced into affectionnfor Mobil.” Ultimately, bothnremarks mean the same thing. The prevailingnvoices continue to claim that peoplenwho mn corporations are either boringntechnocrats or soulless philistines.nThe contrast of commerce and culture—nwhen the one means only profit maximizationnand the other supposedly meansnaesthetic purity—makes out of businessnpeople something other than humans.nNeither ideal nor ideally beaudfial, theynDr. Ashton teaches English and businessnmanagement at the University of Massachusettsnat Amherst.nnncan’t be real.nTwo congment fallacies promote thendehumanization of corporate man. Thenfirst is that MBA program graduatesnmust have been outside of culture fromnthe start, or that they suffered a “valuenlobotomy” that neutralized their humatmess.nThe second is that culture hasnno effect on the uncultured—thus thencultureless corporate manager and hisnworkplace, a chamber of white sound,nrobot typewriters, and always ruthlessncompetition. The corporation is somehownfar more military than the Armynas softened by M*A*S*H. Televisionnviewers know the executive as the villainnof soap operas or the buffoon of the sitcomsn. His stereotype isn’ t real because henisn’t real. But one must remember thatnJames was the perpetuator of a traditionnwhich has kept work and working out ofnthe novel since Dickens. Dickens’s onlynfollowers have been Dreiser, Dos Passos,nand that G.E. employee, Kurt Vonnegut.nPeople in the great novel live onnessentially unearned income. Paradoxically,nthey are more real than the peoplenwho work. Life and work are at odds, andn•^MH31nMarch 1983n