strong appeal, and not just for the left.nMany a libertarian, though rejecting thenspending of taxpayers’ dollars for welfarenor foreign aid, has been seduced into andisarmament position by the hope that anreduced defense budget means smallerntax bills. However, this argument restsnon a dubious assumption: that militarynspending is inherently wasteful and thatnthe military provides no benefits comparablento those gained from tax cuts ornfood stamps.nIn reality, the military provides a servicenwhose utility is unmatched: security.nIts benefit: order amidst global anarchy.nThere is litde in history to counter thenimpression that war is endemic to the internationalnsystem. The commissionnitself admits that there have been overn120 conflicts since 1945. It does not matternwhether one blames resource scarcity,ncrusading philosophies, or innate humannaggressiveness. Variations on all ofnthese themes are to be seen in the contemporarynworld.nThe commission puts its trust in negotiationsnand in the United Nations. Yetnfor such solutions to be viable requiresnthat the participants share compatiblenvalues and goals. A world populatednwith the likes of Castro, Khomeini,nArafat, and Khadaiy, or one in which thenSoviet Union vies for hegemony, hardlynmeets that requirement. Nothingnsounds more Utopian than the commission’sncall for all nations to “renounce thenseeking of unilateral advantage” in theirnforeign and economic relations. This isntantamount to calling for the dissolutionnof the nation-state, since its raison d’etrenis the protection and promotion of theninterests of one community against allnrivals. And for the U.S. that national interestnincludes not just material prosperitynbut human freedom itself.nThe commission tries, unconvincingly,nto refute this traditional concern fornnational security so as to clear the way fornits theory of common security. Repeatedlynthe report claims that “security cannotnbe attained through military superiority.”nVance argues that “no nation cannachieve true security by itself. . . . theyn181nChronicles of Culturencan never guarantee their freedom fromnattack.” In its most basic form, Vance’snstatement is correct. No nation cannguarantee that it will not be attackednsince that is a decision that rests withnothers. However, a nation can influencenthat decision by maintaining its strengthnso that any attacker is presented with thenminimum chance of success. This is thenstrategy of deterrence, backed, ideally,nby the capability to repulse any attack.nThe commission rejects deterrence asn”inadequate” and in this its term is proper,nbut its analysis is faulty. Deterrencenas it is defined in the West has become annexcuse for passivity. MiUtary strength isnto be acquired, but never used. Indeed,nto use it implies failure. However, securityncannot be equated just with peace. Asnlong as there are interests or values fornwhich men will fight, there are interestsnand values deemed more important thannpeace. Security is properly identifiednwith these interests and values, thus placingnit above peace. Unfortunately, thendoctrine of deterrence leaves this pointnuncovered and the question of what happensnif deterrence fails unanswered. It isnthis flaw that the left exploits.nAdvances in technology have madenmultiwarhead, intercontinental weaponsnhighly accurate. First-strike tactics arennow feasible, at least in theory. Precisionnattacks against military targets can reducencollateral damage to civilian targetsnnnwithout reducing the political benefits ofnvictory. In fact, counterforce operationsnare more in the tradition of the unity ofnmilitary force and political purpose thannis the theory of mutual destruction.nThe Soviet Union has understood thisnbetter than has the U.S. While Westernnintellectuals have questioned the utility ofnmilitary force in the nuclear age, thenSoviets and their clients have continuednto apply Clausewitz’s principles on andozen battlefields. Soviet strategists earlynrecognized the unprecedented range andnpower of nuclear weapons, but have stillnincorporated them into their thinking inna role equivalent to heavy artillery. Fromnthe start, military targets have beenndiscussed as the targets for nuclear strikesnrather than cities. This is in contrast tonthe American strategy of attacks on populationnand industrial centers. Thisndivergence dates back to World War II,nwhen the U.S. developed a strategicnbombing force while the Soviets keptntheir air power for support at the battlefront.nSince U.S. doctrine rejects the ideanof a prolonged nuclear war, the justificationnfor attacking cities has shifted tonpunishing aggression. The Soviets havenkept their goal fixed on victory.nAs Soviet capabilities have increased,nthe credibility, wisdom, and morality ofnthe U.S. posture has declined. IfnAmerican strategy does not adapt to thenpotential of the new weapons technologynby modernizing both its arsenal and itsndoctrine, it will find its posture as outmodednas Battleship Row on the morningnof the Pearl Harbor attack.nIt is precisely this kind of adaptationnthat the commission wishes to prevent.nHaving built its case on the premise thatnnational security is impossible, it wishesnto keep the U.S. vulnerable. This is nonmore apparent than when its reportnstates: “It is the ABM Treaty, above all,nwhich prevents the illusion of a nuclearnwar with only minimal damage fromngaining wider credibility.” Wider credibilitynin the West, that is. A first-strikenstrategy does not require an ABM sincenits aim is to destroy enemy missiles beforenthey can be launched. Even so, then