Katmandu became an elegant way of wallowing in newnpolitical romanticism. This vicarious type of meta-nationalismncontinued to play a role of psychological repository fornthe dormant and domesticated Europeans who needed timento heal wounds and wait for yet another renaissance.nHas this renaissance already occurred? The liberal parenthesisnthat lasted for 45 years, and which received its majornboost after the recent collapse of its communist alter ego,nmay indeed be coming to an end. From Iberia to Irkutsk,nfrom Kazakhstan to Croatia, hundreds of different peoplesnare once again clamoring for their place under the sun. Tonassume that they are raising their ethnic voices for economicnreasons alone is misleading, and liberals are committing anserious mistake when they try to explain away nationalism bynvirtue of structuralist-functionalist paradigms, or when theynshrug it off as a vestige of a traditional ascriptive society.nContrary to popular assumptions, the collapse of communismnin Europe and the Soviet Union is a direct spin-ofiF ofnethnic frustrations that have for decades laid dormant, butnhave refused to die away. The paradox apparent at the endnof the 20th century is this: while everybody is talking aboutnintegration, multiculturalism, ecumenism, and cosmic fraternitynfractures, fissures, and cleavages are appearing everywhere.nParadoxes abound as little Luxembourg preachesnsermons to a much larger Slovenia on the utility of staying innthe Yugoslav fold; or when Bush, after failing to rescue thenBaits, comes to the aid of artificial satrapy in the name of then”self-determination” of its handful of petrocrats; or whennSoviet apparatchiks fake concern for the plight of Palestiniansnonly to further crack down against their Bashkirs andnMeshkets.nNationalism is entering today the third phase of itsnhistory, and similar to a heady Hydra and howlingnHecuba it is again displaying its unpredictable character.nMust it be creative in violence only? Ethnic wars are alreadynraging in Northern Ireland, in the land of Basques, innCorsica, let alone in Yugoslavia, where two opposingnnationalisms are tearing Versailles Europe apart and showeringnthe treaty successors with embarrassing and revisionistnquestions.nThere are different nationalisms in different countries andnthey all have a different meaning. Nationalism can appearnon the right; it does, however, appear on the left. It can benreactionary and progressive, but in all cases it cannot existnunless it has its dialectical Other. German nationalism of then19th century could not have flourished had Germany notnbeen confronted by the aggressive French Jacobinism;nmodern English nationalism could not have taken off had itnnot been haunted by assertive Prussia. Each nationalismnmust have its Feindbild, its image of the evil, becausennationalism is by definition the locus of political polarity innwhich the distinction between the foe and friend, betweennhostis and amicus, is brought to its deadly paroxysm.nConsequently, it is no small wonder that intra-ethnic, letnalone inter-ethnic, wars (like the one raging today betweennCroats and Serbs) are also the most savage ones, with eachnside vilifying, demonizing, and praying for the total destructionnof the other.nIn addition, side by side with its positive founding myths,neach nationalism must resort to its negative mythology.nwhich in times of pending national disasters sustains itsnpeople in the fight with the enemy. In order to energizenyounger generations Polish nationalists will resurrect theirndead from the Katyn, the Germans their buried from Silesianand Sudetenland; Croats will create their iconography onntheir postwar mass graveyards, Serbs their hagiography outnof their war-camp victims. Body counts, aided by modernnstatistics and abetted by high-tech earth excavators, will bencompleted by mundane metaphors that tisually tend toninflate one’s own victimology and deflate that of the enemy.nGerman nationalists call Poles ‘Tolacks,” and French chauvinistsncall Germans “boches.” Who can deny that racialnand ethnic slurs are among the most common and picturesquenof weapons used by nationalists world wide?nNationalism is not a generic concept, and liberal ideologuesnare often wrong when they reduce Europeannnationalism to one conceptual category. What needs to benunderlined is that there are exclusive and inclusive nationalisms,njust as there are exclusive and inclusive racisms.nCentral Europeans, generally, make a very fine distinctionnbetween inclusive Jacobin state-determined (staatsgebunden)nunitary nationalism vis-a-vis the soil-culture-bloodndetermined {volksgebunden) nationalism of Central andnEastern Europe. Jacobin nationalism is by nature centralistic;nit aims at global democracy, and it has found today itsnvaliant, albeit unwitting, standard-bearer in George Bush’snecumenical one-worldism. Ironically, a drive towards unitarynFrench nationalism existed before the Jacobins were evennborn, and it was the product of a peculiar geopoliticalnlocation that subsequently gave birth to the modern Frenchnstate. Richelieu, or Louis XIV, were as much Jacobins innthis sense as their secular successors Saint-Just, Cambetta,nor De Gaulle. In France, today, whichever side onenlooks — left, right, center—the answer is always Jacobinism.nIn a similar vein, in England, the Tudors and Cromwellnacted as unitary nationalists in their liquidations and genocides—admajoremnDeigloriam — of the Cornish and Irishnand a host of other ethnic groups. Churchill and othern20th-century English leaders successfully saved Great Britainnin 1940 by appealing to unitary nationalism, althoughntheir words would have found litfle appeal today amongnScots and Irish.nContrary to widespread beliefs, the word “nationalism,”n{nazionalismus) was rarely used in National Socialist Germany.nGerman nationalists in the 1920’s and 30’s popularized,ninstead, such derivatives as Volkstum, Volksheit, ornVolkisch, words that are etymologically affiliated with thenword Deutsch and which were, during the Nazi rule,nsynonymously used with the word rassisch (“racial”). Thenword Volk came into German usage with J.G. Fichte in thenearly 19th century, when Germany belatedly began tonconsolidate its state consciousness. The word Volk must notnbe lightly equated with the Latin or English populusn(“people”). As an irony of history, even the meaning of thenword “people” in the English language is further blurred bynits polymorphous significance. People can mean an organicnwhole, similar to Volk, although it has increasingly come tonbe associated with an aggregate of atomized individuals.nIronically, the German idea of the Volk and the Slavic ideanof narodi have much in common; and indeed, each groupncan perfectly well understand, often with deadly conse-nnnJANUARY 1992/23n