281 CHRONICLESnIn June 1982, he appeared on Soviet television onnan oft-cited broadcast discussing the consequencesnof atomic warfare. It was an extremely cautious andnsuperficial program, aired in such a way as tonguarantee the minimum number of viewers: it wasnbroadcast once, without any advance notice, in thenmiddle of the working day. Much the same thingnhappened to Dr. Chazov’s book, The Danger ofnNuclear War, published in 1982. The Englishntranslation was widely distributed in the West. Butnthe single press run, a symbolic 7,000 copies,nprinted in Russian, was also exported, insuring thenabsence of the book from Soviet libraries and booknstores. . . . Apart from these two efforts. Dr.nChazov’s group has not distributed a single book ornpublished a single leaflet. It has not held a singlenpublic lecture or organized a single seminar fornordinary citizens.nBecause IPPNW has well-oiled propaganda machinery,nwe do not have to guess at the reasons for its self-imposednlimits, no less than its self-defined scope. Its goals include:n(1) An immediate and verifiable freeze upon the productionniriiVi-il^-uAv-:nand deployment of nuclear weapons; (2) Sharp reductionsnand redeployment of military expenditure and usage of suchnfunds for research, immunization against diseases, andnsolution to health and food needs of poorer areas; (3) Annultimate ban on nuclear research for military production,nand in the short-term, working to create nuclear-free zonesnin various parts of the world. Its program has the supportnnot only of medical personnel, but of such ardent antinuclearnleaders as Andreas Papandreou, the Greek primennnminister, who has lent his support and even his reputationnto the IPPNW efforts. Papandreou’s belief in a socialistnstate, his condemnation of NATO and support for the PLO,nhis permissive attitude to terrorism—all of these becomenirrelevant in the wonderful world of single-issue nuclearndisarmament.nThe central tenet of the IPPNW position, one constantlynreiterated by Bernard Lown, who is not so much a “dupe”nof Soviet machinations as chief architect of its organizationalnprogram, is to emphasize single-issue politics. That is tonsay, Dr. Lown’s position is to distinguish the issue of peacenfrom that of freedom, and to establish peace as the priority.n”We are not indifferent to other human rights and hardwonncivil-liberties, but first we must be able to bequeath tonour children the most fundamental of all rights, whichnpreconditions all others: the right to survival.” While suchnbig words like peace and freedom can easily degenerate intonempty sloganeering, the fact remains that the linkage of thentwo is an essential cornerstone of Western foreign policy innthe 1980’s, and the heart and soul of Andrei Sakharov’snpublic appeals. The linkage between peace and freedom isnprecisely what Dr. Lown and Dr. Chazov aim to negate.nIndeed, their single-mindedness on the issue equals that ofnAleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who argues against Sakharov, thatnthe primary if not exclusive question of the moment isnfreedom. Thus the IPPNW position strikes at the essentiallyn(.1 ntrist position of American foreign policy. It is this, notn[list idle chatter about preventing a nuclear wasteland, thatnckfines IPPNW’s primary message to American society.nDr. Lown speaks with great feeling of the lack ofn- mmetry in the critique of Chazov and the defense ofnSjkharov: the “unlinking” of peace and freedom is vital fornll’PNW. “Whenever one points a finger, he should look innI lie mirror . . . asymmetry is what gets Russian goats.” Butn111 course, this issue of symmetry is at the heart of thenmatter. No one dares to suggest that Dr. Lown speaks as anU.S. policy representative. No one dares suggest that Dr.nChazov does not speak with the full authority of the Sovietngovernment. Indeed, his “hard line” speech given when henaccepted his portion for the Nobel Prize suggests that oncenthe charade of neutrality became unraveled as a result of thenqueries about his petition against Sakharov, it becamenpointless to take a soft line. And with the gloves taken off,nthe iron fist of Soviet policy was clearly delineated by thenSoviet cardiologist cum politician. His attack on the UnitednStates’ Strategic Defense Initiative was blunt: “Can’t wendiscern it as an attempt to gradually make us accept thenidea of weapons over our heads in outer space? The ‘spacenshield’ will mean one more step forward toward nuclearncatastrophe.”nThe lack of symmetry inheres in the very essence of thentwo systems: in the United States tens of thousands ofnvoluntary associations flourish, but in the Soviet Unionnvoluntary organizations (save perhaps the Russian OrthodoxnChurch) are tolerated but not officially sanctioned. Indeed,nthe lack of symmetry is nowhere more clearly underscorednthan in the arrest and disbanding of antinuclear protestorsnin Moscow at the time of the awards ceremonies in Oslo.nWhereas “grassroots” politics are simply not tolerated in thenSoviet Union, they are at the core of the American IPPNWneffort. This utter lack of real symmetry is explained, andn