The Albrights of this world have a different scenario inrnmind. They do not seek to delegitimize war crimes per se, butrnto enhance their power to decide what is a war crime on the basisrnof current political calculations. Applied in practice, itrnmeans that when Bosnian Muslims are shelled, driven fromrntheir homes, or murdered, they are seething with indignation.rnWhen Serbs are driven from their homes in the Krajina or inrnSarajevo in the hundreds of thousands, or are discovered withrntheir throats cut, they pretend not to see. When Serbs takernSrebrenica, it is “genocide.” When Serbs are cleansed fromrnKnin, Drvar, Grahovo or Petrovac, there is but silence, or an exultantrncry that they had it coming.rnTo the Albrightesque mind there is no danger of the U.S.rnhaving to accept the jurisdiction of an International CriminalrnTribunal created by the resolution of the U.N. Security Council,rnwithout congressional consent, without presidential signature,rnwith primacy over the Constitution and over Americanrncourts. Such indignities are reserved for a Serbia, or a Rwanda.rnThe intent is not to submit, but to control; the goal is not a newrnglobal superstate but a front for deja-vu politics. As C. DouglasrnLummis wrote in the Nation (“Time to Watch the Watchers,”rnSeptember 26,1994);rnWe can be confident that only the borders of middlingrnand small countries will show a “new legal permeability.”rnThese are the same countries whose borders were alwaysrn”permeable” throughout the age of colonialism and Europeanrncolonial imperialism: the countries of the ThirdrnWorld and Eastern Europe…. As inspiration for a grassrootsrnmovement, human rights is a vital and preciousrnweapon against the state, the corporation and other organizedrnpower. When it raises armies and jailers, however,rnthe time has come to start watching the watchers.rnThe populist, universalist rhetoric used by the American foreignrnpolicy establishment to justify The Hague Tribunal, hasrnbeen deployed ad nauseam to misrepresent “Bosnia” in general.rnSimilar rhetoric may be found in Europe’s leftist-leaningrnpress (The Guardian, he Monde) and among a small core ofrnprofessional “intellectuals” (the most contemptible of whomrnare France’s trio of laptop-bombardiers; Henri-Levy,rnFienkelkraut, and Glucksman). But among the political classrnof Paris, London, or Rome, Clinton’s and Albright’s approachrnis basically a heresy, a deviation from the European norm, as itrnhas been ever since a misreading of Montesquieu and the revolutionaryrnardor of a Tom Paine divided America’s culture fromrnits European roots.rnLofty rhetoric apart, America’s policy in the Balkans hasrnnever been about the Balkans. President Wilson, while advocatingrnthe creation of Yugoslavia, did not know, or care, thatrnthe unification of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 was atrnleast a half-century overdue: had it happened at the time ofrnBismarck’s and Mazzini’s unification projects, it could havernworked. By the time of Versailles the process of separate culturalrndevelopment and creation of separate national identitiesrnamong the South Slavs had been completed.rnWith similar historical inattention, America’s present leadersrnare deliberately ignoring the traumatic legacy of the massacrernwhich Croat and Bosnian Muslim quislings systematicallyrnperpetrated against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies in 1941-45.rnWhat has happened in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991-95 cannotrnbe understood without taking account of the Ustase “policy ofrnracial purification that went even beyond Nazi practices” (EncyclopediarnBritannica). The murder of hundreds of thousandsrnof Serbs during Pavelic’s reign of terror is a contemporary politicalrnfact of life, just as the Holocaust is for the Jews.rnBut what happened in Washington? There are no intrinsicrnreasons for the anti-Serb policy of the administration. ThernSerbs had lived in one state since 1918, when “Yugoslavia”rncame into being. When the breakaway republics tried in 1991-rn92 to force over two million of them to become minorities, literallyrnovernight, they reacted, and often overreacted. The issuernwas not that of aggression versus collective security; instead,rnthe principle of territorial integrity of the former republicsrn(Croatia, Bosnia) fatally clashed with the principle of selfdeterminationrnof the people (the Serbs). There could havernbeen no objection to the striving of Croats and Bosnian Muslimsrnto create their own states. But equally there could havernbeen no justification for forcing over two million Serbs west ofrnthe Drina River to be incorporated into those states.rnThis begs the fundamental question of the Bosnian war: Ifrnthe collapse of Yugoslavia was due to the allegedly insurmountablerncontradictions between its ethnic groups, is notrnBosnia even less a viable state? Are not the divergent interestsrnamong its ethnic groups even more strongly pronounced? ThernAmerican advocates of a “multiethnic” Bosnia have never satisfactorilyrnexplained the paradox that their pleas are also the argumentsrnfor the reintegration of Yugoslavia, while their objectionsrnto such reintegration are also the arguments againstrnBosnia’s viability.rnWhat, then, is the motive for the United States to disregardrnall such questions—reasonable in themselves—and to insist onrnforcing the Serbs to submit to the rule of their enemies, or acceptrnmass exodus, such as the cleansing of the Krajina last August,rnor Sarajevo today?rnThe motives of this anti-Serb stance in Washington are notrnrooted in the concern for the Muslims of Bosnia as such, or indeedrnany higher moral principle. United States policy has nornbasis in the law of nations, or in the notions of truth or justice.rnIt is the end-result of the interaction of pressure groups withinrnthe American power structure. United States foreign policy inrngeneral, and “Bosnian” policy in particular, reflects thoserngroups’ concern for their particular interest and global policyrnobjectives.rnA Washington insider put it bluntly in the early days of thernconflict:rnThe simple facts are these: we are getting incrediblernpressure from the Saudis and others to help the Muslimrncause in Bosnia. They remind us that the Islamic worldrnprovides us with all the oil we want at relatively lowrnprices, that Islamic states have billions of petrodollars torninvest in “friendly states” and offer a potential market ofrnover one billion people for the goods and services ofrn”friendly countries”; and finally, that the peace processrnbetween Israel and the Islamic world would go better ifrnIsrael’s main friend was also a friend to Islamic countries.rnWhen you weigh these facts against what eight millionrnSerbs can do for America’s interests, it’s clear what directionrnour policy is going to take.rnThere are two key strategic goals of American foreign policyrntoday. One is that the United States retain its role as the perceivedrnleader of the “international community.” The other isrnAUGUST 1996/17rnrnrn