either suspicious of or even opposed to democracy, whichnhad been reborn in Europe through the French Revolution.nSince democracy stood for the “politicized nation,” egalitarianism,nand majority rule, for them it inevitably had a closenalEnity with totalitarianism. Hayek has quoted E. Heymannnto the effect that all totalitarian tyrannies claimed to bendemocratic. While there was a kernel of truth in this, theynnever dared to claim to be liberal. The bridge betweenntotalitarian sympathies and liberalism was built only byn”American liberalism” — that curious brew which, genetically,nhas a liberal ancestry, but no longer representsnliberalism since it in no way belongs to any of the fourncategories.nThanks to its character of a fausse idee claire, onenshould not be surprised that Marxism successfullyninvaded liberalism in America, wherenanti-intellectualism forms a part of a certain Britishnheritage.nIB I CHRONICLESnBut how did this happen? Liberalism obviously had tontreat all ideas with an unprejudiced, open mind, especially ifnthey were “new.” Yet what was new to the averagenAmerican about the New Deal? Already there had beennJohn Dewey’s so-called pragmatism, as well as a leftistntradition going back to old English sects (Levellers, Diggers,netc.), plus the notions of Thomas Paine and the older,nquasi-socialist tradition of the Wobblies and Transcendentalists.nBut a powerful new socialist wave rose from BlacknEriday and the Depression. The Soviet Union palmed itselfnoff to the innocent and the naive as a “worker’s paradise.”nWindows and doors had been left open in the draftynhouse of a still-genuine liberalism, and in swept the putativen”wave of the future” which, in this case, was not National,nbut International Socialism. This invasion was made all theneasier because Americans cherish the highly “progressive”nand “futuristic” vision of a Noviis Ordo Seclorum. (Remembernthe great success of Bellamy’s Looking Back: 2000-n1887.) No great wonder, therefore, that a sizable part of thenAmerican “liberal” establishment, with its ideologicallynweak foundation, could be turned around—whereas elsewherenliberalism fought socialism tooth and nail, a goodnsegment (or was it the bulk?) of American “liberals” made an180-degree turn.nTo make everything more confusing, America’s genuinenliberals surrendered their time-honored appellation to thenpinks, called themselves “libertarians,” and now frequentlynhide under the conservative label. In the late 1930’s andnearly 1940’s The American Mercury, no longer edited bynH.L. Mencken but by Eugene Lyons, published a series ofn”Creeds”: the “Creed of a Socialist,” of a “Conservative,”nof a “Reactionary,” and two “Creeds of a Liberal,” onencalling himself an “Old Liberal,” the other a “NewnLiberal.” It was the latter who testified to the radicalnturnabout. The evil effects of a philosophical relativismnmanifested themselves in full force in The AmericannMercury’s series. Here a “liberal” publicly declared himselfnto be “pink.” The critical remark of a wily conservative —nnnthat the philosophy of liberalism is to have no philosophyn(which applies only to certain types of liberalism)—provednits sordid legitimacy.nThanks to its character of a fausse idee claire, one shouldnnot be surprised that Marxism successfully invaded liberalismnin America, where anti-intellectualism forms a part of ancertain British heritage. Marx based his critique of a freenmarket economy on the same conception as did a certainn”libertarian theologian” I met in South America. This manncompared the plight of the exploited masses to four men in anprison cell: one a muscular murderer, and the other threenpuny pickpockets. The big murderer takes half the others’nportions and gets steadily fatter and stronger while theynwither. But in such a cell there are only four walls, fournstomachs and one lavatory — a situation in no way similar tona free economy in a free country. Our rich can only eithernreinvest their incomes or spend them on goods; either way,nthe result is added employment. The more, the merrier.nNevertheless the false but clear ideas of Marxism, whichnappeal to the desperately poor, the improvident, the envious,nand the (naively or charitably) bleeding hearts, arenadmittedly not the only items in the baggage of an Americann”liberal.” They are also watered down. A “pink” is not thensame as a “red.” The American “liberal” is, after all, not anman of iron principles, but a mixture of likes and dislikes. Henis “broad-minded” and boasts of it, but only in a certainndirection, that is, toward the left. Though he considersnhimself a “middle-of-the-roader,” he is decidedly left-ofcenter.nThe political heritage of an American “liberal,” wenmust bear in mind, does not come from the FoundingnFathers, but from the French Revolution and its “democracy”nwhich, in America, replaced one John of Geneva withnanother—Jean Calvin with Jean Jacques Rousseau, anchange that marks the essence of the Great AmericannTragedy. Hence the indignation of the American “liberal”nabout the activity of Senator Joseph McCarthy, provoked byngenuine and undeniable cases of treason.nThe inroads made by a false liberalism had already beennobserved in England by Samuel Butler when he wrote inn1893: “I am afraid of liberalism or, at any rate, of the peoplenwho call themselves liberal. They flirt with radicals who flirtnwith socialists who flirt with anarchists who do something andeal more than flirt with dynamite.” This leftward tendencynis, as a rule, combined with the badly camouflaged convictionnthat the left is on the side of that mythological thingncalled “progress,” and that it will dominate the “shape ofnthings to come.” This is one of the reasons why wealthynAmerican “liberals” frequently send their sons and daughtersnto colleges and universities where half-educated professorsnteach them to draw the final logical consequences ofntheir parents’ view—often to the discomfort of the latter,nwho console themselves with the thought that their offspringnwill, after all, have to live in the much redder world ofntomorrow.nThe declared or concealed Marxism is only a part of thenideological baggage of an American “liberal.” There is innhim still the vague desire to be on the side of freedom, ofn”the liberties.” Yet this inclination is severely restrictednbecause it means defying the left. The right is generallyngiven “the silent treatment,” especially when it presentsnunanswerable arguments. And thanks to their false but clearn