more effective—in treating hyperaetive children. His conclusionsrnwere widely reported and accepted: from 1980 to 1983rn(when he was first accused of misconduct), his published papersrnrepresented at least one-third of all scientihc articles on therntopic. From 1981 to 1985, his work had a “meaningful” impactrnin his field, as measured by citations to his work by others.rnAlthough there is no evidence that any patient was harmedrnby these misrepresentations, the terrible potential became obviousrnto all. The case represented an important milestone inrnthe political controversy in the United States because it shatteredrnthe argument that fraud only involved unimportant orrnuninflucntial work, that deliberately falsified data would neverrnpenetrate the acceptable mainstream, that fakery was so inconsequentialrnit could be safely ignored, and that the systemrnwas “self-cleansing.”rnThe discovery that a scientist has calmly andrnrationally cheated, lied, and deceived hisrncolleagues and the public contradicts therncommon image of how scientists should act.rnIt also creates doubt about the reliability ofrnscientific advice—a disturbing uncertainty inrna world where that advice is so pervasive.rnFraud and deception among society’s heroes draw attentionrnto contradictions and inconsistencies in its value systems. BecausernAmerican culture applauds entrepreneurship, independence,rnand ambition, for example, scientists have been encouragedrnto develop independent imaginations and innovativernresearch, to engage in intense competition, to strive for success.rnIronically, Americans also want their white-coated heroes to bernhumble and generous in success, to share credit where credit isrndue, not to steal credit falsely. The discovery that a scientistrnhas calmly and rationally cheated, lied, and deceived his colleaguesrnand the public contradicts the common image of howrnscientists should act. It also creates doubt about the reliabilityrnof scientific advice—a disturbing uncertainty in a world wherernthat advice is so pervasive.rnPerhaps understandably, many scientists reject such candidrnanalysis. They blame not the perpetrators of fraud but societyrnfor having insufficient faith in scientists, implying that betterrnscience education would improve understanding. Or theyrnblame the analysts, characterizing sociologists, historians, andrnpolitical scientists who study the topic as “anti-science,” as ignorantrnof science (on the theory that only kings or queensrnshould write about the monarchy), or as hurting science’s publicrnreputation by publicizing “a few bad apples.”rnScientists are, by and large, intelligent men and women—sornwhy such hostility? Perhaps because the existence of unethicalrnconduct among peers with similar backgrounds contradictsrnscientists’ self-images. The physicist and the chemistrnsee themselves defending objectivity in an irrational world,rnstruggling to refute pseudoscicncc in a world swimming in superstition.rnSociety reinforces those images by assigning scientistsrnthe role of seekers, determiners, and guardians of truth.rnAt first, such attacks on criticism and commentary werernconfined to the perceived “negativism” of analysts or sciencernjournalists (William Broad and Nicholas Wade, who wroternthe hrst popular book on scientific fraud, drew extraordinaryrnfire). But when congressional committees that oversee managementrnof federally funded research began to raise questionsrn(as is their responsibility), a few prominent scientists challengedrnCongress’s authority to investigate research fraud, evenrnwhen it occurred in federally funded projects. That resistancernto scrutiny, as well as scientists’ failure to coordinate amongrnthemselves any plan for improving research integrity, left thernfield open for congressional action.rnIn a political setting, attention concentrates appropriatelyrnnot on who trusts but on who is trusted. “Accountability” signifiesrnthe responsibility of a government official (or, in the casernof government-subsidized research, the person or institution receivingrna grant or contract) to pro’e himself worthy of the publie’srntrust, to account for financial expenditures or equipmentrnuse, and to follow relevant government policies. The conceptrnof political accountability is, in fact, crucial to understandingrnwhy “scientific fraud” has become more important in the UnitedrnStates as a political, not a moral, issue. The post-World WarrnII organization of research initially attempted to shift managerialrnpower over science away from Washington, to allow individualrnresearchers and institutions autonomy in conductingrnresearch. In return, scientists promised unimpeachable accountability.rnVannevar Bush’s Science—The Endless Frontier (1945),rnwhich outlined the postwar plan, named “publicly and privatelyrnsupported colleges and universities and the endowed researchrninstitutes” as the best home for basic research, providing an environmentrn”most conducive to the creation of new scientificrnknowledge and least under pressure for immediate, tangible results”rnand thereby insulating science from the presumed taintrnof commercial gain. Despite the attraction of reliable, amplernresearch support, some scientists were uneasy about the stringsrnpotentially attached to government funding. In 1945, FrankrnJewett (then president of the National Academy of Sciencesrnand formerly president of Bell Laboratories) warned that “everyrndirect or indirect subvention bv Government is not onlyrncoupled inevitably with bureaucratic types of control, but likewisernwith political control and with the urge to create pressurerngroups seeking to advance special interests.” The rhetoric ofrnthe Bush report attempted to reassure Jewett and his supportersrnthat university administrators and federal grant agenciesrncould buffer bureaucratic controls, insuring the “scientificrnworker… a substantial degree of personal and intellectual freedom.”rnTo further assure sensitivity to science’s special needs,rnscientists would oversee management of research laboratoriesrnand scientists would head the government science agencies andrnadvise on policymaking. This scheme was akin to establishingrna department to fund public housing but requiring that it bernheaded by a housing contractor and that departmental policyrnbe controlled by a board composed exclusively of other eontractors.rnScientists, of course, claimed to be different, to be freernof conflict of interest or self-interest when they contracted forrnknowledge-production. They promised intellectual integrity,rncomprehensive expert review at all stages of research (the “peerrnreview” system for proposals and publications), and political accountability.rnIn retrospect, this plan seems inherently unstable; certainlyrn22/CHRONICLESrnrnrn