261 CHRONICLESntive in either theory or practice.” Undernhis presidency, for the first time innthe nation’s peacetime history, federalnwage and price controls were introduced.nHis fiscal and monetary policiesndrove the inflation rate to its thennhighest peacetime level. He proposed an$20 billion guaranteed income welfarenplan and a $30 billion national healthninsurance plan. He agreed to the expulsionnfrom the UN of NationalistnChina, and then signed a treaty withnCommunist China, and finally, undernSALT I he accepted an inferiority innstrategic arms vis-a-vis the USSR andnagreed to an illusory detente whichncrashed while he was still in office. Sonmuch for “detente plus deterrence.”nWhat about the future? Nixonnwrites:nOur aspirations are in directnconflict. America wants peace;nthe Soviet Union wants thenworld. Our foreign policynrespects the freedom of otherncountries; theirs tries to destroynit. We seek peace as an end innitself; they seek peace only if itnserves their ends. The Sovietsnpursue those endsnunscrupulously, by all meansnshort of all-out war. For thenSoviets, peace is a continuationnof war by other means.nThe Soviet Union is, he says, “anninherently aggressive power because itsntotalitarian system cannot survive withoutnexpanding. The Soviet system ofninternal repression is the root cause of itsnaggressive foreign policy.”nWhat remains unclear is why the USnshould negotiate with a country which,nto quote Nixon again, is guilty of “diplomaticntreachery” and therefore cannotnbe expected to live by the bilateral rulesnof detente. Doesn’t negotiation implynan essential condition of mutual trust? Ifnthe house crapshooter won’t allow annon-site inspection of the dice, whynwould anyone want to risk his capital?nNixon still insists that negotiations arenessential, for the following reasons:n* He rejects a school of thought whichnargues that the less we negotiate withnMoscow, the better for our side. Henconcedes that the Soviets exploit negotiationsnas a way of achieving their victorynwithout war; while “too often we usennegotiations only to achieve peace withoutnvictory.” Nixon doesn’t spell outnwhat he means by “peace without victory”;nwe are only in the presence of anpiety.n* A president who opposed negotiationsnper se would be opposed by Congressnand a large sector of the Americannpeople. That doesn’t prevent Nixonnfrom savaging Reykjavik: “no summitnsince Yalta has threatened Western interestsnso much as the two days atnReykjavik.” Reagan must have noddednoff while Nixon was talking.n* Even with communists, statecraft andnnegotiations can make a “positive difference.”nAs proof, Nixon offers his successfulndealings with China. He definesn”statecraft” as the capacity to integratenall our capabilities — military power,neconomic clout, covert action, propaganda,nand diplomacy.n* Without summits, NATO would fallnapart because Western Europe fearsnnuclear war far more than Soviet expansionism.nNixon takes a crack at Reagan’snonetime “belligerent rhetoric about thenSoviets” which, coupled with Gorbachev’snbrilliant public relationsn”peace” campaign, have contributed tonthe NATO crisis.n* A reduction in East-West tensions,nsays Nixon, divides the East more thannthe West. While confrontation makes andictatorship stronger, contact and negotiationncan weaken it.nThe Nixon administration’s use ofnthe word “detente” is, to my mind, onenof the great deceptions in Americannforeign policy, and alas. President Reagan’snsecond term has become a newntesting ground for Nixon’s old foreignnpolicy. Detente was actually a euphemismnfor Cold War, a term whichnNixon and Henry Kissinger eschewednearly on.nDetente meant cooperation betweennthe two superpowers, according to thenNixon-Brezhnev declaration of Mayn1972. That paper charged the twoncountries with a “special responsibilityn… to do everything in their power sonthat conflicts or situations will not arisenwhich would increase international tensions.”nA document outlining 12 “basicnprinciples of relations” between the USnand the USSR was agreed upon as ancode of conduct.nAt the first opportunity, the SovietnUnion violated those principles in thenevents leading up to the 1973 YomnKippur war. The Soviets knew thensurprise Arab attack was coming at leastnnnfour days before it happened on Octobern6. Not only did they not warn thenUS what was coming, they attempted tonwiden the war by transporting Moroccanntroops to the front. Three days afternthe Arab attack on Israel, Brezhnev,nPresident Nixon’s partner in an agreementn”to do everything in their powernso that conflicts or situations will notnarise which would increase internationalntensions,” sent Algeria (and a day laternall Arab countries) a message saying thatn”Syria and Egypt must not remainnalone in their fight against a perfidiousnenemy.”nBrezhnev gave a speech in Moscownthe day before sending that message, innwhich he expressed the hope that thenArab aggression against Israel wouldn’tndisturb “detente.” Well, it didn’t, evennthough on October 25, 1973, PresidentnNixon ordered a Grade Three nuclearnalert and even though Brezhnev made itnclear that he was prepared to send innRed Army airborne divisions to rescuenthe encircled Egyptian Third Armynunless the Israelis withdrew.nIn 1972 Nixon characterized detentenas “the new foundation [which] hasnbeen laid for a new relationship betweennthe two most powerful nations innthe world.” Today he writes: “Diplomaticntreachery, military intimidation,nand aggression by proxy are standardnoperating procedures for the Kremlinnleaders.” What Nixon fails to answer isnhow come he didn’t appreciate thenperversity of Soviet communism inn1972? Why did he and Secretary ofnState Kissinger stake their political careersnon detente? Why did he discouragenintelligence estimates which stressednthe Soviet threat? Kissinger went so farnin his appeasement of the Soviets as tonforbid the Voice of America to broadcastna reading of The Gulag Archipelagonon the VOA Russian language program.nPerhaps Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn hasnthe answer. In 1980 he described whatnhe called the “Kissinger syndrome.” Itnpertains, he said, to “individuals [who],nwhile holding high office pursue anpolicy of appeasement and capitulationn. . . but immediately upon retirementnthe scales fall from their eyes and theynbegin to advocate firmness and resolution.”nIf only Reagan had listened to hisnown instincts, instead of listening to thenadvice of a failed president. Leonidn