the very men whom Stalin would havenused to annihilate him, his erstwhilencolleagues. In 1957 the Brotherhoodnemerged from its partial eclipse, albeit innless cohesive form than when it had beennguided by a single overpowering figure.nBrezhnev, for one, joined Suslov innKhrushchev’s ruling circle, and Suslov’sninfluence expanded to fill the vacuumnleft by the departed “anti-party group.”nAndropov, thanks to his success innfacilitating the suppression of thenHungarian uprising in 1956 (duringnwhat was supposed to have been hisndiplomatic exile in Budapest), wasngiven, at Suslov’s instigation, the task ofnsupervising relations with ruling communistnparties in the Soviet bloc, China,nand Korea. Andropov remained on thenfringe of that ruling circle until 1967,nwhen his appointment to the position ofnKGB chairman brought him de fecto thenstatus he was to assume de jure whennnamed a full member of the Politburo inn1973.nWhen the Brotherhood topplednKhrushchev in 1964, it acquired thenposition of unhindered power that Stalinnhad planned, but it dared not carry outnStalin’s final plan. Like Lenin’s WarnCommunism of 1917-1921, and like thencollectivization, industrialization, andnmass terror of the 1930’s, the schemenwhich Stalin contemplated from 1946nto 1953 was one of creating totalitarianism,nthe act of forcing history andnhumanity into the mold of ideology. ThenBrotherhood lacked the fervor to attemptnit anew. Instead they aimed tonpreserve what had already been established:nthe bureaucratic machinery ofntotalitarian coercion already in place.nThis preservative animus prevailednthroughout most of the so-calledn”Brezhnev era,” a period distinguishednless by the preeminence of one purposefulnleader than by the rule of a smallnoligarchy, in which Mikhail Suslov’sninfluence was at least comparable to thatnof Brezhnev, the titular leader.nFor Andropov, Suslov’s death innJanuary 1982 appears to have been then18inChronicles of Culturencatalyst for a plan to disrupt that oligarchynand to establish an order whereinnthe secret police would decisivelynprevail over the Communist Party.nBeichman and Bernstam demonstratenthat Andropov’s associations with thensystem of concentration and slave-laborncamps and with the state security apparatusnwere intimate after the 1930’s,nwhen he joined the Communist YouthnLeague, or Komsomol—^not just after henbecame KGB chairman in 1967. In 1982,nAndropov was consciously fulfillingnaspirations he had cherished throughoutnhis career. He had tried out these aspirationsnin microcosm in the 1970’s, bynfostering the replacement of corruptnparty regimes in Georgia and Azerbaijannwith new rulers from the ranks of thenKGB. One of the few sound achievementsnof Solovyov and Klepikova is tondescribe in some detail these “experimentsnin the Caucasus” and to establishnthat Andropov instigated them.nJ-f these “experiments” were anynindication of Andropov’s plans for thenSoviet Union as a whole, it would benwrong to jump to the conclusion thatnAndropov, as one of the few remainingnpeople fully cognizant of what Stalinnwished to accomplish in the 1950’s,nnnintended to pick up where Stalin had leftnoff. Still, Andropov was not so timid as hisnbrethren had been after Khrushchev’snIkU. While he did not attempt a revival ofnWar Communism, Andropov, like hisnminions in Georgia and Azerbaijan in then1970’s, proceeded to use terror tonattempt to restore discipline and tonreduce corruption in the bureaucracynand among the citizenry. Terror wasnused to reinvigorate totalitarianism.nAndropov’s terror, though not as massivenand pervasive as Stalin’s, was anpronounced departure from the oligarchy’sntolerance of sloth and venality.nTo speculate on the ends of this stylenof ruling, one must begin by consideringnwhat motivated it. It is highly unlikelynthat Andropov was moved by a sincerendedication to Marxism-Leninism. Andropovnand his brethren were, of course,nthe beneficiaries of the ideological zealnof Bolshevism, the inheritors of itsntotalitarian state apparatus, and theyncould only damage their own positionsnby aUowing Marxism-Leninism to die annatural death. Yet it is unlikely that any ofnthem, with the possible exception ofnSuslov, sincerely believed in that ideology.nAndropov may have wished tonappear a truer and more zealous Leninistnthan Brezhnev and his associates, but itnwas only the appearance that mattered.nWhat lay beneath it? Great Russiannnationalism? Not even Solovyov andnKlepikova, who glibly account for thennature of the Soviet regime at its worstnby asserting that it answers, by somenineffable and mystical mechanism, to thendeepest yearnings of the Russian people,nconsider Andropov a Russian nationalist.nAndropov’s purpose, they believe, wasnnaught else than the aggrandizement ofnimmense power, with no further end innview.nThis lack of fervent ideological ornnationalistic purpose within the Sovietnleadership and an aU-consuming infetuationnwith power for its own sake was thenultimate consequence of the Brotherhood’snascent. Andropov, because of hisnroots in the security apparatus, was ancomplete embodiment of a devolutionn