an War and the average deployment oer the course of the VietnamrnWar. It has thus become tlie standard for a “regional conflict.”rnBy the end of 1995, the United States \’ill only have tenrnArmy divisions, five Marine brigades, 11 aircraft carriers, and 13rntactical wings on active dutv. This is barely enough to fight onernregional conflict, let alone retain a reserve to deter others fromrnexploiting the situation by mounting a challenge elsewhere.rnThe United States Armed Forces are being reduced to theirrnlowest level since 1949. The cuts reflect the various liberal proposalsrnmade during the 1980’s for reallocating resources awayrnfrom President Reagan’s rearmament program. Though thernobjective of such plans was primarilv to find more money forrnsocial programs, sometimes the authors would let slip their disdainrnfor the military as an arm of an independent American foreignrnpolicv. For example, a plan of massixe defense cuts drawnrnup under the auspices of the World Folic; histitute in 1988 proclaimed,rn”Our new strateg’ emphasizes defensive missions andrncommon security . . . and precluding U.S. intervention in regionalrnconflicts except for humanitarian purposes and U.N.-rnsanctioned peacekeeping efforts.” Among the authors wasrnClinton’s longtime friend and future Labor Secretary, RobertrnReich.rnClinton scrapped the Bush administration’s plan to deployrnan antimissile defense system to protect the United States,rnhistcad, Clinton has favored protecting the intcgritv of thernAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He has e’en accepted some Russianrndemands that the ABM Treat be expanded to restrict therndevelopment of theater defense sstems that could protectrnAmerican forces overseas. A bilateral agreement is ill-suited torna world with multilateral threats. Why should the UnitedrnStates make an agreement with Russia to “dumb down” its antimissilerntechnology? This would not only limit America’s defensesrnagainst Russia, but also against Iran, North Korea, China,rnand every other threat. One answer is that the administrationrnhas an ideological commitment to arms control that supersedesrnany practical considerations. Another is that by keeping thernUnited States vulnerable to attack, a significant constraint isrnplaced on America’s freedom of action. This is clearly in thernminds of those Third Wodd militants who are busily expendingrntheir people’s meager resources on ballistic missiles and warheadsrnof “mass destruction.” But there arc also some in thernUnited States who still think that threats of “mutual destruction”rnsupport global stability, another principle they arc willingrnto place above their nation’s interests—even the interest in survival.rnUnited Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright likes torncharge that the Republican Congress is taking the UnitedrnStates back to the isolationism of the I920’s. This is a referencernto the country’s refusal to join the League of Nations. Yet thernLInited States assumed a leadership role in talks to limit war andrnarmaments throughout the interwar period. The most importantrnarms control measure of this period was the WashingtonrnNaval Treaty of 1922, later expanded in the London Treaties ofrn1930 and 1935. These agreements set severe limits on thernnavies of the world powers; scores of warships were scrapped.rnBut the strategic result of this system was that militant but economicallyrnweak powers like Japan and Italy were able to buildrnwithin striking distance of richer democracies, like the UnitedrnStates, who were prohibited from converting their superior resourcesrninto superior strength. The league proved useless, butrnthe arms control treaties proved disastrous. It is thus the Clintonrnadministration that is repca mg the mistakes of the 1920’s.rnHouse Republicans are pushing for the elimination of thernArms Control and Disarmament Agenc as an independent organization.rnThe ACDA has been pushing expansion of thernABM Treaty. The agenc’ and its defenders in Congress and tirernmedia have argued that there is a need for an independentrnvoice for arms control as an end in itself. As an editorial circulatedrnby the ACDA put it, the agency’s autonomy is neededrn”to protect them from the myopic Cold Warriors at the StaternDepartment.”rnThese debates have revealed the real threat to sovereignty. Itrnis not “world government,” because such an institution is inhercntlvrnunworkable. Every attempt made in its behalf hasrnquickly collapsed in acrimony and incompetence. In mostrnparts of the world, popular irationalism is on the rise. The realrnthreat to the Ignited States is the continued belief of key segmentsrnof the American political elite in the libcral-universalistrnphilosophv that makes world government seem attractive.rnIn the futile pursuit of this ideal, the American governmentrnhas been surrendering the levers of power upon which itsrnca]3acity for independent action and effective sovereignty depends.rnIndeed, the United States seems determined to surrenderrneven the principle that it has a right to independent action.rnThe real beneficiaries of this surrender will not be the “globalist”rnbureaucrats in New York or Ceneva, though they will revelrnin the thought. And various special interests will line theirrnpockets during the interregnum. But such unrooted nonentitiesrncan onl thrive if national governments abdicate their vastlyrnsu]5erior powers to make law, mobilize resources, and deplovrncoercive force in the name of a coherent society. That is whyrnan power vacuum created by the retreat of American powerrnwill ultimately be filled by other nation-states that have maintainedrntheir military and economic strength and have, morernimportantly, kept the will to use their strength in support ofrntheir own strategic interests.rnIt is then that America’s considerable investment in the creationrnof multilateral organizations will prove to be the greatestrnblunder ever committed by a modern power. As the “last superpower,”rnAmerica’s primary aim must be to prevent the risernof an rial power or coalition of powers that can match itsrnstrength. The ‘ery kind of anarchy deplored bv globalists isrntlius to America’s advantage. The United States must avoid beingrnsubmerged into larger bodies where it can be overwhelmed,rnand it must ensure that multilateral organizations, be theyrn”regional” or “worldwide” in scope, do not become vehicles forrnthe creation of hostile coalitions that could not only damagernAmerica’s prosperity but also its security.rnThe belief that America can “lead” movements that encompassrnhemispheres or regions as large as Asia is pure hubris.rnAdxocates of this policy forget that the envy other societies feelrnfor American material success is a dark emotion, made morernexplosixe when combined with a revulsion for the degeneraternside of American culture. The United States needs to bernactiveh engaged in world affairs, but in the tradition ofrnbalance-of-power diplomacy—keeping potential rivals apart,rnnot tr ing to bring them together. Like the spokes of a wheel,rnthe United States should place itself at the center of a series ofrnadvantageous bilateral relationships that would obstruct thernformation of competing coalitions. But to consider devising arnnew Crand Strategy for the nation first requires that the principlernof sovereignty be returned to the center of American foreignrnpolicv.rn20/CHRONICLESrnrnrn