way, by means of national technicalnverification, that such an agreementncan be monitored.nSeismic sensors can detect the undergroundntesting of warheads that explodenby nuclear fission; they cannot detectnthe much smaller explosions producednby nuclear fusion in neutron warheads.nOnce again, this has obvious implicationsnfor any nuclear-arms treaty.nPresident Re^an ordered the productionnof neutron warheads, but deferredntheir deployment in Europe untQ landbasednintermediate-range missiles (PershingnU’s and ground-launched cruise missiles)nare in place. Impatient with internationalndiplomacy, Cohen argues that anwe^xjn good enough to produce is goodnenough to deploy.n1 he book’s last five chapters consistnof polemics on the military, ethical, andnpolitical problems associated withnCohen’s invention. He quickly disposesnof opponents regarded as experts by thennews media. To Herbert Scoville, Jr., onenof the most-quoted flreeze personalitiesnwho claims that irradiated soldiers willnfight harder, Cohen asserts that the soldiersntargeted will quickly become incapacitated,nthat by asking us to fear thenpossible behavior of soldiers on the peripherynof the explosion Scoville “divert[s]nthe targeting issue to troops thatnaren’t targeted.” To Dr. Kistiakowsky,ndio claimed that the Soviets could shieldntheir tank crews against radiation, Cohennagrees that indeed one can, “providednthat you’re willing to incapacitate thentank” by overloading it with heavy armor.nTo Stanford physicist Sidney Drell, whonclaims that a neutron warhead e3q)losionnwould make the irradiated area “uninhabitablenfor long periods of time,” Cohennreplies that “This is patently false,” thatncalculations show radiation declining tona safe level in a few hours. To UnitednStates Senator H. John Heinz, who claimsnthat the neutron warhead is “literally dehumanizing,”nCohen responds thatn”Speaking for myself, if I were going tonbe wounded on the field of battle, I’d fernrather be dosed by radiation than burnednby napalm, or crushed by blast concussion,nor have my body torn up by a landnmine or a fragmentation bomb.”nThese arguments are not just persuasive,nthey are simple. Orwell argued thatnintellectuals think badly about war becausenthey imagine suffering so vividlynthat their fear overturns their intellect. Inam convinced that there is another problem:neven vAiea intellectuals master theirnfear, the basic simplicity of warfare befiiddlesntheni. It is too unsubtle for themnto grasp, all this business of push comingnto shove. They complicate the issuesnbeyond recognition, then take professionalnsoldiers for bloody-minded dolts.nCohen, no professional soldier, is at hisnbest when he thinks like one.nBut at his worst, Cohen essays geopoliticalnstrategy. His advertised defectionnfrom “the American nuclear establishment”nconsists merely of an argumentnfor isolationism. In a war with the Soviets,nhe believes, Europe and the Middle Eastnwould cost us more to defend than theynare worth. Thus he suggests we pull ourntroops out and use the money saved tonrebuild our nuclear arsenal and strengthennour civil defense. These sentimentsnIn the Mailnare hardly a serious policy for a commercialnrepublic confronting totalitarianism.nSoviet domination of Europe andnthe Middle East would, of course, giventhem control of two of our principalnmarkets. Even in its military aspect,nCohen’s isolationism fails. He calls defendingnEurope impossible because thenSoviets wiU try to destroy NATO’s nuclearndefenses, including neutron warheads,nbefore they march. But the Sovietsnhave warned that any NATO warheadsnhittii^ Soviet territory—and some surelynwould—will bring retaliation againstnthe United States itself If they mean that,nthey recognize that a European warnwould probably cause global war. Theynwill not imagine they can win that warnunless Western pacifists have their way.nNuclear weapons in Western Europenwill tie America to its allies more firmlynthan at any time in 20 years. Europeansnwho fear this tie, v^ho feel more threatenednby our weapons and our policy thannby Soviet weapons and policy, may yetndecide to see more clearly. Cohen saysnthey won’t, a dubious assertion. Onenthing seems evident: it would be a badnmistake to insure defeat by giving up toonsoon. DnUnder Scorpio by Ihomas G. Bergin; Solaris Press; Rodiester, iMI. Poems written as poemsnwere once written—before greeting cards and newspaper squibs became the standards.nThe Games They Played: Sports in American History, 1865-19S0 by Douglas A. Noverrnand Lawrence E. Ziewacz; Nelson-Hall; Chlc^o. Not only can this book be used to win barnbets, but it’s also interesting, as lists of statistics aren’t.nAlateFriend^iip: TheLetterso/KarlBarlheutdCatiZiiclanayerltat^latedbyGeoBkeynW. Bromiley; Wm. B. Eerdmans; Grand Kapids, MI. One fears what will h^pen if the Bell System’sncampaign promoting the use of telephones as a way of keeping in touch succeeds, particularlynin light of these delicate missivesnPublius: Annual Review of American Federalism: 1981 edited by Stephen L. Schecter;nUniversity Press of America/Center for the Study of Federalism; Washington, DC. A studynof the effects of the sometimes-bitter medicine: the Re^an Administration’s “New Federalism”nand the statesnCarter Braxton, Virginia Signer: A Conservative in Revolt by Alonzo Thomas Dill;nUniversity Press of America; Washington, DC. Not well known, but nonetheless interesting:nhe was accused of being a pirate; he wasn’t certain about cutting the ties with Great Britain; he ultimatelynsigned the Declaration of Independence.nnnOctober 1983n