a powerful state that controls much of the activity of its membersnand only if the latter identify themselves as citizens andnfaithfully perform the duties of that station.nMost astonishingly of all, numerous thinkers and publicistsnmaintain that the state is the chief locus of, and citizenship thenchief means to, intensely personal and effective relationshipsnsuch as community, fraternity, and even friendship. The thirdnor affective relationship model informs the thinking of Catholicnconservatives of the bent of Joseph de Maistre and more thanna few of our self-styled contemporary conservatives; ofnRousseau and his democratic participationist followers; of Romanticnnationalists such as Mazzini and present-day promotersnof patriotism; of numerous contemporary communitarians;nall of these, although disagreeing sharply in theirnconceptions of friendship, community, fraternity, and thenvirtues necessary to them, agree that organized, authorityladennpolitical association is essential to the cultivation ofnthese intimate and exclusive relationships. In the absence of anpolitically organized society populated by an engaged andnfaithful citizenry, human beings wallow in egoism, selfishness,nand discord; sink into anomie, alienation, and ressentiment.nThese three understandings and estimations of citizenshipnare absurdly exaggerated and otherwise regrettable. Thenpleasures afforded by associations such as those invoked innmy first image depend vitally on a condition that state membershipncan satisfy little if at all, namely the voluntary and selectivencharacter of membership in them. This is yet more emphaticallynthe case with the attachments and affections atnissue in my third image. It is possible for friendship and evennlove to develop among people who are compelled to associatenwith one another. In any but the rawest sense of causality,nwhen this occurs it is despite, not because of, the compulsoryncharacter of the relationship. And the idea that I could ornshould cultivate such feelings for the millions of people whonare held together in even the smallest of the “modern’states” isnnot only absurd but—when it becomes us-against-them patriotismnand jingoistic nationalism—dangerous absurdity.nConstrained government, prudently conducted under thenwary eyes of a citizenry jealous of its private, personal, and associationalnpursuits and prerogatives, can decrease somewhatnthe cruder threats to happiness and friendship, may offer reliefnfrom the effects of unavoidable disasters, and may amelioratenmaterial and other conditions adverse to these vital aspectsnof human well-being. Neither government itself nor participationnin the politics that takes its life primarily from the scufflenfor governmental power can themselves bring about or sustainnthese rare and rightly treasured conditions andnachievements. Far more often than not, the state, perhapsnespecially states emboldened and energized by the participationnof persons whose primary identification is that of citizen,nhas proven to be the antagonist of pleasure and happiness,nof fraternity and friendship.nIt is not open to us to disdain the distinctive form of membershipnthat is citizenship. If we make the hegemon of the secondnor need and interest image into a state, furnish it with authoritynand with power sufficient to enforce its municipal lawsnand commands against disobedience, then that image depictsna salient feature of the circumstances of all those likely to readnthis essay. If it is a dangerous fantasy to think of the state asnsupplying the desiderata at issue in my first and third images;nit is regrettable but undeniable that numerous of the present­n30/CHRONICLESnnnly existing states control resources that are necessary to satisfyingnbasic needs and interests of their citizens. So long asnthis continues to be the case, those without standing with ornbefore the state are in a dangerously exposed position. It is truenand admirable that some states afford protections and othernservices to legally and”even illegally resident aliens. Notoriously,nhowever, these policies are at their least reliable in respect tonthat hapless denizen of the modern world, the “stateless” person.nAnd because no state accords aliens formal rights of participationnin the processes by which such policies are adoptednand implemented, the benefits aliens receive are largely at thensufferance of persons other than themselves. For these reasons,ndisdain for or indifference to citizenship is reckless imprudence.nAs elements of my need and interest image are intended tonconvey, there are other and better reasons for valuing citizenship.nThe best of these reasons, articulated in a tradition ofnthinking running from Montaigne and Hobbes to contemporarynthinkers such as Isaiah Berlin and especially MichaelnOakeshott, are responses to the anything but pretty history ofncompany towns, exclusive ethnic and religious communities,nand the like. That history is of course one of intolerance—thenintolerance found in virtually all human communities. Butnit is also a history of “official” punishment of deviation, dissent,nand even mere difference. Insofar as there are offices of formalnauthority and collective power, those who occupy them, rathernthan using their positions to protect and defend the unorthodoxnand unpopular, take the lead in repressing them. (If wenneed reminding of these ugly facts, and it seems that we do,ncurrent reports from what was Yugoslavia, what is Turkey andnIraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, will serve the purpose.)nLet us consider a fourth image or model, one that might bencalled civil. In its most estimable formulations, the idea of politicalnassociation, and of citizenship as the form of membershipnin such an association, is the idea of an association thatnencompasses a fluctuating plurality of economic enterprises, ascriptivelyndefined groups, religious confessions and the like;nit is the idea of a form of membership that is available to allnwho choose, even intermittently, to live their lives in that association.nMost importantly but elusively, it is the idea of annassociation that in certain basic respects stands for and willnstand by its citizens as such, without regard to the furtherncharacteristics that distinguish them from and put them atnodds with one another.nOn this understanding—never fully realized but discerniblenat moments in English history and the history of some Americannstates—citizenship is of fundamental importance, is beyondnall price. The reasons for its value, however, are quite differentnthan those I have for the most part been discussing.nThe authority and power of the political association, and thenstanding of the citizen in such an association, are viewed primarilynas sources of protections supplemental to those thatnindividuals and groups are able to afford to themselves. Givennthe existence of a number of such politically organized societiesnin the world, these protections are now importantlynagainst incursions by states other than one’s own. But if we asknwhy there should be political associations at all such that thenproblem of relations among them arises, we see that the protectionsnthey are to afford are first and foremost against the intrusivenand oppressive demands of the less-encompassingngroups and associations of which the political association, oncenformed, partly consists.n