On this civil view, citizenship is yalued fundamentally becausenit assures, insofar as can be, that these further protectionsnwill actually be afforded. Those who seek additional rightsnand privileges, including the right to participate in the processesnby which rights are established and protections provided,ndo so primarily in order to maximize the likelihood thatnthey and others actually receive the protections that it is thenchief purpose of the association to provide.nSuch an association may also provide its citizens with furthernservices and opportunities. If proposals to do so are widelynand genuinely supported, the state may gather and deploy resourcesnof the society in order to pursue purposes that arenshared among its citizens. And to the extent that such projectsncome to be proposed and entertained, the value of the right tonparticipate in decisions concerning them may be estimatednyet more highly than I previously suggested.nOn the civil understanding, however, this extension of thenargument for citizenship will be recognized as dangerous, asnjeopardizing what is distinctively important about this form ofnmembership. Citizens will be wary of such proposals and evennof the kind of thinking about citizenship that highlight thenright to participate in decisions concerning such proposals.nThey will recognize that collective ventures tend to deflectnthem from their own most highly valued personal and groupnpursuits at the same time that they divert the political associationnfrom its most important duties. They will fear thatnadopting and pursuing such projects will enlarge the authoritynand enhance the power of the political association, mightnwell make it into a threat greater than those it is meant toncombat.nIf inspired by or modeled on the gratification or affective relationshipnunderstandings, especially if informed by somencombination of the two, citizenship is likely to be an object ofnenthusiasm and affection. Those who hold citizenship arenlikely to approach its duties as well as its rights with zeal, to accordnpride of place to the activities it involves. They will looknto it for, identify it with, their most intense pleasures and enjoyments,ntheir warmest affections and strongest attachments.nAnd because there is no such thing as citizenship apart from anstate, because citizenship is an office in or of the state, these affectionsnand enthusiasms are likely to transfer to the state itself.nThe state will be magnified and energized by the affirmativenattitudes of its citizens toward it and its activities. If modelednon need and interest, citizenship may be viewed less warmly butnyet more intensely. Thinking about it may take on a certainnalmost desperate quality.nThrough much of its history, the pronounced tendency ofnthese three kinds of thinking about citizenship has been circumscribednand to some extent countered by a concomitantnview, one that goes quite easily with such thinking but that hasn(with one increasingly salient qualification) now been largelynabandoned. Those who have placed a high estimation on citizenshipnhave for the most part thought that only a small partnof the population of any society is eligible for it. Just as thosenwho place a high value on a club, vocational, or fraternal associationntypically establish selective criteria and procedures fornmembership in it, so most theorists and practitioners of citizenshipnhave reserved that status to those—usually few—humannbeings who they have judged deserving of its privilegesnand capable of discharging the demanding duties that it entails.nThis practice denied the benefits of citizenship to manynpeople. But it also meant that the energies of the latter werenless readily available to the state, were often directed againstnthe state. In a curious and perhaps unintended way, this featurenof thinking about citizenship diminished dangers implicitnin it.nIn countries in which citizenship is a meaningful conceptnand status, such selectivity and restrictiveness has for the mostnpart ended in regard to the native born of society. Countriesnsuch as the United States, while increasingly restrictive of immigration,nroutinely extend the rights and duties of citizenshipnto the great preponderance of their residents. And becausenthinking about citizenship is for the most part on the gratificationnand need and interest models, the political activitiesnand energies of this great throng are put largely to the purposenof demanding that the state provide them pleasures and meetntheir interests and needs. (The affective relationship modelnmakes its, almost always ugly, appearance primarily in thencontext of radically “we-they” thinking such as Americansnversus foreigners or “true Americans” versus those “un-American”ntypes who are but shouldn’t be of our company.)nAlthough hardly the only cause or support of the gargantuannand immensely dangerous states under the thrall of whichnwe live, these ways of thinking about citizenship have donenand continue to do their lamentable part in engendering andnsustaining state power. But they have not yielded the satisfactionsnthat were falsely promised on their behalf. As withnsubscribers who have been severely disappointed by an enterprisenassociation or fraternal order in which they have investedngreat hopes, citizens of contemporary states are disillusionednand embittered. Their demands on the state continue unabated,nand they are all too ready in their acquiescence to itsnmost barbarous domestic and foreign adventures. But theynhave little enthusiasm and diminishing aptitudes for thosendemanding modes of thought and action that citizenship requires.nThere is no sovereign remedy for this cheerless state of affairs.nA step toward ameliorating it would be to revive andnpromote the civil mode of thinking about citizenship and politicalnassociation. On this view, government and politics,nand the standing of the citizen in relation to them, are indispensablento us. They are, moreover, indispensable becausenof characteristics of human beings and their circumstancesnthat we may partly regret but that we would not want to benwithout, characteristics such as individuality and individualnwillfulness, diversity and disagreement, competition and conflict.nAbsent these qualities, human life would be lacking innthe uncertainties and challenges that are essential to zest, savor,nand a sense of accomplishment and fulfillment. Given thesenqualities, human beings need to contrive and endeavor to sustainnarrangements that support and enhance individuality,nplurality, and freedom by containing the destructive forcesnthat individuality, plurality, and freedom themselves generatenand release. Properly understood, political association andncitizenship can and occasionally have contributed to maintainingnthe always delicate balance among these desirabilities.nThey do so only when the temptations I have discussed are resisted,nonly when cives realize that citizenship, as MichaelnOakeshott has argued, “calls for so exact a focus of attentionnand so uncommon a self-restraint” that we cannot be “astonishednto find this mode of relationship to be as rare as it isnexcellent.”nnnJULY 1992/31n