Such willingness to overlook evidencencontrary to prevailing opinionnabout women in combat was just whatnthe Army was counting on. All it hadnto do was wrap the evidence in cellophanenand the press would pretend itncouldn’t see a thing. No one would letnon that the Army’s story about thenwomen being too tired to drive wasnludicrous on the surface. Any soldierntoo tired to continue his mission afternonly nine hours on duty is not much ofna soldier, or no soldier at all.nNeither would the press bother tonverify the Army’s account of the incident.nIf they had, they would havenfound that the women had not beenndriving for nine hours “under fire.”nThey had driven only in the first hournof the invasion and had spent the nextneight hours safely waiting for their nextnmission. Nor had the women voicednany concern about their ability to accomplishntheir mission until they werentold it would be dangerous, and amongnthe men at the scene there was nondoubt that the women were acting outnof fear and not fatigue.nAlso, the investigation did not findnthe women blameless. Rather, it recommendednagainst prosecution becausenof dubious legal objections. Theninvestigating officer, an Army lawyer,nreasoned that the women could not benprosecuted for failing to obey ordersnbecause the orders came from someonenoutside their chain of commandnand because the spirit of the so-calledncombat exclusion laws makes it unlawfulnto order women on a combatnmission.nThe Army’s suppression and distor-nHon of these facts constitutes a shameless,ncynical, arrogant cover-up of annevent that reflects poorly upon Armynwomen and Army policy. It was andeliberate, and quite successful, attemptnto misinform and mislead thenAmerican people.nPanama did not prove that womennshould be combat soldiers. The actionnwas too limited, too short, too safe.nCapt. Bray’s attack on the dog kennelnwas little more than “playing army”ncompared to the horrors men faced atnPork Chop Hill or Bastogne.nNeither did the invasion prove thatnwomen should not be combat soldiers,nthough it did produce evidence tonsupport that position.nPanama did prove that the Armyncannot be trusted to tell the truth aboutnwomen in the military. The politics ofnthe issue are too sensitive, the habit ofnadhering to the party line too ingrainednto permit any honest presentation ofnthe issue or the evidence. Too manynhigh-ranking Army officers don’t mindncompromising their personal integritynas long as it’s in the line of duty. Toonmany Army spokesmen don’t mindnsaying the stupidest things as long asnthey think no one will notice.nBrian Mitchell is the author of WeaknLink: The Feminization of thenAmerican Military. He is a reporternfor the Navy Times and lives innVirginia.nBUSINESSnTrading WithnGorbachevnby R. Cart KirkwoodnThe Case for ExportnControlsnIt was 1979 and the Carter administrationnwas coming to a close whennLarry Brady, the Commerce Department’sndeputy director for export administration,ntestified before the IchordnSubcommittee of the House ArmednServices panel. Run by conservativenDemocrat Richard Ichord, the subcommitteenwas trying to determine whethernthe Kama River Truck plant, which wasnbuilt with American technology, wasnnnproducing trucks and other items for thenSoviet military. The National Securitynand Defense Intelligence Agencies hadnreceived hard intelligence that Kamanwas producing military hardware, a factnthat could have grave consequences fornJimmy Carter’s accommodationist policies,nand that prompted one administrationnofficial to deny the truth tonIchord.n”Do you agree, Mr. Brady?” Ichordnasked. “No,” came Brady’s reverberatingnreply. It turned out that a representativenfrom IBM installing computernsoftware at the plant had observed Sovietnpersonnel in military uniforms pacingnKama River’s floor, clipboards in hand,njotting notes and barking orders in Russian.nKama River was not only producingntrucks that took the Red Army intonAfghanistan, but also 12-cylinder tanknengines.nThus did U.S.-Soviet trade in generalnand technology security in particularnbecome a campaign issue for GovernornRonald Reagan, who cited Brady innspeeches and promised him a job in hisnadministration. Before Brady, no one inngovernment had really focused on thenmatter, a state of affairs that would endnalmost immediately when Reagan tooknoffice. At the end of his first term, thenhigh-tech and economic security appointeesnhad so thoroughly frustratednthe Soviets and their shills in the protradenlobby that they mounted an alloutneffort to rid the administration ofnReaganesque hard-liners. They succeeded,nand by the end of Reagan’snsecond term, when the “Evil Empire”nrhetoric and his closest advisors werencanned and became little more than anbad memory for Nancy Reagan andnMichael Deaver, the plans had beennlaid for a renewed program of economicnand technological aid for the SovietnUnion that would exceed anything anyonenhad thought possible in 1980.nGeorge Bush and his advisors arengoing at it hammer and tongs with thenNATO allies and Eastern Europeans tonbring those plans to fruition. For instance,nthe administration initiated anbillion-dollar program of financial assistancento Hungary and Poland, supposedlynto assist the development of freenmarket economic systems in each country.nIncluded in the bag of goodies arenU.S. taxpayer subsidies to encouragenAmerican business investment. Democraticnlawmakers are proposing anothernMAY 1990/55n