$500 million. Another facet of the plannto “democratize” the Evil Empire isnrelaxing and even eliminating exportncontrols on technology even our DefensenDepartment hasn’t incorporatedninto the most advanced Americannweapons systems.nWhile these hastily-made policiesnare aimed primarily at Eastern Europenfor now, they will soon be applied tonthe Soviet Union, if the administration’snrhetoric and recent congressionalnhearings are any indication. The perilnis that U.S. policymakers are giving upntoo much too soon in expectation of ansea change in the adversarial relationshipnof the East and West that maynnever materialize.nAs he has often said, Mr. Bushnwants to revitalize the Soviet economynand thereby boost the fortunes ofnperestroika and glasnost. In announcingnlast year’s Maltese confabulationnwith Mikhail Gorbachev, Bush said,n”What I want to make clear to Mr.nGorbachev, is that we do want to seen[perestroika] succeed.” The thought isnthat if perestroika prospers, we cannwean Eastern Europe away from Moscownand the Warsaw Pact will beat itsnswords into plowshares, after which thenSoviet Union will become some sort ofndemocracy and desist as a militarynthreat to the United States. The scenarionis a firm article of faith in thenBush administration.nThe U.S. business community,nsniffing profits in the provinces ofnMuscovy, is foursquare behind Mr.nBush’s plan, which includes forging annew trade agreement with Moscow.nOf some twenty businessmen who testifiednbefore the House Ways andnMeans Committee on January 30 andn31, only one opposed selling the storento the Soviet bloc. Pepsico’s DonaldnKendall, Dresser Industries’ JohnnMurphy, Armco’s Kempton Jenkins,nand even a representative from annoutfit known as the Emergency Committeenfor American Trade, all testifiednin favor of dramatically curtailing U.S.nexport controls such as the Jackson-nVanik provisions that block trade becausenof Soviet emigration policies.nThey believe the U.S. should revisenthe Export Administration Act, whichnimposes national security controls onnhigh technology exports, and that thentaxpayer-subsidized Export-ImportnBank and Overseas Private Investmentn56/CHRONICLESnCorporation should subsidize thenAmerican corporate expedition behindnthe tattered Iron Curtain. The UnitednStates should also grant the SovietnUnion and its Warsaw Pact allies MostnFavored Nation status, which wouldn”normalize” trade relations by droppingnU.S. export barriers to productsnfrom the East. Finally, the SovietnUnion would be recruited for membershipnin the General Agreement onnTariffs and Trade.nAn ambitious agenda. CorporatenAmerica’s main point is that tradenrestrictions of any kind cost Americanncompanies a lot of business vis-d-visnEuropean and Japanese competitors,nwith no corresponding benefit tonAmerican national security or foreignnpolicy goals. Dresser Industries’ Washingtonnlobbyist Ardon Judd told menthat Jackson-Vanik controls on oil andngas equipment cut the U.S. share ofnsales in that market from 25 percent ofnthe world market to less than 2 percent.n”We lost billions of dollars and thousandsnof jobs in what used to be annindustry in which we had a real positionnof primacy,” Judd says. But Juddnand his colleagues believe such controlsnhurt U.S. national security as well,nbecause the U.S., having lost its leadingnmarket share of such technology,n”has no control over the sale of gas andnoil equipment.” Besides, now thatnEastern Europe has been democratized,nthey ask, what’s the point innblocking trade? A spokesman for thenAmerican Committee on U.S.-SovietnRelations, which wants to drop allnexport controls that prevent high technologynfrom flowing east, says “there’snno capability” in Czechoslovakia, Poland,nor Hungary to make war on thenWest. But even if there is such ancapability, some businessmen aren’tnworried about it.nThe Advisory Committee for TradenPolicy and Negotiations boldly suggestednin a 51 -page report to the President:n”The convergence of economic andnpolitical change in Europe is placingnnew strain on the ability of the U.S. tonunilaterally control the flow of sensitiventechnologies that could enhance Sovietnmilitary capabilities.” Confirming thisnview, a highly-placed government officialnfrankly admits that “certain equipmentnmay end up in the wrongnhands,” and that “that’s a risk we havento take” to push the East toward de­nnnmocratization.nWhatever the impact on corporatenAmerica’s bottom line, Reagan-era exportncontrols dramatically fortified U.S.nnational security. Thanks to Reagan’snSenior-Inter Agency Croup for InternationalnEconomic Policy (SIG-IEP),nwhich included officials from the nationalnsecurity community and Statenand Commerce departments, the U.S.nlead in important, militarily usefulntechnology was fortuitously enlarged.nUnder SIG-IEP’s guidance the administrationnran up a string of policynsuccesses. It impeded the flow of hightechngoods to Moscow, pushed ournallies into eliminating governmentbackedncredits to Moscow, persuadednthe Organization for Economic Cooperationnand Development to eliminatensimilar subsidies, and convinced thenInternational Energy Agency to capnSoviet natural gas imports at 1982nlevels. SIG-IEP was so effective inncontrolling policy that in June 1983nNATO issued a communique emphasizingnthe new trade-security consciousnessnof the allies, a point reiteratednat the 1983 Williamsburg EconomicnSummit. President Reagan alsonput some new teeth in the CoordinatingnCommittee for Multilateral ExportnControl (COCOM), which regulatesntrade with the communist world.nAccording to the files of one hightechnfirm, the Reagan administration’sntrade policies bore delicious fruit:n*”A major slowdown in the Soviets’nability to incorporate Western technologyninto their military systems;n*”An extension of the gap in semiconductors,nwhich had narrowed to andangerous 1-2 years in 1981 to 7-9nyears in 1988;n*”A real decline in Soviet computernoutput and in quality, widening thenWestern lead over the Soviets to 15nyears or more;n*”An inability of the Soviets tondevise technological means to answernthe Strategic Defense Initiative; ‘n*”An explicit recognition by distinguishednSoviet scientists that the Sovietsnhad little or no possibility of producingnsupercomputers like the Cray;n*”A near blockade of turnkey factoriesnin critical areas such as microcomputers,nelectronics, and advancednmaterials;n*”A significant rise in Soviet failuresnto achieve readiness and increasingn