various radical causes which Moscownsupports. This is manifest in the arguments,nechoed by Tsipis, that for the U.S.nto gain an advantage in space would bendestabilizing because the Soviets wouldnbe in an inferior position. The Sovietnthreat to America would be reduced,nclearly a good thing to the country atnlarge, but a possibility which sendsntremors of anxiety through the Left.nTsipis occasionally engages in misdirection.nAt one point, he states that thenU.S. has 900 warheads aimed at Sovietncities. In the next paragraph he describesnthe damage that a one-megaton (MT)nblast could do to a city. He not onlynexaggerates this (in his chapter onncounterforce, he downgrades the powernof nuclear blasts to argue against thenpracticality of a first strike) but gives thenimpression that the 900 warheads previouslynmentioned are in the megatonnclass. They are not The largest Minutemannwarhead is 350 kilotons (KT), thatnis 0.35 MT. Most are only 0.17 MT. Thenwarheads on the Poseidon submarinelaunchednmissiles are smaller still: 0.04nMT. The difference is significant. Toncreate an overpressure of 5 psi abovenMoscow (enough to knock down masonrynbuildings but not steel and concretenhighrises) would require six 1-MTnwarheads or 48 40-KT warheads. Not allnwarheads are the same, nor is the clichenof “one bomb, one city” accurate.nTsipis also knows more about physicsnthan he does history. He claims that innWorld War I aircraft “were used to lobnhand grenades into trenches or to strafentroops in the field, but not to dropnbombs,” He liirther claims that the firstnattack on a city was in the Spanish CivilnWar by the Nationalists. As a matter ofnfact, both Germany and France developednbomber forces before World War I.nThe Germans had a fleet of ^eppelinsnbuilt for this mission and followed withnGotha and R-bombers in 1917. All werenused against London. The French developedna separate air arm under thenSupreme Commander for use againstncities behind the battle lines. This wasnnot unexpected and there were manynbombing scares in the first days of thenwar. Technology limited the efiects ofnsuch attacks, but the attempts werenmade and the incentive to improve wasnfelt.nTsipis’s purpose is to provide thenpublicwith information with which theyncan press for a “democratic” say innmilitary policy. His aim is to take authoritynout of the hands of the experts andnplace it in the hands of people morenvulnerable to the propaganda of thenpeace movement. This is also the aim ofnFreeman Dyson. Dyson is another physicist,nbut less analytical than Tsipis in hisnpresentation. He has worked for thenDepartment of Defense and he professesncertain sympathies for “the warriors” asnindividuals, though his overriding identificationnis with “the victims” (i.e.neveryone else), a dichotomy he usesnthroughout his book. He has beennassociated with Princeton’s Coalition fornNuclear Disarmament and his views arensimilar to Tsipis in regard to counterforce,nmissile defense, and new weapons.nE>yson rejects many of the doomsdaynprophesies of the movement, arguingnthat books such as Jonathan Schell’s ThenFate of the Earth are no more scientificallynvalid than were On the Beach or Dr.nStrangelove 20 years ago. Dyson believesnthat for all life on earth to benendangered would require 10 or morennuclear wars. His fear is that once such anwar is fought, the psychological barriernwill be broken and the use of nuclearnweapons will become commonplace. Henalso acknowledges that Robert Oppenheimernand the other scientists whonopposed the H-bomb were wrong inntheir predictions that thermonuclearnweapons would constantly grow innpower. Nuclear weapons are actuallynbecoming smaller, trading accuracy fornpower and reducing collateral damage.nHowever, he does not let technicalnfactors influence his argument unlessnthey support disarmament. His treatmentnof Helen Caldicott, leader of thenantiwar Physicians for Social Responsibilitynis revealing. He admits that “Hernnnstyle is personal rather than objective.nThe substance of her argument is anecdotalnrather than analytic. She is carelessnabout technical details.” Yet, he finds hernpersuasive. “It is easy to understand hownshe has captured the hearts and minds ofnpeople around the world.” He has concludednthat “the two primary agents fornabolishing nuclear weapons must beninternational negotiations and thenaroused conscience of mankind.” Caldicott,nSchell, and even On the Beachncontribute to arousing emotions whichnsupport his own ends.nDyson’s attitude toward defense isndisquieting. “It is meaningless to countnthe lives saved” through counterforce,nmissile defense, or fallout shelters. This isnbecause nuclear war is so full of unknownsnas to become useless to thinknabout. The only way to save lives is tondisarm. He recounts a conversation henhad with Swiss civil-defense officialsnwho expressed wonder at how easy itnhad been to build shelters for the buUc ofntheir population. They wanted to knownif the data they had used for the effects ofnnuclear weapons had been understated.nHe told them that their information wasncorrect, but that he still opposed shelters.nTo him, shelters are an ethicalnproblem: “The building of public sheltersnby a government heavily armed withnnuclear missiles created an image of ancountry setting out to massacre itsnenemies while keeping its own populationnsafe firom retaliation.” He considersnthis to be a “nightmare” image. Butnsurely the image of your own countrymennunprotected and under attack is thennightmare.nDyson leans towards unilateral disarmamentnif mutual disarmament provesntoo difficult to negotiate. He seems tonbelieve that if the U.S. disarmed, thenSoviets would follow. Domestic pressurenwould build for diverting resourcesnto consumer goods production. Henthinks that the Soviet military wouldnsupport nuclear disarmament.nThe Soviet Union has on many occasionsnoverrun, annexed, or occupiedni l lnFebruary 1985n