description of the ideal that has beennchosen. Hoffman is content to inform hisnreader only that his is a liberal vision, thencharacter of which is to be inferred fromnthe vision of a good world that he subsequentlyndescribes. He simply assumesnthat the reader shares this vision, for henmakes no effort to convince those whonmight hold another that the good viewednthrough his lenses is superior to the idealsnoffered by others.nJnc suspects that Hoffman wouldnhave a great deal of difficulty attemptingnto convince others of his vision of thengood because he appears incapable ofnthe serious discussion of ideas. He isnquick to dismiss any assertions of opposingnparties in international disputes asn”ideology.” His major avoidance of thenserious discussion of conflicting ideas isnhis embrace, early in the text, of MaxnWeber’s notion of an “ethics of responsibility,”nas opposed to an “ethics ofnultimate ends.” A realist would acknowledgenthat an “ethics of responsibility” isnpossible only if the ultimate goals havenalready been chosen. One can have a notionnof “responsible” (that is, right) conductnonly after one has decided what thenproper standard of human conductnshould be in the given situation. Untilnthese standards have been chosen, ornunless one assumes universal agreementnto the most vaguely asserted “ideals,”none is still lacking an idea of the substancenunder consideration. The truenrealist realizes that discussion under suchnconditions is simply wasted air.nAlthough a caricature of Hobbes wasndismissed early in the text, Hobbes’s realnproblem resurfaces throughout thenbook. As a founder of modern liberalism,nHobbes knew that the state ofnnature was not merely a fiction that couldnbe wished away because people do notnact consistently in a vicious manner. Hisninfluence endures because he expressed,nmore eloquently than anyone before ornsince, that, however ardently politiciansnaspire to establish a good society, theirnactions will always be governed in a criticalnsense by those who seek to reducen24nChronicles of Cultttrenhuman conduct to the beastly. A truenethics of responsibility would begin bynrecognizing the vicious character of certainn”ideals” and conceding the responsibilitynof politicians to prevent theirnsociety from the pursuit of such viciousnends. For Hobbes, the worst fate thatncould befall man was the violent deathnthat was a constant threat in the state ofnnature. The responsibility to protect thenmere existence of life thus became thenprimary task of the Leviathan. GivennHoffman’s recurrent assertions of thenimportance of preventing violence andnpursuing peaceful change, one can onlynconclude that he does not understandnthe extent to which he remains undernHobbes’s influence.nIhe leaders of the Soviet Union rejectnthe Hobbesian view, believing that flieynhave a historical responsibility to establishna socialist international order consistentnwith the principles of dialecticalnmaterialism. For them, life has valuenonly as long as it promotes this “ideal.”nThe role of the gulag in the Soviet Unionnand the sequence of events demonstratingnthe desire of the Soviets to impose ansocialist order on other societies aroundnthe globe indicate the seriousness withnwhich they pursue their vision. The Americannfounders also rejected the Hob­nIn the Mailnbesian view. Although they recognizednthat the preservation of life is a preconditionnto any other achievements in thisnworld, the signers of the Declaration ofnIndepencence would have sacrificedntheir lives, fortunes and sacred honor tonpreserve their status as a free people. Fornthem, and for the system of governmentnthat they instituted, one cannot achievenhappiness as a slave.nBy rejecting an “ethic of ultimatenends” and eschewing the responsibilitynto decide whether either of these alternativenethical visions is preferable, Hoffmannmaintains his links with the relativismnthat now reigns in the American academy.nHis inability to choose, on principledngrounds, between the vision of thenAmerican founders and the vision of thenSoviet leaders reflects the paralysis resultingnfrom that relativism. As an intellecmalnleader among current teachers of internationalnpolitics, Hoffman is an architectnof the strategy of capitulation thatnis a logical result of this intellectualnparalysis. That paralysis is unlikely to bencured until our intellectual elite developsna capacity to discuss differences betweenndisparate sets of ideas in a more seriousnmanner. If nothing else, Hobbes’s influencenwill outiast Hoffman’s becausenhe painted a more accurate picture of thenresults ofsuchintellectual evasions. CHnScience and the Quest for Meaning by Donald M. MacKay; Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.;nGrand Rapids, Michigan. MacKay argues that there is little reason for a dichotomy betweennscience and faith in two lively lectures.nChristianity & Civilization edited by James B.Jordan; Geneva Divinity School; Tyler, Texas. Thisncollection of essays is subtitled “The Failure of the American Baptist Culture,” a topic that isnthoroughly examined.n”The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union” by Vladimii Bukovsky; The Orwell Press; NewnYork. Bukovsky shows how Lenin’s statement, “As an ultimate objective peace simply meansnCommunist world control,” is being manifested in the world.nTax-Based Incomes Policies: A Cure for Inflation? by Jack Carr, William Scarth and RobertnSchuettinger; the Fraser Institute; Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. An insightfulnanalysis of the causes and cures of inflation written in nontechnical language.nFour American Indian Literary Masters by Alan R. Velie; University of Oklahoma Press; Norman,nOklahoma. An introduction to four outstanding contemporary Indian writers—N.nScott Momaday, James Welch, Leslie Marmon Silko and Gerald Vizenor.nnn