ing Terrorism in Southern Africa. The ANC’s murder ofnthe chief witness on the SACP at the Denton hearings,nBartholomew Hlapane (in Soweto, a few months after hentestified), was also ignored by the press in the United States,nexcept for The Washington Times.nThe suppression of evidence about the ANC, SWAPO,nand the SACP, and the disregard of reforms, are connected.nThe denial of change makes it possible to ignore the strategynthat wanted to stop such changes in order to show thatnviolent revolution was the way out.nThe more things moved in South Africa and South WestnAfrica, the more the violence and international campaignnincreased, as Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the Chief Minister ofnKwaZulu, best understood. In a classic letter to ReverendnLeon Sullivan in May 1987 he wrote: “Those who wantnvictories by violence fear democratic developments, andnthey will scream and protest the loudest on the very eve ofnvictory through negotiation.”nSteve Biko had perceived ten years earlier the readiness tonchange that Buthelezi knows the violence dreads. Biko hadncalled the atmosphere in Vorster’s South Africa “vibrantnwith change”: “What I mean here is that both sides — that isnnow Black and White — see the need for a solution in ansense. Both sides reject the present situation.”nBiko had been against violence, demonstrations, andnconfrontations, and for negotiations, because he knewnAfricans had to take responsibility for themselves before theyncould take change. Like Buthelezi, he knew the servility ofndemonstrations, an idea that is all but incomprehensible tonthe West today. Biko also knew change could only comenthrough the government, not by destroying it. That is notnonly common sense, but testimony to the Africans’ respectnfor authority, which makes it possible for them to distinguishn20/CHRONICLESnnnbetween defiance and violence. This is evident in the wordsnof most of the Denton witnesses, especially those ofnDelphine Nokonono Kave:nI felt really betrayed [when she learned the ANCncollaborated with the PLO and other terrorists], andnI felt I did not want to be a part of what I did notnbelieve in . . . And I later found that in workingntogether with the PLO and other southern Africannopposition parties that we are — you know, wenare — undermining the stabilizing electedngovernments in southern Africa, not only, younknow, in southern Africa, but northern Africa, andnin the independent countries, and I realized I didnnot want to be a part of international terrorism, andncommunism.nBy “opposition parties” Kave meant terrorist organizations.nWith the exception of Hlapane, who gave crucialntestimony about the SACP in the 50’s, the timenNelson Mandela and an Afrikaner of prominent family,nAbraham Fischer, devised the strategy the SACP and thenANC still follow, most of the youths before the DentonnCommittee testified about South Africa and South WestnAfrica after the upheaval in Soweto in 1976 that led tonsporadic defiance and violence throughout South Africa fornmore than a year.nBefore 1976, the SACP and the ANC had assumed therenwould not be much spontaneous defiance within SouthnAfrica, only the parody of it. Fischer made this clear innremarks to the underground SACP’s Central Committee inn1963: “The main attack on South Africa will come from thenoutside. But it is essential that a strong local movementn