that Hillary would not have to divulgenthe names and clients she representednbefore state agencies.” There is, however,none name Ms. Oakley passes overnlightly but that I predict will becomenbetter known in the months ahead: DannLasater. His involvements with the Clintonsnin the Arkansas years have yet tonunfold. And when they do . . .nArnold Beichman, a research fellow at thenHoover Institution, is a columnist for thenWashington Times and the author ofnAnti-American Myths: Their Causesnand Consequences.nAll Post-KeynesiansnNownby fames f. NovaknJohn Maynard Keynes, Economistnas Savior: 1920-1937nby Robert Skidelskynhlew York: Penguin;n768 pp., $34.95nFor connoisseurs of biography, RobertnSkidelsky’s projected three-volumenwork, John Maynard Keynes, will ranknwith the best of the genre. The first volumenappeared over a decade ago undernthe subtitle Hopes Betrayed. The secondnvolume, under review here, surpasses thenfirst. The third is not yet finished.nLike its predecessor, volume two is anmasterpiece of narrative, providing superbnanalysis of Keynes’ life and timesnand economic theory. Readers will learnnof Keynes’ contribution to both the artsnand the Bloomsbury Group. And whilenSkidelsky’s prose style is lucid enoughnnot to discourage nonspecialists, seriousnstudents of economies will find themselvesnriveted to his description of thentheoretical aspects of one of the mostnfertile and turbulent eras in economicnthought.nFor many today, it is difficult to reconstructnthe deep ideological struggle thatnerupted during the Great Depression,nwhen the already high unemploymentnthat haunted Europe in the difficult periodnof adjustment following World WarnI exploded into mass unemployment,nand when international trade, the enginenof growth and employment, broke down,nseparating nations into self-containednunits. As radical predictions by nationalnand international socialists seemed tonhave been realized, fascist and communistnmovements were catapulted to thencutting edge of history. Ordinary democracynand capitalism were not only in disrepute,nbut the theories of Burke andnAdam Smith were treated as outdatednwindow dressing for sinister interests. Innthis milieu, Keynes’ work helped bringnback sanity by grasping the immediate issuesnand trying to turn the tide.nBefore touching briefly on Keynes’neconomic contribution, I must point outnthat Skidelsky has unearthed informa-n,tion regarding Keynes’ life and beliefsnthat is sure to surprise even those alreadynknowledgeable about the man. For example,nI was surprised to learn that thengreat economist read and respectednEdmund Burke, and that he not onlynwas impressed with T.S. Eliot but wasnsympathetic to the poet’s conversion tonChristianity, a step Keynes refused tontake. Similarly, so great was Keynes’ reverencenfor the English way of life that henappreciated the dangers of communismnwhen it penetrated the Apostles Societynat Cambridge—the society that producednPhilby, Blunt, Burgess, and LeonLong—to which Keynes belonged andnfor which he had great loyalty. Skidelskyntells us that Keynes, who had several homosexualnliaisons, ended this part of hisnlife when he married Lydia Lopokova, anRussian ballerina and actress, and thatnthe economist was an inveterate and successfulntrader in stocks and bonds, bothnon his own behalf and on that of hisnCambridge college. Thus, Skidelskynportrays a side of Keynes that, despite hisnoften rakish ways, represents the best ofnEnglish life.nAs for Keynes, the economist, he notnonly exhibited his talents early on butntook pains from the outset to be somethingnof an iconoclast. This was no smallnmatter, since he held positions in thenTreasury during World War I and later atnVersailles, positions which gave him invaluableninsights into the inner workingsnof policymaking. An able polemicist andnpublicist, he was also capable of describingncomplex issues with great ease andnforcefulness, as in his Economic Consequencesnof the Peace, a tour de force ofniconoclasm, astute analysis, and polemicalnthrust. Political elites distrusted himnfor that iconoclasm, literary circles for hisnstinging prose, and economists for beingnnnwhat we now would call a cranky policynwonk. Fortunately for Keynes, he wasnright enough of the time never to lose hisncredibility. In 1926, he opposed a returnnto the Gold Standard, which was toonhigh to be maintained. It collapsed innI93I.nHis best work. Treatise on Money,nfailed to change the world, a feat thatnwas accomplished by his second book,nthe General Theory of Employment, Interest,nand Money, which no one considersnhis best. And while, as Skidelsky pointsnout, almost none of the General Theory’snconcepts is applied by economists today,nhistorians of international trade theoryncan look back at the Treatise on Money asna milestone along the road to floatingnexchange rates, hideed, Milton Friedmannonce told me that floating currencynexchange rates “solved the problemnKeynes could not solve.” Skidelsky explainsnwhy Keynes could not devise a systemnof employment generation: hencould/not foresee floating rates which allowngovernments to choose betweennkeeping a present rate or inflating thencurrency and accepting lower exchangenrates (a choice made more or less consciouslynby the Reagan administration,nwhich allowed the dollar to float downwardnduring the 1980’s as it inflated thencurrency). For in Keynes’ time, fixedncurrency exchange rates were essential—nas they were until late in the Nixon-Fordnyears and again during the Reagan era.nBut it was the General Theorynthat shook the world in its day and fornwhich Keynes is famous. The book’snmost enduring contribution, Skidelskynwrites, was the shift in focus from theneconomics of the firm, now called “microeconomics,”nto an analysis of the nationalneconomy as a whole, or “macroeconomics.”nIt was this macro look at thennational economy that most peoplenunder age 70 but over 40 had to study innthe multitudinous versions of PaulnSamuel’s textbook, that dominated discussionsnin the 1950’s and 1960’s andnthat informed the econometricians andnwhiz kids of the President’s Council ofnEconomic Advisers. So entrenched wereneconomic models based on this view thatnin the halcyon days of the “end of ideology”nin the 1960’s a great economistnwrote that there was not much more tonlearn in economics except how to manipulatenthe various numbers in thenmodels. That Keynesian doctrine heldnAmerica enthralled until the late 1970’s,nlasted well into the 80’s in Thatcher’snMARCH 1995/35n