duct is a secondary yet significant themernrunning throughout his book. Bell emphasizesrnagain and again that silencernequals guilt. As the hero of one of hisrncase studies, an anthropologist who lostrnhis NSF grant because of the rumors hisrnrivals on the peer review panel circulatedrnabout him, reasons: “Ultimately… everyrnscientist that individually and collectivelyrnfails to confront abuses and wrongdoingrnin the system is contributing torncorruption in the system.” Bell alsornchampions the victimized whistleblowersrnin these cases, who are often denouncedrnand even investigated themselves forrnbringing unfavorable attention to (andrnthus threatening the power of) universitiesrnand funding agencies. MargotrnO’Toole (who could not find work afterrnshe exposed the Baltimore scandal), Dr.rnErdem Cantekin (whose superiorsrnmoved his office, erased data from hisrnhard drive, and tried to revoke his tenurernwhen he challenged a colleague’s endorsementrnof amoxicillin), and ErnestrnFitzgerald (who was fired by PresidentrnNixon from his job as an Air Force costrnanalyst for exposing the deficiencies ofrnthe C-5ATransport) illustrate that fraudrnfrequently pays while whistleblowingrndoes not.rnBy combining breadth (in the varietyrnof cases he examines) and depth (in hisrnanalysis of each case). Bell provides anrnexcellent overview—for the scientist andrnthe lavpcrson alike—of the causes andrnconsequences of scientific misconduct.rnI le thoroughh’ surveys the available evidencern—court cases, government investigationsrnand reports, testimony givenrnunder oath before congressional committees,rndocuments requested throughrnthe Freedom of Information Act, andrnpersonal interviews, as well as the morernusual newspaper and journal articles,rnbooks, and radio transcripts. His tonernmay be too alarmist for some, but hisrnwork nevertheless raises critical questionsrnabout the practices and ethics of the scientificrncommunity.rnOne of these questions is “Where DornWe Go From Here?”—the title of Bell’srnconcluding chapter. While Bell couldrnhac said more on the subject, he doesrnaddress himself to three potential solutions.rnSelf-regulation and bureaucraticrnoversight are obviously inefficient (thernnumber and names of the committees,rnreports, and agencies that he citesrnthroughout his book are enough to strikernhorror in the heart of any decentralist).rnBell therefore proposes: one, separatingrnfunding and control in scientific research;rntwo, requiring universities thatrnreceive federal research money to preventrnor at least publicize conflicts of interest;rnand three, refining the FederalrnFalse Claims Act, which allows one tornsue an individual or organization thatrnhas defrauded the government, to furtherrnprotect the whistleblower from retaliation.rnHe hopes that these remediesrnwill force scientists “to live up to thernstrictures of the scientific method.” Yetrnhe neglects to mention perhaps the mostrnessential ingredient to any plan to reformrnscience: vigilant media coverage ofrnthe type of shenanigans Impure Sciencerndescribes. For if misconduct is as rampantrnin the scientific community as Bellrnsuggests, something more than a handfulrnof new regulations is needed to shake uprnits patronage system. Indeed, the futurernof science may depend on similar exposes.rnChristine Haynes is the editorialrnassistant at Chronicles.rnInescapablernHorizonsrnby Mark C. HeniiernThe Ethics of Authenticityrnby Charles TaylorrnCambridge: Harvard University Press;rn142 pp., $17.95rnWeighing in at more than 500rndense and provocative pages,rnCharles Taylor’s Sources of the Se/f (Harvard,rn1989) was clearly not intended forrnthe general reader; at just over 100 pages.rnThe Ethics of Authenticity is much morernaccessible. While not a fully “polished”rnwork, this slim volume is so full of valuablerninsights I am tempted to say thatrnreading it is a moral duty for contemporaryrnAmericans.rnA practicing Roman Catholic, Taylorrnuntil recently taught political philosophyrnat Oxford and was perhaps bestrnknown for his writings on Hegel. Politicallyrnhe is a man of the left who has runrnfor Parliament in his native Canada as arncandidate for the New Democrats, onrneconomic issues significantly more radicalrnthan the American Democratic Party.rnStill, there are many points of contactrnbetween his thought and traditional conservativernconcerns; more than anyonernelse, conservatives should profit from anrnengagement with the ideas of this remarkablernthinker.rnTaylor begins by describing “threernmalaises” of modernity. First, the “modernrnfreedom” won at the expense ofrn”older moral horizons” and social hierarchiesrnhas led us to a disenchanted “individualism”rncharacterized by a “centeringrnon the self, which both flattens andrnnarrows our lives, making them poorer inrnmeaning, and less concerned with others.”rnSecond, the “primacy of instrumentalrnreason,” with no evaluative criteriarnbeyond “maximum efficiency,” hasrnproduced a technological civilizationrnwhile destroying the language of moralrnends, reducing human relations to thernlevel of a commodity to be bought andrnsold, and generating a fear of impermanencyrnin the face of revolutionary technologicalrndevelopments. From these twornpredicaments, a third, essentially political,rnmalaise (foreseen by Tocqueville)rnfollows: the loss of genuine freedom tornthe “soft despotism” of a bureaucraticrnstate, as the liberated individual findsrnhimself unable to maintain an identityrnagainst the grain of prevailing opinionsrnand social forces.rnTaylor’s concerns are familiar to readersrnof Richard Weaver, Allan Bloom, andrnAlasdair Maclntyre. But Taylor poses arnchallenge that should startle us into reflection.rnFocusing on the problem ofrnmoral freedom, he believes that conservativerncritics are right to condemn thern”trivialized and self-indulgent forms” ofrnthe “individualism of self-fulfillment”rnthat are now so prevalent. He also believes,rnhowever, that these manifestationsrnare not simply a matter of “moralrnlaxity,” which, as such, is a constant inrnhuman experience; rather, because theyrnarise from the pursuit of a genuinern”moral ideal,” they are the historicallyrnnovel expressions of the specifically modernrnnotion of “authenticity.”rnThus, Taylor observes, many peoplerntoday feel compelled to “sacrifice theirrnlove relationships and the care of theirrnchildren to pursue their careers,” in orderrnto be true to themselves. This situationrnpresents a new challenge for moralists.rnThough Taylor believes that suchrnchoices are most often made in error,rnsimply to condemn those who so choosernis, he argues, ultimately a futile response.rnSEPTEMBER 1993/33rnrnrn