its realities at first hand . . . . [II]ov yourncan inflict damage on complexity, ambiguity,rnand irony, is not clear to me or,rnI suggest, to anyone who prefers plainrnEnglish to jargon. Obviously the warrninfluenced people’s thinking permanently,rnhut to call such shaping of thernmind ‘lasting damage’ is fatuous. Onernmight as well say that forty years ofrncomparative peace have inflicted ‘lastingrndamage’ on modern intelligence, andrnadduce modern theories about thern194()s as proof.”rnThe war has certainly not inflictedrnany lasting loss of irony on tVaser’s sliarprnmind. He muses on how he, thoughrntoo young to vote himself, sympathizedrnwith his colleagues who were conspiratorsrnagainst the greatest statesman ofrnour time—growling, jowly Winston. Inrnhis case, it was because the Labour candidaternfor his home constituency was arnpatient of his father, a Scots physician;rnhe also genuineh sympathized withrnhis fellow soldiers who wanted a GreatrnBritain that guaranteed them freedomrnfrom the terrible insecurity of the Depression,rnThey got that, but lost muchrnmore. The Britain, Fraser laments,rnthe’ see in their old age is hardlyrnthe “land fit for heroes” that theyrnenvisaged. . . . They did not fightrnfor a Britain which would be dishonestlyrnrailroaded into P’airopernagainst the people’s will; they didrnnot fight for a Britain where suceessiverngovernments, by theirrnweakness and folly, would encouragerncrime and violence on anrnunprecedented scale; they did notrnfight for a Britain where thugsrnand psychopaths could murderrnand maim and torture and ne’crrnhave a finger laid on them for it;rnthey did not fight for a Britainrnwhose leaders would be too cowardlyrnto declare war on terrorismrn. . . they did not fight for a Britainrnwhere children could be snatchedrnaway from their homes and parentsrnby night on nothing morernthan the good old Inquisitionrnprinciple of secret information;rnthey did not fight for a Britainrnwhose churches and schoolsrnwould be undermined by fashionablernreformers; they did not fightrnfor a Britain where choice couldrnbe anathematized as “discrimination”;rnthey did not fight for arnBritain where to hold by truthsrnand N’alues vyhich have beenrnthought good and worthy for arnthousand years would be to runrnthe risk of being called “fascist”—rnthat, really, is the greatest andrnmost pitiful irony of all.rnNo, it is not what they foughtrnfor—but being realists they acceptrnwhat they cannot alter, andrnreserve their protests for the noisernpollution of modern music inrntheir pubs.rnThe truth today is, unfortunately, everywherernan object of reeducation. But ifrnyou get a chance to hop across thernpond, do pick up a copy of George Mac-rnDonald Eraser’s book and restore yourrnsense of belonging to a brotherhood ofrnmen who fight and endure for causesrnthat, whether they end in victory or defeat,rnare, alas, always betrayed by poyyerfulrnmen who don’t keep the faith. Nilrndesperandum.rnH.W. Crocker III is at work on the greatrntrans-Atlantic novel.rnLet Them Eat Briernby William R. HawkinsrnThe Highest Stakes: The EconomicrnFoundations of the NextrnSecurity Systemrnby Wayne Sandholtz, Michael Borrus,rnJohn Zysman, Ken Conca, jay Stowsky,rnSteven Vogel, and Steve WeberrnNew York: Oxford University Press;rn272 pp., $29.95rnThe Berkeley Roundtable on the InternationalrnEconomy (BRIE) hasrnbeen in the forefront in de’ising thernnew paradigm of strategic trade andrnindustrial policy. This set of essays byrnBRIE members articulates the group’srnview of how the major national economiesrngrow, innovate, and compete withrnone another and examines the ‘ariousrnalternative world orders that couldrnemerge from the struggle for wealth andrnthe dominance of markets. The interestsrnof national communities will continuernto clash, the contributors believe.rnIndeed, the wodd, they argue, is seeingrna resurgence of nationalist passion: peoplernthe world over are striving to controlrntheir particular collective destinies.rnWe are entering “an era in which ‘securityrnthreat’ no longer refers just to tanksrnand missiles but also to the control ofrnmarkets, investment and technology; anrnera that recycles old security vocabularyrnto fit new issues: market share, protectionism,rnrelative gains from trade.”rnThat a strong economy is the ultimaternbasis of national power is an ancientrnand universal concept that hasrnbeen forgotten of late in the UnitedrnStates, leftists having assumed that oncerncapitalism had created the means ofrnproduction, bureaucrats could simplyrntake over the humming machinery,rnmanaging distribution and assuring universalrnpeace. On the right, many observersrnhave fallen prey to the classicalrnliberal view that economics should bernseparated from politics, an argumentrnadopted to counter the leftist programrnwithout due regard to its origins orrnbroader implications: classical liberalsrnconcocted the notion of an autonomousrneconomy simply to deny the power ofrnindustry to ambitious statesmen. As thernarch-liberal Richard Cobden stated inrn1842, “It would be well to engraft ourrnfree trade agitation upon the peacernmovement. They are one and thernsame.” Laissez-faire was considered tornbe the economic equivalent of disarmament,rnand it is refuted by the samernlogic.rnAt the core of both socialist and classicalrnliberal thought is the assumptionrnthat production can take care of itself.rnMost economic models treat technologyrnas an exogenous variable which appearsrnrandomly and to which the system automaticalK’rnadapts. Yet production is notrneasy, nor rapid progress assured. Exeryrneffort, including advantageous publicrnpolicy, must be made in behalf of nationalrnimprovement.rnBRIE sees a serious weakening of thernUnited States within the ranks of thernadvanced capitalist powers: “[IInternationalrnmarkets for technology, manufacture,rnand finance no longer unquestioninglyrnsupport U.S. industrial leadership.”rnThey reject both the “overstretch”rnand “catch-up” explanations.rnAmerica’s foreign commitments did notrnovertax the economy when they werernmade in the early decades of the ColdrnWar. Rather, a sluggish economy hasrnin recent years fallen out from underrnthese commitments.rnThe fatalistic iew holds that a rela-rnMAY 1993/41rnrnrn