32 / CHRONICLESnin the merchant marine increased,nthough, and the non-Slavic nationalitiesndefected in greater numbers thannbefore.nThe KGB list ends in 1969, butnKrasnov has searched available sourcesnto give us an accurate picture of defectorsnsince then. In the 1970’s, 300,000nSoviets, mosdy Jews, immigrated legally.nThis wave of immigration, tied tondetente, the pressure of dissidents, andnWestern publicity, ended in 1979.nNonetheless, Krasnov lists 230 defectorsnwho have come out of the cold sincen1969—a rate of defection higher thannthe pre-1969 era. In 1984 alone therenwere 25 documentable cases.nDefectors in this post-1969 era tendnto be better educated than before, reflectingnthe increased travel opportunitiesnin scientific, academic, cultural,nand sport exchanges. More womennhave made it out in recent years, butnmales still escape much more frequently.nDeath sentences are listed for almostnhalf of the defectors on the pre-1969nlist, but professionals and intelligencenspecialists are usually shown morenclemency. Apparently Soviet leadersnconsider at least some defectors to benmore valuable alive than dead.nOn the pre-1969 KGB list, about onenin 20 of the defectors worked for thenKGB or GRU. Some defectors are listednas cooperating with “foreign” intelligencenservices after defection, but Krasnovnestimates that no more than 10npercent of the defectors have had annexperience in spying prior to defection.nHe knows of only one case out of 700nwhere a defector—Ivan Rogalsky—hasnbeen proved to be a spy. As the case ofnYuri Yurchenko showed, the defectornas Soviet spy makes good newspaperncopy, but such eases are rare. ThenSoviets do all they can to make defectorsnappear to be criminals, but thenKGB charged almost none of the pre-n1969 defectors with crimes other thanndefection.nKrasnov’s chapter on “Defection andnDetente” records numerous examplesnof defectors who never made it due tonpoor response on the part of the Immigrationnand Naturalization Service andnthe State Department. The ease ofnSimas Kudirka, the Lithuanian shipjumpernwho was beaten in 1970 by thenSoviets on a U.S. Coast Guard ship innU.S. territorial waters and returned’tonthe Soviet ship, was a tragedy thatnshould never have been repeated. Batneven after the establishment of newgovernmentnmechanisms and proceduresnto deal with such cases, Americannofficials shll sadlv mishandled MiroslavnMedved when he recently tried to jumpnship in the Mississippi River. Krasnovnfears that such woeful lapses in judgmentnwill continue until we see Sovietnauthorities as the thugs they are.nKrasnov wishes to alert the U.S. andnother Western countries to the ways innwhich they might better plan for, takencare of, and learn from defectors. Henbelieves defectors should go public rathernthan seek a secret identity and startnfrom scratch. The publicity, he believes,nmight protect them, and theirnprofessional background also mightnprove to be an asset rather than somethingnto be hidden. Lacking family,nfriends, companionship, employment,nand a knowledge of our system, is it anynwonder that some defectors might thinknof returning to the Soviet Union? ThenU.S. interest is served by allocatingnmore resources to assist defectors oncenthey are here so they can contributentheir talents and skills in their professions.nDefectors who have not gone undergroundncould also do much to correctnAmerican misperceptions of the SovietnUnion. Their reports, along with somenof the information in Conquest’s booknon the Soviet secret police, might benmore useful than reading any numbernof peace proposals.nMichael Warder is director of publicnaffairs for The Rockford Institute.nMadman in thenDocknby Christopher MuldornCrime and Madness: The Origins andnEvolution of the Insanity Defense bynThomas Maeder, New York: Harpern& Row.nWhen John Hinckley was acquitted inn1982 for his attempted assassination ofnthe President, the verdict galvanizednopposition to the insanity defense.nSome lawmakers wanted to restrict thenuse of the defense or even abolish itnaltogether. In Crime and MadnessnThomas Maeder places the insanityndefense and the recent challenges to itnin historical perspective. Outrage overnthe Hinckley verdict, along with alarmnover rising crime rates, inclined manynto view the widespread use of the insanityndefense as merely another manifestationnof modern “soft” criminal justice.nBut Maeder argues that such anview is erroneous. For one thing, thennumber of defendants successfullynnnusmg the insanitv defense is small.nMore importantly, Maeder traces theninsanity defense, in various forms, backnto ancient times.nAs Maeder makes clear, the insanityndefense exists because crimes committednon account of madness cannot bentreated in the same manner as otherncrimes. The law can dispense equalnjustice to all only by hypothesizing an”reasonable man” who is responsiblenfor his actions. This hypothesis is plausiblenenough with most individuals,ndespite inevitable differences in intelligence,ntemperament, and other factors.nBut what of those properly classed asninsane? Their mental disturbances andndelusions set them apart from the overwhelmingnmass of humanity and makenthem more deserving of sympathy (andntreatment, if it is feasible) than punishment.nMaeder traces the evolution of insanitynlaw from the fragmentary evidencenof early cases through the more substantialnrecords of the English trials of then18th and early 19th centuries up to thenpresent day. The seminal case for modernnAnglo-American jurisprudence wasnthat of Daniel McNaughton; the resultingnMcNaughton Rule would in timenbecome the law throughout the BritishnEmpire and in nearly every Americannstate. Briefly stated, the VleNaughtonnRule established a strictly “cognitive”nview of madness: an individual could benfound insane only if, because of mentalndisease, he could not understand thennature of his act or recognize that it wasnwrong.nIn recent decades, the insanity defensenhas come under attack from twondifferent groups. Opponents of the insanityndefense have claimed that it isntoo readily available to defendants andnthat it should be used only by thosendefendants whose mental disease is utterlynbeyond dispute. Among supportersnof the insanity defense, on the othernhand, many have complained that thenMcNaughton Rule is anachronistic andnunhelpful, since it does not do justice tonthe noncognitive aspects of mental illness.nMaeder sees some merits on bothnsides of the issue but argues that thencomplexity of madness and crime precludesnany extreme ideological solution.nThe insanity defense can be abused,nbut occasional abuses should notnmean a universal ban. Because thenrelease of mentally ill defendants cannconstitute a serious hazard to society,nMaeder suggests ways to reduce thenrisks. He recognizes the limitations ofnthe cognitive McNaughton Rule butnpoints out that attempts to broaden then