tomers with much more on deposit thanrnthe FDIC limit of $100,000 had theirrnmoney wired to them in a few moments.rnTo stop the run, the Reagan administrationrnnationalized ContinentalrnIllinois, backing $100 million depositorsrnwith $10,000 taxpayers. Today, the bankrnis 80 percent owned by the ResolutionrnTrust Corporation, one of thousands ofrnsocialist enterprises bequeathed to us byrnReagan.rnReagan’s deregulation also made possiblernthe activities of Charles H. KeatingrnJr., antipornography crusader, owner ofrnsome of our finest politicians, and headrnof Lincoln Savings and Loan. Keatingrnpurchased his S&L with Michael Milkenrnjunk bonds in 1984 and used it for funnelingrnfederally insured deposits intornrisky securities and real estate. “1 thinkrnwe’ve hit the jackpot,” a happy Reaganrnhad said as he signed the deregulationrnlegislation. And many did, at a cost ofrnmore than $500 billion to the taxpayer.rnDeregulation is an economic imperativernin real industries, but not when it freesrnfinancial cowboys to roll the dice at taxpayerrnexpense.rnIn addition to costing Americans $1rnbillion in insured losses, Keating alsornsold $200 million in uninsured Lincolnrnbonds to what a confidential salesrnmemo described as their top prospects:rn”the meek, the weak, and the ignorant.”rn”Keating had said he would sell thernbonds to Mother Teresa,” writes Grant,rn”although that was apparently not whatrnthe memo was driving at.” The day beforernKeating was indicted for fraud, 79-rnyear-old Martin Fowler bought $14,000rnworth of the even-then worthless bonds.rnAccording to the Los Angeles Times, hernplanned to use the income to help carernfor his 40-year-old daughter who hasrnDown’s Syndrome.rnThe debt boom of the 1980’s is over,rnalthough we are only beginning to seernits consequences. But as Grant shows,rnthe speculative frenzy didn’t just happen.rnIt was the result of a long processrnof the centralization of money andrnbanking, the democratization of credit,rnand the socialization of risk. The WallrnStreet Journal denounces these views asrn”Victorian finance,” but isn’t that exactlyrnwhat we need in such a financiallyrnpromiscuous time? And who but arnmoney crank or a Keynesian could agreernwith Andrew Stuttaford in NationalrnReview that Grant is to be faulted forrnopposing “expansion of credit” andrn”government assistance,” which havernmade us “immeasurably richer”? Actually,rnthey have made most of us poorerrnand much less free.rnThis is the most entertaining book ofrnits kind. More than that, it is brilliant—rnand brilliantly written—history. Worthrna Pulitzer but too right-wing to get it.rnMoney of the Mind shows not only whyrnwe’re in trouble, but why four thousandrnpeople pay $450 a year for James Grant’srncommentary. He’s a national treasure.rnLlewellyn H. Rockwell, jr., is presidentrnof the Ludwig von Mises Institute inrnAuburn, Alabama.rnThe NewrnImperialismrnby William R. HawkinsrnDispelling the Myth of Globalization:rnThe Case for Regionalizationrnby Hazel j . JohnsonrnNew York: Praeger; 176 pp., $42.95rnThe terms “global economy” andrn”New Wodd Order” have becomernpart of the common litany that framesrnforeign policy discussions. Though thernsecond term is often used in a mockingrnor ironic tone, the first has attained thernstatus of a paradigm. Yet Hazel J. Johnson,rna professor of finance at the Universityrnof Louisville, does not believe it isrnan accurate description of world trends.rnInstead of a “one world” Utopia whererngoods and money flow without regardrnto national boundaries or politics, Johnsonrnfinds only pockets of growth organizedrnaround strong nation-states: arnpattern of regional empires rather thanrnuniversal harmony. The “Old WorldrnOrder” persists, and in this slim but data-rnfilled monograph she looks at eachrnmajor geographical region in turn. Shernfinds—not surprisingly—very large disparities;rnwhat is surprising in the currentrnatmosphere is her frank discussion ofrnwhat lies behind these differences.rnAsia warrants the most attention.rnJapan greatly increased its share of thernworld’s wealth in the 1980’s, largely atrnthe expense of the United States.rn”Japanese economic behavior fails onrnevery front to qualify as ‘global’. . . Therncountry is strongly nationalistic with unmistakablerntendencies towards imperialism,”rnwrites Johnson. “The Japanesernare truly intent on building a new empire,rnbased in Asia, with affiliated officesrnaround the world.”rnJapan’s trade surpluses with the UnitedrnStates have given Tokyo enormousrnfinancial reserves, which are being convertedrninto ownership of productive assetsrnand raw materials. Japan prefers tornown its sources of imports, and Japanesernfirms are investing in energy development,rnmining, agriculture, and basicrnmanufacturing throughout Asia. Productionrnis aimed at American and Europeanrnmarkets, while Asian resourcesrnare meant to substitute for more distantrnsupplies. The strategic and highly valuablernelements of industry, however, arernkept in Japan—along with authority overrnthem.rnAmerica’s pullback from Asia opensrnnew opportunities for Tokyo. The cheaprnlabor and natural resources of the Philippines,rnfor example, are attractive. Johnsonrnbelieves that South Korea, despiternits economic success, will not be able tornfinance reunification with North Korearnwithout external help. If the UnitedrnStates is unable to fill this role, Japanrnwill be Seoul’s only option. She predictsrn”Japan will extract economic concessionsrnfrom Korea the likes of whichrnhave not been seen since the peninsularnwas invaded at the turn of the century.”rnIn the nascent Japanese empire, “thernprimary functions that the United Statesrnappears best suited for are basic manufacturingrnand expanding the sphere ofrnJapanese farm and other land ownership.”rnJapanese investments in the UnitedrnStates, as elsewhere, serve to expandrnJapan’s own network. “Japanese manufacturingrnoperations in the United Statesrnchannel output through Japanese wholesalerntrading companies with transactionsrnfinanced by Japanese banks.” The multiplierrneffects of these investments arerncaptured primarily by Japanese firms atrnthe expense of their American competitors.rnThus every new job “created” in arnJapanese-owned factory in the UnitedrnStates costs the American economy twornjobs in other sectors. Johnson does notrnhold out much hope for America to negotiaternbetter arrangements with Japan.rnAny concessions the Japanese are preparedrnto make, they are saving for negotiationsrnwith a united Europe whosernmercantilist tradition makes it a muchrn38/CHRONICLESrnrnrn